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We investigate partial functions and computability theory fromwithin a constructive, univalent
type theory. The focus is on placing computability into a larger mathematical context, rather
than on a complete development of computability theory. We begin with a treatment of partial
functions, using the notion of dominance, which is used in synthetic domain theory to discuss
classes of partial maps. We relate this and other ideas from synthetic domain theory to other
approaches to partiality in type theory. We show that the notion of dominance is difficult to
apply in our setting: the set of Σ10 propositions investigated by Rosolini form a dominance
precisely if a weak, but nevertheless unprovable, choice principle holds. To get around this
problem, we suggest an alternative notion of partial function we call disciplined maps. In the
presence of countable choice, this notion coincides with Rosolini’s.
Using a general notion of partial function, we take the first steps in constructive computabil-
ity theory. We do this both with computability as structure, where we have direct access to
programs; and with computability as property, where we must work in a program-invariant
way. We demonstrate the difference between these two approaches by showing how these
approaches relate to facts about computability theory arising from topos-theoretic and type-
theoretic concerns. Finally, we tie the two threads together: assuming countable choice and
that all total functions N → N are computable (both of which hold in the effective topos), the
Rosolini partial functions, the disciplined maps, and the computable partial functions all co-
incide. We observe, however, that the class of all partial functions includes non-computable
partial functions.
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InMathematics as a Numerical Language [10], Bishop outlines what he viewed as the most impor-
tant questions of constructive mathematics of his time. In it, he states “that mathematics con-
cerns itself with the precise description of finitely performable abstract operations.” He also
states that constructive mathematicians can use classical mathematics “as a guide” and that
much of classical mathematics “will raise fundamental questions which classically are trivial
or perhaps do not even make sense.” The essay continues by sketching three problems that
are classically easy, but when viewed constructively demonstrate gaps in our conceptual un-
derstanding. He states “Each of the three problems just discussed requires the development
of new concepts appropriate to the constructive point of view. None of them is likely to be
given an acceptable solution by the application of a general technique of constructivization.”
In fact, for two of these problems (Birkhoff’s ergodic theorem and the construction of singular
cohomology), there is no constructive solution, so a new approach must be taken to develop
the field. For the third (Hilbert’s basis theorem), the proof itself is constructive, but exhibiting
objects to which the theorem can be applied necessarily requires non-constructive arguments.
This thesis is focused on computability theory, but done from the point of view of construc-
tivization that we see in the previous paragraph. That is,
· our mathematical work should describe “finitely performable abstract operations”;
· we will be guided by the classical development of computability theory, but
· we will pay special attention to fundamental questions which are classically trivial and
on concepts that are appropriate for the constructive point of view.
The goal, then, is not to develop a full constructive account of computability theory but to un-
derstand how computability theory fits into a constructive mathematical world. In particular,
the behavior of partial functions is more subtle in a constructive world, so we spend a consid-
erable amount of time examining the theory of partial functions.
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In order to proceed, we must fix a constructive framework for doing mathematics. For-
mally, we use a modest extension of intensional Martin-Löf type theory (MLTT). This connects
directly to our motivating paragraph: while introducing his type theory in [57], Martin-Löf
cites Bishop [10, 9] as a motivation for MLTT. We will not work formally: since we are commu-
nicating mathematics, and not describing a computer formalization, we will describe and use
this implicit framework in an informal way. Nevertheless, it should be possible to formalize the
material in this thesis directly in a proof assistant such as Coq [19] or Agda [61].
Both the approach we take to mathematics and the language we use to communicate it are
not widely familiar. The traditional constructive approach is a Bishop-style mathematics: one
gives sets via a collection of elements and an equivalence relation saying how to identify these
elements. Mathematics in MLTT usually mimics this approach using setoids (Section 1.2 and
Chapter 6), but more recent work tends to be done from a univalent perspective (described
in 1.5), which we take here. Briefly, univalent mathematics is an approach to mathematics
which instead works with the identity types for equality, and which pays special attention to
the structure arising from this proof-relevant equality. This attention motivates several new
definitions, in particular a new interpretation of logic in type theory. Moreover, this approach
allows us to formally distinguish between notions seen as structure and notions seen as prop-
erty. Practical work in this approach requires the addition of some extensionality principles to
MLTT (Chapter 2).
Part I of this thesis develops the univalent approach to constructive mathematics. The aim
is to present a concise, self-contained and readable introduction to univalent mathematics, go-
ing somewhat beyond what is required in Part II. Most of the material in Part I can be found
already in the HoTT Book [86], but we make a number of different choices in terminology and
presentation. In particular, we simplify many proofs, insist less on homotopical intuition, and
reorder the priority and primacy of various concepts to better fit with the aims of Part II and
the changes in the field over the last several years. We also spend quite some time discussing
the relationship between extensionality axioms. There is a technical contribution here: both
the proof that univalence implies function extensionality and the surrounding discussion in
Section 2.4 are new, although some of the ideas were already implicit in Voevodsky’s proof as
presented in [33].
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Part II begins the main technical contributions of the thesis by examining partial functions.
There are several approaches to partial functions (Chapter 4 and Sections 5.1 and 5.2), but the
most technically useful is one based on a notion of partial element (Definition 5.3), which is a
type-theoretic version of the notion of subsingleton subset, as well as a constructive version of
the lifting from classical domain theory; indeed, all lifted sets are DCPOs (Section 5.4).
As mentioned above, our broad aim is to better understand how the computable partial
functions fit into a constructive world. Although intuition tells us that anything which can
be done constructively can be done computably, we can define a partial function h : N ⇀ N
which enumerates the complement of the halting set, and so cannot be a computable partial
function. It is worth asking then which partial functions can be computable. Chapter 5 is de-
voted to shedding light on this question by looking for a restricted notion of partial function
for which it is consistent that all such partial functions are computable. Importantly, we expect
such partial functions to be composable. The obvious way to find a more restricted notion of
partial function is via the notion of dominance—set of propositions satisfying certain closure
properties (Section 5.5). Dominances were introduced and studied by Rosolini [75] as part of a
project of synthetic domain theory, andmodulo size issues (Section 5.6), the theory of dominances
transports directly from a topos-theoretic to a type-theoretic setting. Importantly, we can give
a restricted notion of partial function for any set of propositions S, and the partial functions
arising this way are closed under composition precisely if S is a dominance. This fact suggests
that we can use the dominance of Rosolini propositions, typically called Σ, as our restricted no-
tion of partial function. Indeed, this is the approach taken in work on both synthetic domain
theory and synthetic computability theory.
Unfortunately, a weak version of countable choice, which is not provable in our system [26],
is required to show that the Rosolini propositions form a dominance (Theorem 5.30). The
Rosolini dominance arises by truncating a family of types—by replacing a structure with the
property that there is such a structure; for any set of propositions S arising this way, there is a
weakening of the axiom of choice equivalent to the claim that S is a dominance (Theorem 5.32).
From the perspective of partial functions, the issue is that intensional information is used to
compose pairs of S-partial functions, but this intensional information is hidden when we trun-
cate S. That is, S-partial functions come with no guarantee that they respect the required in-
tensional information. To resolve this issue we look at a notion of disciplined map (Section 5.10),
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which can be seen as the class of maps which respect the intensional information used to com-
pose S-partial functions. Indeed, disciplined maps can be shown to compose even without
choice (Theorem 5.44), while countable choice implies that the disciplined maps out of N are
exactly the S-partial functions fromN (Theorem 5.46). That is, in the settings examined by syn-
thetic domain theorists and synthetic computability theorists, the Rosolini disciplinedmaps are
the Rosolini partial functions, making them a natural candidate notion of computable function.
In Part III, we finally turn to computation. Facts about computation from the topos-theoretic
perspective seem to conflict with facts about computation from the type-theoretic perspective.
From the topos-theoretic perspective,
1. it is consistent that all total functions N → N are computable: this is true of constructive
higher-order logic, with the effective topos as a model.
2. It cannot be proven that there is an embedding from the class of computable functions
to the natural numbers: this embedding would tell us that excluded middle holds for
equality between computable functions, which fails in the effective topos.
On the other hand, from the type-theoretic perspective
1. it is false that all total functions N → N are computable: an argument by Troelstra shows
that even in a constructive higher-order setting, this would allow us to solve the halting
problem.
2. There is an embedding from the class of computable functions to the natural numbers:
this is a first theorem in computability theory.
Univalent mathematics gives a general framework incorporating both of the above perspec-
tives. In particular, the topos-theoretic facts correspond to facts about computability as property,
while the type-theoretic facts correspond to facts about computability as structure. We present
computability via a notion of recursive machine (Section 7.2) which abstracts away details of ini-
tialization, state and memory from the definition of Turing machine. We say that a computation
structure for a partial function f : N ⇀ N is a recursive machine computing f , while being
computable is the associated property arising by truncating the type of computation structures.
Much of a first course in computability theory goes through for both computation as structure
(Chapter 7) and computation as property (Chapter 8). The computability theory we present is
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not deep, and we reiterate that a complete development is not the goal. Rather, these results
should show that our approach to computability theory is sound.
The final technical Chapter 9 contains a discussion of how computability as structure and
computability as property differ, and a look at how computability theory fits with the view of
partial functions developed in Chapter 5, bringing the two threads back together. The key re-
sult is that countable choice and “Church’s thesis” (the statement that all total functions N→ N
are computable) together imply that the computable partial functions N ⇀ N are exactly the
Rosolini partial functions. There is an unfortunate lacuna here: one of our goals is a notion of
partial function for which it is consistent that all such partial functions are computable. It is
indeed consistent with MLTT that our candidate notion of disciplined map is such a notion:
in the effective topos, the disciplined maps, the Rosolini partial functions and the computable
partial functions coincide. However, we use a univalent version of proposition extensionality
throughout, and this statement relies on treating propositions as types satisfying a certain prop-
erty, rather than as elements of a sub-object classifier, as is done in topos logic. We would need
to either give a translation from our type theory to topos logic, or construct a model validating
countable choice and Church’s thesis to resolve this discrepancy. For reasons of scope, we do
neither here. Filling this gap is one of the obvious directions for future work. Another direction
for future work is to examine higher-type computability from the perspective developed here.
We discuss both of these directions in more depth when discussing future work.
A few threads woven through this thesis determine its shape, despite being difficult to ex-
press in a way that is both general and technical. I will try to explain them here, with reference
to Bishop’s essay Schizophrenia in Contemporary Mathematics [11].
Bishop’s essay concerns itself primarily with what Bishop calls the debasement of meaning.
Two particular trends leading to this debasement (according to Bishop), were the tendency to-
wards formalism—inwhichmeaning is simply ignored, in favor of formalmanipulations—and
an “esotericism”—in which meaning becomes imprecise. Strangely, despite the particularly
formal subject matter, it seems computability suffers more from the latter than the former. For
example, many books on computability theory will fix some formal notion of computation (or
discuss and compare several), and then after the first chapter, prove all results with an appeal
to the Church-Turing thesis and a rough description of an algorithm, leaving the reader left to
wonder why theywent through the trouble of understanding (e.g.) Turingmachines in the first
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place. The appeal to intuition implicit in the reference to the Church-Turing thesis would be
more honest if done as in other areas of mathematics: rather than suggest we are appealing to
an empirical principle, simply describe informally how to construct the mathematical object of
interest.
For his part, Bishop responds to the identification of finitely-performable and recursive by
saying that the “naive concept“ of an algorithm is more basic than that of recursive function,
and “the recursive concept derives whatever importance it has from some presumption that
every algorithm will turn out to be recursive.” Bishop, then, seems to take the view that com-
putability theory is a misguided attempt to make more precise the concept of algorithm. I take
a different view: computability theory is the mathematization of the real-world concept of pro-
gram, and programmable functions. This mathematization has proved fruitful in aiding our
understanding of programming, and one may suspect, will continue to do so. In other words,
computability theory is a part of mathematics which deserves treatment.
Amore precise (and less polemical) example of the debasement ofmeaning in computability
theory is given by the notion of Kleene equality. One often says that f(x) ' g(x) when either
both f(x) and g(x) are undefined, or both are defined and equal. This does not work in a
constructive setting, since we cannot say that a function is either defined or undefined on some
input. Moreover, the treatment of partial functions is such that the terms f(x) and g(x) are only
meaningful when defined. That is, this notation makes reference to a non-existent thing, and
we explain this notation by reference again to this non-existent thing. The treatment given here
differs: we have no need of Kleene equality, because partial functions f : X ⇀ Y are taken to
be ordinary function into a special type of partial values of Y . Then, f(x) ' g(x) precisely if
f(x) and g(x) are equal as partial values.
In this case, an ad hoc notion of equivalence can be reduced to an honest equality by revis-
ing our approach. This idea—replacing ad hoc notions of equivalence with the general notion
of equality—represents a crucial benefit of the univalent approach. Working directly with se-
toids, as Bishop does and as is traditional in type theory, brings with it byzantine bureaucracy,
arising from the ad-hoc treatment of equality. Martin Hoffman showed how to interpret MLTT
with equality in setoids [35], so MLTT can be used to simplify this bureaucracy. Identity types
provide a uniform and general way to present the machinery of setoids. However, some ex-
tensionality principles are required to treat identity types properly, and there has long been a
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question about how best to approach extensionality in type theory. The univalence axiom pro-
vides one possible answer to this question.
The last point concerns the meaning of existence. One of Bishops concluding remarks is
“There seems to be no reason in principle that we should not be able to develop a viable termi-
nology that incorporates more than one meaning for some or all of the quantifiers and connec-
tives.” A particular point of dispute between classical and constructive mathematicians is the
meaning of the existential quantifier. The univalent perspective gives two versions, one which
we denote ∃ is valued in propositions, the other is denoted Σ and is valued in structures. While
our logic of propositions is not classical, the meaning of ∃ seems more in-line with the logicist
interpretation used in classical mathematics, while the meaning of Σ aligns with the intuition-
istic interpretation used in constructive mathematics. These connectives are made possible by
the distinction between properties (families of propositions) and structures (general type fam-
ilies) in a univalent setting. This distinction is certainly not unique to univalent mathematics,
but it seems to be the first to give a formal language for exploring the distinction. The work re-
ported here began as an attempt to study the distinction between structure and property, not at
a general abstract level, but in the wild, with a particular example. It grew into its present form
by returning repeatedly to the central question: how does computability viewed as structure
differ from computability viewed as property?
Summary of contributions
The main contributions are Chapters 5, 7, 8, and 9. Some of the material in these chapters has
appeared in [31]. Sections 5.8-5.10 contain the truly novel material of Chapter 5; the rest of of
the chapter is largely an exercise in translation from one framework to another. The technical
results in Chapters 7 and 8 are standard, well-known results, but they have not been proved
in a univalent setting, and the key contribution is the clear and rigorous distinction between
computability as structure and computability as property. This distinction is what leads to the
denouement in Chapter 9. Except for Theorem 9.9 due to Troelstra, this chapter is entirely new.
The discussion of partiality via setoids in Chapter 6 is new, but is only in sketch, and serves
mostly as comparison.
Part I is standardmaterial. Themain technical contribution is the new proof that univalence
implies function extensionality in Section 2.4. There are some minor contributions: some mi-
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nor simplifications in other proofs (the proof of Theorem 1.13 comes to mind), and Chapter 3,
which is mostly folklore, but which contains some material that does not seem to be published
anywhere. Nevertheless I feel there is a larger contribution here: the organization of concepts
in univalent mathematics has changed in the 5 years since the HoTT book was first published.





Part I deals with univalent foundations. We begin with an overview chapter which explains
the underlying system (Section 1.1), relates this system to approaches to constructivemath (Sec-
tions 1.2-1.4), and then introduces the univalent perspective (Sections 1.5-1.9). It is important to
emphasize that the waywemake intuitive ideas rigorous in a univalent setting is different from
the classical approach. The first chapter is is chiefly designed to give language that better fits
the univalent approach, and to give intuition on how it differs from other approaches to con-
structive mathematics. In particular, since univalent mathematics is built on a type-theoretic
framework, logic is not an underlying part of the language, but something which we must
interpret. Instead of the Curry-Howard interpretation taken in traditional type-theoretic ap-
proaches, we take a “propositions as subsingletons” view of logic, isolating the propositions
as a distinguished class of types. Importantly, this distinction is made internally (not using a
judgement), using a defined operator isProp : U → U ; except for constructions made using
isProp, propositions are treated as any other type.
With this language in place, we develop basic tools for the univalent perspective in Chap-
ter 2, focusing particularly on extensionality principles (Sections 2.1 and 2.4) and on proposi-
tions (Sections 2.2). We will see quickly that pure MLTT is insufficient for developing a logic
of propositions using isProp. We must extend the type theory with a truncation operator, tak-
ing a type to its best representation as a proposition. We will also need the propositions to be
closed under Σ and Π; Closure under Π happens to be equivalent to extensionality for func-
tions (pointwise equal functions are equal), while closure under Σ is true already in MLTT.
Similarly, it is desirable to have an extensionality principle for propositions (logically equiva-
lent propositions are equal). We will assume both of these principles in Parts II and III, but
here we discuss the univalence axiom, which serves as an extensionality principle for types, im-
plying both proposition and function extensionality. Here, and throughout, we use the term
extensionality principle to mean a principle which allows us to prove equality between objects
from a seemingly weaker relationship. We do not consider the question of whether such prin-
ciples make the theory truly extensional (for this, see [82] or [50]). Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 cover
ideas that are new to univalent mathematics, via applications to constructions that have been
problematic in type theory.
Finally, we examine a few traditional notions from the univalent perspective in Chapter 3.
Of particular importance are Section 3.5 on an internal notion ofmonad on the universe of types,
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and Section 3.6 on the axiom of choice. These are not of note because the univalent approach
is interesting (although with choice, it is), but because we will be particularly concerned with




To begin, we explain the base formal system, which we will later extend in Chapter 2. We then
move on to a discussion of the traditional way to interpret logic in this system, and a discussion
of informal constructive mathematics. To end the chapter, we give a small taste of univalent
foundations, discussing the perspective taken in a univalent development and giving the basic
definitions needed to explore the univalent approach.
1.1 Martin-Löf type theory
Wework in an extension ofMLTT similar to that in the HoTT Book [86], and use some language
from the HoTT Book. Our theory is a theory of objects called typeswhich have members called
elements or inhabitants. We write a : A to mean a is an element of the type A. Judgmental
equality–which expresses a syntactic notion of equality—will be denoted by ≡. Elements can
only be given as elements of a specified type. That is, we have no global universe of discourse
or global membership predicate. We have several basic types and type operations, each of
which come with formation rules saying how to create the type, introduction rules saying what
the type’s canonical elements are, elimination rules saying how to use elements of the type, with
a specification (the computation rules) saying how the eliminator acts on canonical elements. We
treat types themselves as being elements of special types called universes, representing types of
types. To avoid circularity issues, we have a hierarchy of universes, U0,U1, . . .. Universes are
cumulative (if A : Ui then A : Ui+1) but are not transitive (so a : A and A : Ui does not mean
a : Ui), and we have Ui : Ui+1 for each Ui. We will work in an ambiguous universe U , only
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indexing the universe when we are discussing size issues. As such, we will writeA : U to mean
that A is a type. Type families indexed by a type Awill be treated as functions B : A→ U .
We will often use types as statements, in which case we mean to say that they have an
element. For example, we state many theorems by saying something of the form "We have P .",
which means "There is some (unspecified) p : P ". In fact, all statements and constructions in
our system reduce to the construction of some element p : P , andwe prove all of them by giving
an explicit element. We discuss this in more depth in Section 2.2.
The first type former of interest is that of dependent products: For any typeA and type family
B : A → U , we have a dependent product type, or type of dependent functions, Π(a : A), B(a) : U .
Elements are introduced via lambda abstraction: if for any x : A, we have t : B(x) then there is
an element λx. t : Π(a : A), B(a). We will sometimes write definitions by giving arguments to
the function, so f(x) def= y means f def= λx.y. The elimination rule is function application, and
the computation rule says that (λx. t)(a) ≡ t[x/a]. The type A→ B of functions from A to B is
the product over the constant family λ(x :A). B.
We treat a function of two arguments (of type A and type B) as a curried function of type
A → (B → C), or in the dependent case, if B : A → U and C : Π(a : A), (B(a) → U), as a
function Π(a : A), (Π(b : B(a)), C(a)(b)). When we have f : Π(a : A), (Π(b : B(a)), C(a)(b)) we
may write f(a)(b), or f(a, b) or fa(b) for the application of f to a and b, depending on focus
and readability. To simplify notation, we treat quantifiers (such as Π) as binding as far right as
possible, and→ as right-associative, so that we can write the types above as A → B → C and
Π(a : A),Π(b : B(b)), C(a)(b). The most basic example of a function is the identity function,
id : Π(A : U), (A→ A),
idA ≡ λx.x.
The computation rules are sometimes know as η rules , and the η rule for functions warrants
some discussion. Consider the non-dependent composition operator
−◦− : (B → C)→ (A→ B)→ (A→ C)
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defined by
g ◦ f def= λx.g(f(x))
Then the η rules says that h ◦(g ◦ f) ≡ (h ◦ g) ◦ f , as we have
h ◦(g ◦ f) def= λx.h(g ◦ f(x)) ≡ λx.h((λx.g(f(x)))(x)) ≡ λx.h(g(f(x))) ≡ λx.(h ◦ g)(fx) ≡ (h ◦ g) ◦ f.
In fact, in general, if two functions f, g : A → B are such that f(x) ≡ g(x) for every x : A,
then we have f ≡ g. However, judgmental equality should be thought of as part of the meta-
system, and so we cannot express this fact in our system. We will shortly introduce a type-
level or propositional version of equality, and the corresponding statement (known as function
extensionality) for propositional equality can be expressed internally, but does not hold in pure
MLTT. We discuss function extensionality in more detail in Section 2.1.
Most of the rest of our type formerswill be inductive types: the elimination rules are induction
principles saying that a (dependent) map out of the type is defined uniquely by specifying its
behavior on the canonical elements. We have,
· An empty type, ∅ : U with no introduction rule, so that for any C : U we have a unique
function ! : ∅ → C; more generally, if C : ∅ → U then we have a unique dependent
function ! : Π(z : ∅), C(z). We interpret statements of the form "NotP " asmeaningP → ∅.
· A unit type, 1 : U with a single canonical element ? : 1.
· A boolean type, 2 : U with canonical elements 0, 1 : 2.
· A type N : U of natural numbers with canonical elements 0 : N and succ(n) : N for each
n : N. As usual, we will often write n+ 1 for succ(n).
· For each A : U and B : A → U a sum type, or type of dependent pairs, Σ(a : A), B(a) with
canonical elements (a, b) : Σ(a : A), B(a) for each a : A and b : B(a). The cartesian product
A×B of A and B is taken to be the sum over the constant family λ(x :A). B
· For A,B : U , we have a coproduct or disjoint union type A + B with canonical elements
inl(a) : A+B for each a : A and inr(b) : A+B for each b : B.
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A member of Σ(x : A), B(x) is thought of as a pair, and this is expressed by the elimination
rules for Σ. In particular, we have
pr0 :
(










These two functions are completely specified by giving their value on constructors. We will
sometimes abuse notation writing something of the form λ(a, b).t(a, b) to mean the function
defined by induction with value t(a, b) on the pair (a, b). As with Π, we take Σ to bind as far
right as can be made sense of. We also treat (−,−) as right associative, so (a, b, c, d) means
(a, (b, (c, d))) and is an element of the type
Σ(a : A),Σ(b : B(a)),Σ(c : C(a, b)), D(a, b, c),
while ((a, b), c) is an element of the type
Σ(p : Σ(x : A), B(x)), C(pr0(p), pr1(p)).
or less formally, of the type
Σ((x, y) : Σ(x : A), B(x)), C(x, y),
However, as expected, pairing is associative (up to equivalence), and we will be sloppy with
our pairing notation when doing so aids readability.
Additionally, for each A : U , we have the inductive family IdA : A → A → U of identity
types. We will usually write a = b or a =A b for IdA(a, b), and we call elements of a = b
paths or equalities. The introduction rule gives refla : a = a and the elimination rule, called path
induction, is as follows:
Given
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· C : Π(a, b : A), a = b→ U , and
· c : Π(a : A), C(a, a, refla);
we have an inhabitant
f : Π(a, b : A),Π(p : a = b), C(a, b, p).
such that
f(refla) ≡ c(a).
The element expressing the elimination rule is traditionally called J :
JA,C :
(
Π(a : A), C(a, a, refl)
)
→ Π(a, b : A),Π(p : a = b), C(a, b, p).
Note that here we have used a judgemental equality, which is also assumed for the inductive
types given above. However, as we work informally, we will be vague about the difference be-
tween judgemental equality and the type-level equalities arising from identity types. In short,
we only work up to type-level equality.
There is also a based path induction principle which says that for fixed a : A and given
· C : Π(b : A), a = b→ U , with
· c : C(a, refla);
we have an inhabitant
f : Π(b : A),Π(p : a = b), C(b, p)
such that
f(refla) ≡ c(a).
In practice, we usually present proofs by path induction by assuming p is refl. We prove the
following lemma first in a more rigorous style using J , and then in the more intuitive style we
use subsequently.
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Lemma 1.1. Fix a type A : U .
(i) For any x, y : A and p : x = y, there is p−1 : y = x.
(ii) For any x, y, z : A any p : x = y and q : y = z, we have p  q : x = z such that each of the
following equations hold for all p : x = y:
p  refly = p,
reflx  q = q,
p  p−1 = reflx,
p−1  p = refly.
Proof. (Using J .)
(i) Define C : Π(x, y : A), (x = y)→ U by
C(x, y, p)
def
= y = x,
andnote that for any a : AwehaveC(a, a, refla) ≡ (a = a), so thendefine c : Π(a : A), C(a, a, refla)
by c(a) = refla. Then letting f
def
= JA,C(c) we have
f : Π(x, y : A), (x = y)→ (x = y),
satisfying the equation
f(a, a, refla) ≡ refla.
Now define p−1 = f(p).
(ii) Define C : Π(x, y : A), (x = y)→ U by
C(x, y, p)
def
= Π(z : Z), (y = z)→ (x = z).
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Note that for any a : A we have C(a, a, refla) ≡ Π(z : Z), (a = z) → (a = z), so define
c : Π(a : A), C(a, a, refla) by c(a) = λz, p.p. Let f
def
= J(c) and for p : x = y and q : y = z,
define p  q def= f(x, y, p)(z, q).
That reflx  q = q follows by definition. For the other two equations, we need to again use
the elimination principle.
We need to check the equations. Define C,C ′, D,D′ : Π(x, y : A), (x = y)→ U as
C(x, y, p)
def
= p  refly = p
C ′(x, y, p)
def
= reflx  p = p
D(x, y, p)
def
= p  p−1 = reflx
D′(x, y, p)
def
= p−1  p = refly
Then we have



















JA,C(c) : Π(x, y : A),Π(p : x = y), p  refly = p
JA,C′(c
′) : Π(x, y : A),Π(p : x = y), reflx  p = p
JA,D(d) : Π(x, y : A),Π(p : x = y), p  p
−1 = reflx
JA,D′(d
′) : Π(x, y : A),Π(p : x = y), p−1  p = refly
Proof. (By reduction to the case that x and y are the same and p is refl.)
(i) Let x ≡ y and p be refl. Then define refl−1 def= refl.
(ii) Let x ≡ y and p be refl. Then define refl  q def= q, so that we have refl  q ≡ q.
We also have refl  refl−1 ≡ refl  refl ≡ refl. Now suppose q is refl, so that we have a path
reflx  refly ≡ reflx and so for any p, we have p  refly = p.
1.2 Bishop-style mathematics and the Curry-Howard interpretation
Type theory arose from an intuitionistic perspective, whereinmathematical constructions are at
least as basic as logical operations, in contrast to a first-order theory such as ZFC, which builds
mathematics on top of logical deduction. In other words, to express logic in our language,
logical notions must be encoded using types. This is traditionally done via the Curry-Howard
interpretation of logic: we interpret propositions as types, and take a proof of the proposition
P to be the construction of an element p : P . Under this interpretation, the logical operations
are
P ∧Q ≡ P ×Q
P ∨Q ≡ P +Q
P ⇒ Q ≡ P → Q
¬P ≡ P → ∅
∀(a : A), P (a) ≡ Π(a : A), P (a)
∃(a : A), P (a) ≡ Σ(a : A), P (a).
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For example, the statement




x = 0→ ∅)→ Σ(y : N), x = succ(y),
and this type has an element, by induction on x:
In the base case, we want to see (0 = 0 → ∅) → Σ(y : N), x = succ(y). Let f : 0 = 0 → ∅; as
we have refl : 0 = 0, we then get f(refl) : ∅, and so by the elimination principle for ∅ (i.e., the
unique function from ∅ into any other type), we have !(f(refl)) : Σ(y : N), x = succ(y).
For the inductive step, we know x is of the form succ(n). Then
λf.(n, reflsucc(n)) :
(
x = 0→ ∅)→ Σ(y : N), x = succ(y).
Using the induction principle then gives us an element of the desired type—a proof of the fact
that every non-zero natural number is a successor.
TheCurry-Howard interpretation allows the interpretation of logical conceptswhichmatches
the constructivist explanation of the logical connectives. However, it quickly becomes appar-
ent that many extensional concepts [35]—concepts specifying the behavior of equality—should
be added to MLTT in order to work with MLTT effectively. Four noteworthy extensional con-
cepts are function extensionality, saying that pointwise equal functions are equal; proposition
extensionality, saying that logically equivalent propositions are equal; proof irrelevance, say-
ing that any two proofs of the same proposition are equal; and quotient types, identifying re-
lated elements of a type. The traditional way to resolve these difficulties is to equip types with
equivalence relations on demand, instead of using the identity types introduced earlier. This
matches Bishop’s view that to give a set is to give not only its members, but also what we must
show to show twomembers to be equal. A type equippedwith an equivalence relation is called
a setoid. Given two setoids (A,≈) and (B,≈), there is no reason to expect an arbitrary f : A→ B
to respect the equivalence relation. It is typical to therefore call elements of A → B operations
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from A to B, and call an operation f : A → B a function when for all a, a′ : A if a ≈ a′ the
f(a) ≈ f(a′).
When working with setoids, we can force function extensionality to hold by equipping the
type of functions with the equivalence relation of pointwise equality. Similarly, we may intro-
duce quotients by simply adjusting the equivalence relation on the setoid: if (A,≈) is a setoid,
and E as an equivalence relation on A which is coarser than ≈, we can set A/E to be the se-
toid (A,E). More subtly, we may consider a class of proof-irrelevant setoids: say that (A,≈) is
proof-irrelevant when ≈ is the chaotic relation—that is, when a ≈ a′ for any a, a′ : A.
We will say more about setoids in Chapter 6, after we examine the extensional concepts we
are interested in from the univalent perspective. For now, it is worth remarking that it is some
work to equip Σ and Π types with setoids (a notion of substitution is required for this), and
that it is not clear whether there is a reasonable way to make the universe into a setoid. As the
universe is central to our approach to partial functions in Chapter 5, the setoid approach will
not work for our purposes.
1.3 Informal mathematics and constructive taboos
The logic we get in a Bishop-style mathematics and the logic we get in the univalent mathemat-
icswewill use are both constructive. As a result, we do not have the law of the excludedmiddle.
A consequence is that the possibility of an independent or constructively undecided proposition
is always in the air. Discussion around these principles can be misleading at times. Consider
the following two sentences
· “The type of natural numbers is discrete.”
· “The type of real numbers cannot be discrete.”
While we do not yet know the definition of discreteness, it is enough to know that if LEMholds,
then all sets are discrete. Regardless, the first is a theorem in our system (as a consequence of
Theorem 1.13) and the second is an informal metatheorem. We could make this into an honest
metatheorem by (e.g.) proving that there is no proof that the real numbers are discrete, but
we want to avoid a deep detour into metamathematics. Such informal statements are often
justified in constructive math by appeal to constructive taboos: statements which we expect not
to be provable in a constructive system. Statements of the second form are explanations of
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results of the form P → Q, where Q is a constructive taboo. In particular, if the type of real
numbers has decidable equality, then we can derive Bishop’s limited principle of omniscience,
which we can write in a logical style as
LPO
def
= ∀(α : N→ 2),
(




∃(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
As the limited principle of omniscience says that we can examine infinitely many cases, it does
not meet Bishop’s requirement that we are describing “finitely performable abstract opera-
tions”, and so a system which allows us to prove LPO is by its nature non-constructive. Then
we cannot expect to have the type of real numbers to be discrete in a constructive system.
Some constructive systems arise fromconsiderations in analysis or computability theory [13],
and often contain axioms that are incompatible with the law of the excluded middle. In this
thesis, such principles will also be called taboos. Belowwe list several taboos that we will make
mention of throughout. The list contains an informal statement of each, a brief explanation of
the reasons the principle might be considered, and a formal logical statement, and the same
statement in the Curry-Howard interpretation.
Limited principle of omniscience (LPO) Every binary sequence either takes the value 1, or
doesn’t take the value 1. First introduced by Bishop [9] as a principle which should not
be constructively valid.
∀(α : N→ 2),
(




∃(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
Π(α : N→ 2),
(




Σ(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
Weak limited principle of omniscience (WLPO) Every binary sequence is either constantly 0
or not constantly 0. LPOweakened by replacingQ by ¬¬Q, whereQ is ∃(n : N), α(n) = 1.
Of interest when considering computability, as here it should fail (see Section 8.2).
∀(α : N→ 2),
(




∀(n : N), α(n) = 0
)
.
Π(α : N→ 2),
(








Markov’s Principle (MP) If a binary sequence is not constantly 0, then it takes the value 1.
Introduced by Markov [56] based on considerations in recursion theory.
∀(α : N→ 2),
(




∃(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
Π(α : N→ 2),
(




Σ(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
Kripke’s Schema (KS) For each proposition P , there is a binary sequence such that P holds iff
this sequence takes the value 1. Introduced to formalize Brouwer’s concept of the creative
subject. See Section 4.10 of [85] for some history. Allowing quantification over proposi-
tions, this is written
∀(P : Prop),∃(α : N→ 2),
(
P ↔ (∃(n : N), α(n) = 1)
)
.
Under Curry-Howard, we take Prop to be U :
Π(P : U),Σ(α : N→ 2),
(
P ↔ (Σ(n : N), α(n) = 1)
)
.
Church’s Thesis (CT) Every total function N → N is computable. Arises from computability
considerations, as all constructively definable functions ought to be computable.
∀(f : N→ N), ∃(e : N), ∀(n : N), f(n) = {e}(n).
Π(f : N→ N),Σ(e : N),Π(n : N), f(n) = {e}(n).
Here {e} is the function coded by e.
The Curry-Howard statements of both Kripke’s Schema and Church’s thesis are false, even
thoughKripke’s Schema follows fromLEM, and there are constructive settings inwhichChurch’s
thesis holds [43]. We will introduce a more refined interpretation of logical principles in Sec-
tion 2.2. Using this interpretation, we consider a more reasonable version of Church’s thesis
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in Section 9.2. A version of Kripke’s Schema which seems to better capture the intent of the
schema can be given using ideas from Chapter 5.
1.4 Topos logic
It is possible to interpretMartin-Löf type theory in a topos E , followingHoffman’smodification
of Seely’s interpretation in any locally cartesian closed category [77, 36]. Briefly, we take the
objects of E to represent contexts of free variables, and a type in context Γ is a map into Γ (an
object of E/Γ), while an element of that type is a section of this map. Any map f : ∆→ Γ gives
rise to a function f∗ : E/Γ → E/∆ by pullback. The left-adjoint of this is used to interpret Σ,
while the right adjoint is used to interpret Π.
The interpretation outlined above gives a way to interpret informal mathematics in a topos,
by appealing to the Curry-Howard interpretation in the type theory associated to the topos.
However, it is more common to interpret informal mathematics in a topos by appealing to the
Mitchell-Benabou language of a topos. The Mitchell-Benabou language for a topos E is a higher-
order logic which arises by considering the subobject classifier Ω of E . We roughly follow the
presentation in [55]. A more detailed account can be found there, as well as in [51] and [59].
For each object X of E , there is a type X , and each type has a set of terms. Each term in the
language additionally has free variables of fixed types. A term of type B with free variables of
types A1, . . . , An will be written
x1 : A1 . . . , xn : An ` t : B.
A term x1 : A1 . . . , xn : An ` t : B will be interpret by a morphism A1 × · · · × An → B.
The basic data of the LCCC structure of E give terms of the language corresponding to the
morphisms given by the data. We omit these, except for those given by exponentiation which
are illustrative: Given a term x : U ` σ : X interpreted by χ : U → X and a term v : V ` f : Y X
whose interpretation is given by β : V → Y X , there is a term x : U, y : V ` f(v) : Y whose
interpretation is given by
V × U 〈χ,β〉−−−→ X × Y X e−→ Y,
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where e is the evaluation map. Given a term x : X,u : U ` Z which is interpreted by θ, there is
a term x : X ` λx.θ : ZU whose interpretation is the transpose of θ.
The terms of interest to us here are those whose type is Ω, which we call formulas. As there
are maps ∧,∨,⇒: Ω → Ω and a map ¬ : Ω → Ω corresponding to the logical connectives, we
can interpret the logical connectives on formulas. What remains is interpreting equality and
quantifiers. As the diagonal ∆ : X → X ×X is an embedding, it has a characteristic function
δ : X × X → Ω, and so given terms u : U ` σ : X and v : V ` τ : X , we have a formula
u : U, v : V ` (σ = τ) : Ω interpreted by composing 〈σ, τ〉with δ.
The quantifiers are slightly more work. The formula x : X, y : Y ` ϕ : Ω is interpreted as a
mapX × Y → Ω, which corresponds to an arrow λx.ϕ : Y → ΩX . The unique mapX : X → 1
gives rise to a map 1Ω → XΩ, which corresponds to the functor (!X)∗ : E/1 → E/X , and we
know that 1Ω = Ω. The left and right adjoints give us maps ∀X ,∃X : Ω → ΩX . Then we have
maps ∀X ◦λx.ϕ : Y → Ω and ∃X ◦λ.xϕ : Y → Ω, which we take as the interpretations of
∀(x : X), ϕ(x, y) and ∃(x : X), ϕ(x, y).
As a formula is treated as a map X → Ω, any formula ϕ corresponds to a subobject of X ,
and we can write {x | ϕ(x)} for the domain of this subtype. In short, we have interpreted
equality, the logical connectives, quantifiers, and a form of comprehension. Then we can use
this to interpret a great deal ofmathematical work. Moreover, themore structure our topos has,
the more mathematics we can interpret: for example, if the topos contains a natural numbers
object, we can interpret the natural numbers, and arithmetic in the topos.
The interpretation of MLTT and the Mitchell-Benabou language of a topos are not entirely
independent: give an object X of E , there is the formula (with no free variables) ‖X‖ def= ∃x.>
which we can call the truncation of X . If P : X → Ω, we can form not only the formula
∃(x : X), P (x), but also the type Σ(p : P ), (X), and in fact we have an isomorphism between
the truncation ‖Σ(p : P ), (X)‖ and ∃(x : X), P (x). In other words, in a topos, existential quan-
tification can be defined from Σ and truncation. In univalent mathematics, we will do the same
thing: since we are working in a type theory, we have Σ, and we will then define a trunca-
tion operator (See Section 2.2), which we will use to define the existential quantifier. This gives
way to a third, more nuanced interpretation of mathematical ideas where we are allowed to




In Lemma 1.1, we proved that we can compose and invert the elements of identity types. When
we include the reflexivity path refl, we can see this result as expressing that identity is an equiv-
alence relation; as the elimination principle can be seen as saying that identity is the smallest
reflexive relation, this also makes identity into the smallest equivalence relation. However,
x = y is not simply a proposition, but a type—to assert x = y is not simply to give a truth value,
but to give the data of which inhabitant of x = y we have. This is to say, identity is not simply
property in Martin-Löf type theory, but structure.
Univalentmathematics arises from the observation that the structure of identity typesx =A y
is part of the structure of the type A. For example, the fact (which we prove shortly) that
Π(n,m : N), (n = m) + ¬(n = m) is part of the description of the structure of N. We can then
stratify the types into levels based on how deep the identity structure on a type goes. These
levels, called homotopy-levels capture a notion of dimension. Traditionally, these dimensions
are indexed from −2, following the indexing in homotopy theory; we use N−2 for the type of
integers at least−2. Themost important are the first four levels, those of contractible types, propo-
sitions, sets and groupoids. In order, these are types with exactly one element, types with at most
one element, types whose identity types are propositions, and types whose identity types are
sets. More explicitly:
Definition 1.2. We define the operations isProp : U → U , isContr : U → U , isSet : U → U and
isGroupoid : U → U by
isContr(X)
def
= Σ(a : X),Π(x : X), (a = x),
isProp(X)
def
= Π(x, y : X), x = y,
isSet(X)
def
= Π(x, y : X), isProp(x = y),
isGroupoid(X)
def
= Π(x, y : X), isSet(x = y).
We call a typeX a proposition or a subsingleton if isProp(X), contractible or a singleton if isContr(X)
a set if isSet(X) and a groupoid if isGroupoid(X). We call a type family P : X → U a predicate
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when Π(x : X), isProp(P (x)). We also have the types Prop,Set : U1,
Prop
def
= Σ(P : U), isProp(P ).
Set
def
= Σ(X : U), isSet(X).
For any n : N−2, the homotopy n-types, are given by
is-(−2)-type(X) def= isContr(X),
is-(n+ 1)-type(X) def= Π(x, y : X), is-n-type(x = y).
Wewill be working primarily at the level of sets and propositions, but as far as possible, we
will state our results for general types. Wewill alsomake use of examples and counterexamples
which have higher levels. The question of whether a type is a set is not a size issue, in the way
that the class of all sets is too large to be a set, but rather, it is an issue of depth of structure. Size
issues are handled by universe levels. For example, we gave the type Set as a type in U1. More
explicitly, we have for each i, a type Seti : Ui+1 with Seti
def
= Π(X : Ui), isSet(X).
Note that the definition of isProp(P ) and is-(−1)-type(P ) are not quite the same. We will
show shortly that these two notions are in fact equivalent, and so also that sets are 0-types and
groupoids are 1-types. However, we do not yet have the machinery to talk about equivalence
properly.
In the meantime, we use a notion of logical equivalence: Define
A⇔ B def= (A→ B)× (B → A)
and say that A and B are logically equivalent if A ⇔ B. The name is justified by Lemma 1.7,
which says that when two propositions are logically equivalent, they are in fact equivalent (in
the sense defined in the next section).
The canonical examples of propositions are ∅ and 1.
Theorem 1.3. The empty type ∅ and unit type 1 are propositions. The unit type is contractible, while
the empty type is not.
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Proof. The elimination principle for ∅ says directly that Π(x, y : ∅), x = y. Moreover, the first
projection
(
Σ(x : ∅),Π(y : ∅), x = y
)
→ ∅ gives a map isContr(∅)→ ∅.
As we have refl : ? = ?, by the elimination principle for the unit type we have some witness
w : Π(x : 1), ? = x, and so (?, w) : isContr(1). However, again by applying the elimination
principle for 1 to w, we get Π(x, y : 1), y = x, by symmetry we have isProp(1).
The type N is a set which is not a proposition. The proof relies on the notion of equivalence,
so we give it in the next section.
When defining an algebraic structure, for example, a group, it is most natural to work with
underlying types which are sets, since we want the group equations to be property, with the
structure given only by the operations. Regardless, we may define GrpStruct : U → U by
GrpStruct(X)
def
= Σ(− · − : X → X → X),Σ((−)−1 : X → X),Σ(e : X),
Π(x, y, z : X),
(




(x · e = x)× (e · x = x)× (x · x−1 = e)× (x−1 · x = e)
)
,
The first line says that we have the operations − · − and (−)−1, as well as an identity e; the
second line ensures associativity, and the third the identity and inverse rules. This is a direct
formalization of the classical definition:
A group structure on X consists of a multiplication operation − · − : X2 → X , an inverse
operation (−)−1 : X → X and an element e ∈ X satisfying the equations
(∀x, y, z ∈ X) x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z
(∀x ∈ X) x · e = e · x = x
(∀x ∈ X) x · x−1 = e = x−1 · x
All of the operations on types are such formalizations. For example, a typeP is a proposition
if for all x, y : P , we have that x = y.
In the case thatX is a set, the required equations can be shown to be propositions—that is,
we can show that the equations are property. Then we can define Grp : U1:
Grp
def
= Π(X : U), isSet(X)× GrpStruct(X).
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If we assume Voevodsky’s univalence axiom (see Section 2.4), we can show that equality in
Grp is exactly isomorphism [24]. As we may have many non-trivial isomorphisms between two
groups, we know that we cannot have that Grp is a set. In fact in this case we can show that Grp
is a groupoid.
1.6 Structure versus Property
Before moving on, we should further discuss structures and properties. In a traditional devel-
opment of semi-formal mathematics, we establish the truth (or non-truth) of statements. For
example, one may express the first isomorphism theorem in such a development as
For any surjective homomorphism ϕ : G→ H , there is an isomorphism G/ kerϕ ' H .
This is a perfectly honest theorem, but it asserts only a simple fact: it tells us that we can
identifyG/ kerϕ andH . This fact gives us no information about what happens to a given g ∈ G
under this identification, despite the fact that when using the isomorphism theorem, we are
often interested in a particular isomorphism between G/ kerϕ and H . A better version of the
theorem is given by
For any surjective homomorphism ϕ : G→ H , the natural function ν : G/ kerϕ→ H defined by
ν([g]) = ϕ(g) is an isomorphism.
This version contains structure: we not only know that G/ kerϕ can be identified with H ,
but we know which map gives this identification, and how it behaves. We can think of an
isomorphism as a structured identification between groups, so that in rephrasing the theorem,
we have moved from a simple statement of fact to a description of structure. On the other hand
the property that f is an isomorphism between groups is something we usually do not wish to
analyze for deeper structure: the fact that f is an isomorphism is all we are interested in.
In a formalization based on first order (or higher order) logic, wemanipulate facts; structure
is not easily expressed by the formal manipulations. If we want the formal framework under-
lying our mathematics to be able to manipulate structure directly, then another sort of system
is needed. The obvious choice is to turn to some variant of MLTT. However, logic is a part of
mathematical reasoning, andMLTT does not natively have a notion of truth value, so some con-
vention on how to interpret logical operations must be taken. Propositions can be represented
by types, and then we say that a proposition P is true if there is some inhabitant p : P . The
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traditional convention is that of Section 1.2. Namely, view all types as propositions and use a
Curry-Howard interpretation of logic. But then we lose our simple facts: even 3 + 4 = 7 is (a
priori) a type with structure which can be analyzed.
Our example above suggests that mathematics is concerned with both facts and structures.
Traditional foundations often only directly express the former, while type theoretic foundations
often only directly express the later. Univalent definitions allow us to talk about both, and to
relate them. Arbitrary types represent structure or data. Propositions represent simple facts—
the definition tells us that the structure of the type is trivial. In principle, we can give two
versions of a notion: a propositional version (expressing a simple fact), and a structured version
(giving data). For example, we can talk of a function f having the property of being computable
(which is a simple fact), or we can talk about computation structures for f : programs computing
f . Chapters 7 and 8 deal with these notions.
When we switch to a univalent approach, we are not abandoning the Curry-Howard inter-
pretation, but augmenting it: we still have Σ and +, allowing us to express a logic of structures,
but we also have a notion of proposition, for which we can introduce a logic of propositions, as
we do in Section 2.2. This allows a richer expression of ideas, as we get to choose in our defi-
nitions and theorems whether to use structured or propositional notions. Often, one choice is
more natural than the other.
As being a proposition is a property of types, we can introduce a type, and then prove after
the fact that it is a proposition. There are two benefits of this: it gives us concise and clear
language for expressing that structure is trivial, and more usefully, it gives us tools for turning
simple facts into interesting structure. For an example of this latter situation, see Lemma 3.13,
where we show an example where the truth of a proposition can allow us to compute a natural
number.
The distinction between structure and property guides formalization: for example, we can
ask for a monoid structure on a type:
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A monoid structure on X consists of a multiplication operation − · − : X2 → X and a unit
e : X , satisfying the equations
(∀x, y, z ∈ X) x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z
(∀x ∈ X) x · e = e · x = x
Then we have the type family MonStruct : U → U . Using ideas from Chapter 2, we can also
discuss the property of being a monoid isMonoid : U → Prop using truncation, but this is of little
use: there may be many possible monoid structures on a typeM , but a witness of isMonoid(M)
cannot distinguish between these: the property of being a monoid does not allow us to access
an actual monoid structure, in general. On the other hand, given a monoid (M, ·, e,−) : Mon—
namely, a set equipped with a monoid structure—and an element m : M , we can define the
type of inverses of an element
inverseM (m) : Σ(n : M), (m · n = e)× (n ·m = e),
and while inverse : M → U is a priori structure, we can in fact prove that inverse(m) is a propo-
sition for allm : M . That is, we can show that the type of inverses is a proposition. In our case,
this means that asserting the existence of an inverse is the same as giving an explicit inverse; or
even more evocatively: inverse are uniquely specified. As we can also show that products over
propositions are again propositions, we have a predicate isGrp : Mon → Prop, saying whether
a monoid is a group. So while a group is structure imposed on a set, the structure is already
imposed by the underlying monoid (in fact, already by the underlying semigroup).
The ability to infer that a type is a proposition distinguishes univalent mathematics from,
for example, the calculus of (inductive) constructions [21, 25], which also has a universe of
propositions. However, propositions are completely separate from other types in CiC, and no
structural content can be inferred from them.
Unfortunately, pure MLTT does not give us everything we need to make use of univalent
definitions properly. In particular, we cannot form a proposition-valued version of ∨ or ∃, and
we cannot show that ¬ and ∀ preserve propositionhood. We will show how to extend MLTT
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with a truncation operator (resolving ∨ and ∃) and a principle of function extensionality (to re-
solve the problem with ¬ and ∀) as we develop the univalent approach in Chapter 2.
Properties—proposition-valued type families—play a central role in anywork in a univalent
framework. In Chapter 2 we will provide additional technical justification for the claim that
propositions should be viewed as types with trivial structure, but we will make use of the fact
in our exposition from here onward. We will see in the next section that we have the type-
theoretic analog of the Leibniz law, that identical objects are indiscernible. Then if P is some
proposition, all its elements will be indiscernible.
Consequently, once we know that a type P is a proposition, we will often leave elements
of P unnamed. Moreover, we will ignore the behavior of constructions on propositions (see,
for example, the definition of the lifting monad in Chapter 5). Finally, we will stick to a rigid
naming convention: If we give a type family A→ U a name beginning with is, we will (at some
point) prove that this type family is proposition-valued, and we will also have capital letters
somewhere in the name—for example isContr, isProp, isSet, isGroupoid. Moreover, after proving
isXYZ : A → U to be proposition-valued, when we need to name an element of isXYZ(a), we
will often use the lowercase isxyz : isXYZ(a).
1.7 Homotopies and equivalences
The development of univalent mathematics relies on tools for comparing functions and for
comparing types which we explain here. The tools are those of homotopy between functions
and equivalence between types. The logical equivalence defined earlier is sufficient when we
are dealing with properties, but when comparing structures, it is insufficient: for example, the
unit type is logically equivalent to the natural numbers. One of the first insights leading to uni-
valent mathematics was the definition of equivalence in Voevodsky’s Foundations library [91],
which refines the traditional notion of isomorphism. Since then, several equivalent notions
have been given, which are the focus of Chapter 4 of the HoTT Book. We are interested in three
notions, which they call quasi-invertibility (Definition 2.4.6), bi-invertibility (Definition 4.3.1) and
contractibility (Definition 4.4.1). The notion of quasi-invertibility is problematic; we will discuss
why after formally introducing these notions. We diverge slightly from the HoTT Book in our
terminology. In particular we call bi-invertibility equivalence, and a quasi-inverse of a function,
simply an inverse. To express these notions, we need the notion of homotopy, or pointwise equality.
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Definition 1.4. A homotopy between two functions f, g : Π(x : X), B(x) is a pointwise equality
between f(x) and g(x):
f ∼ g def= Π(x : X), f(x) = g(x).
For any f, g : Π(x : X), B(x) we have a map
happly : (f = g)→ (f ∼ g)
defined by path induction with happly(refl) def= λx. refl.
Definition 1.5. For f : A→ B, and b : B, the fiber of f over b is the type
fibf (b)
def
= Σ(a : A), f(a) = b.
Now we may define our notions of equivalence.
Definition 1.6. A function f : A→ B is contractible when it has contractible fibers:
isContr(f)
def
= Π(b : B), isContr(fibf (b)).
A right inverse for f is a map g : B → A such that f ◦ g ∼ idB , and a left inverse for f is a map
g : B → A such that g ◦ f ∼ idA. That is,
rinv(f)
def
= Σ(g : B → A), (f ◦ g ∼ idB).
linv(f)
def
= Σ(g : B → A), (g ◦ f ∼ idA)




We write A ' B for the type of equivalence from A to B:
A ' B def= Σ(f : A→ B), isEquiv(f).
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When f : A→ B has a left inverse, we say that A is a retract of B. We call a function which has
a left inverse a section and a function which has a right inverse a retraction.
An inverse for f is a map g : B → Awhich is both a left and a right inverse for f :
inverse(f)
def
= Σ(g : B → A), ((f ◦ g) ∼ id)× ((g ◦ f) ∼ id).
The distinction between equivalence and having an inverse is the first example of the dif-
ference between structure and property. We can show that isEquiv(f) is a proposition—that is,
that being an equivalence is property—but this is not true in general for the type inverse(f)—
that is, having an inverse is structure. Lemma 4.1.1 of the HoTT Book shows that if inverse(f)
(which they call qinv(f)) has an element, where f : A→ B, then
inverse(f) ' Π(x : A), x = x.
The fact that having an inverse is not a proposition means we cannot naively use inverse(f)
as a replacement for isEquiv(f). In particular, we will shortly define a map idtoequiv : A =
B → A ' B, taking a path in the universe to an equivalence, and the univalence axiom says
that idtoequiv is an equivalence, but the corresponding statement, that the map (X = Y ) →
Σ(f : X → Y ), inverse(f) has an inverse is actually inconsistent, since a consequence of this
statement is that inverse(f) is a proposition. We will see this in detail when we talk about the
univalence axiom on Section 2.4
We will show in Section 1.9 that having an inverse, being contractible and being an equiv-
alence are all logically equivalent after we develop some tools for working with paths. In the
meantime, we fulfill our promise to justify the phrase “logical equivalence”. We aim to use
propositions to encode logic in our system, so the information encoded directly by propositions
is logical information. This means that when we call two propositions logically equivalent, we
should be able to conclude that they are equivalent. Indeed, we have the following.
Lemma 1.7. If A and B are propositions, then (A⇔ B)→ (A ' B).
Proof. Suppose f : A→ B and g : B → A. We have that g(f(a)) = a and f(g(b)) = b, as A and
B are propositions.
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The words path, homotopy, contractible and equivalence come from homotopy theory. The
modern terminology for several other important notions come also from homotopy theory.
Nevertheless, no knowledge of homotopy theory is needed to understand our type theory. The
next name coming from homotopy is application on paths, which expresses that functions respect
equality. Given any function f : A→ B and x, y : A, there is a function
apf : x = y → f(x) = f(y)




In involved computations, we may abuse notation and write f(p) instead of apf (p). Applica-
tion on paths tells us that functions are congruences, or act functorially with respect to equality.
Formally, we mean the following.
Lemma 1.8. For any f : A→ B we have
1. apf (reflx) = reflf(x);
2. apf (p  q) = apf (p)  apf (q);
3. apf (p−1) = apf (p)−1.
where p : x = y and q : y = z for some x, y, z : A.
Proof. The first equation is definitional, the second and third follow by path induction: First,
fix p ≡ q ≡ reflx, so that
apf (refl  refl) = apf (refl) = refl = refl  refl = apf (p)  apf (q).
Then, fix p ≡ reflx so that we have
apf (refl
−1) = apf (refl) = refl = refl
−1 = apf (refl)
−1.
Note that ap immediately gives us that any retract of a proposition or contractible type is
again a proposition (or contractible type).
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Theorem 1.9. If f : A → B and (g, η) : linv(f) is a left inverse of f , then isContr(B) → isContr(A)
and isProp(B)→ isProp(A).







so g(c) is the center of contraction of A.








so A is a proposition.
A direct corollary is that propositions (and singletons) are closed under equivalence.
Corollary 1.10. If A is a retract of B and B is a proposition, then A and B are equivalent.
Proof. AsA is a retract ofB, we haveA⇔ B andA is a proposition. ThenA ' B by Lemma 1.7.
This allows us to give the following characterization of the contractible types as propositions
with elements. 1.
Lemma 1.11. The following are logically equivalent for any type A:
· A ' 1; (A is equivalent to 1)
· isContr(A); (A is contractible)
· A× isProp(A); (A is a proposition with an inhabitant)
Proof. If f : A ' 1 then we know c def= f−1(?) : A, where f−1 : 1 → A is an inverse of f . For
a : A, we have f(a) = ?, so a = f−1(f(a)) = f−1(?) = c. So then A is contractible.
Let A be contractible, with center of contraction c : A. For a, b : A, we have a = c = b, so A
is a proposition.
If a : A, we have a map ca : 1 → A given by ca(?)
def
= a, and we have c? : A → 1. If A is
additionally a proposition, then we have A⇔ 1, and so A ' 1.
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Corollary 1.12. All contractible types are equivalent.
For dependent function f : Π(x : A), B(x) the situation is more subtle. As f(x) and f(y)
need not even have the same type, the expression f(x) = f(y) is not even well-formed. To
resolve this issue, we notice that paths give rise to functions, called transport functions. For each
x, y : A, we define by path induction




and then given f : Π(x : A), B(x) we have again by path induction, for each x, y : A, a dependent
application function,




We will call a path q : transportB(p, u) = v a path in B lying over p, and write
(u =pB v)
def
= transportB(p, u) = v,
dropping the subscript when the type family is clear from context. Then for p : x = y we may
write
apdf (p) : f(x) =
p f(y).
The spatial picture giving rise to the homotopy-theoretic names is as follows: A type family
B : A → U can be seen as a space lying over A, with B(a) the fiber over A. A dependent
function gives a section of B, and using this, we can lift any path p : x y in A to a path in the
total space of B. This path can be decomposed using a natural family of paths B(x)  B(y)
and a path inB(y). This natural family of paths is captured by transport, while the path inB(y)
is apd.
There is a similar logical picture, which is captured more directly by the above definitions:
Via apB , an equality p : x = y in A gives rise to an equality B(x) = B(y) in the universe. As an
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equality between types allows us to identify the types, there should be a functionB(x)→ B(y),
which we call the function induced by p. Indeed, we have for any A,B : U the map
idtofun : (A = B)→ (A→ B)




Then, applying this to apB : (x = y)→ (B(x) = B(y)), and we have
transport(p, u) = idtofun(apB(p), u).
Conversely, we may define idtofun from transport as
idtofun(p, u)
def
= transportidU (p, u).
In any case, by path induction, we can show that themap idtofun(p) is an equivalence for any
p : A = B: for reflA : A = A, we have that the identity function idA : A → A is an equivalence,
as it is its own inverse:
((idA, λx.refl), (idA, λx.refl)) : isEquiv(idtofun(refl)).
From this and path induction we get a map idtoequiv : (A = B) → (A ' B). In other words
equal types are equivalent. Moreover, viewing type families as encoding properties, the type
of transport expresses Leibniz’s law—the indescernibility of identicals. The function apd tells
us that Leibniz’s law respects choice of witness.
We now have the definitions we need to show that N is a set.
Theorem 1.13. The type N is a set, and is not a proposition.
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We use a modification of a technique called encode-decode which is typically used to charac-
terize the type of paths in a space. Encode-decode proofs proceed by defining a coding family
code : N→ N→ U ,
together with a family of encoding functions,
encode : Π(x, y : N), (x = y)→ code(x, y),
and decoding functions
decode : Π(x, y : N), code(x, y)→ (x = y),
such that encodex,y and decodex,y are inverses.
In our case, it suffices to show that x = y is a retract of code(x, y) and that code is a predicate.










code(x+ 1, y + 1)
def
= code(x, y).
In order to define the encoding functions we define a function r : Π(x : N), code(x, x) which


















=! : ∅ → (0 = x+ 1);
decodex+1,0
def
=! : ∅ → (x+ 1 = 0);
decodex+1,y+1
def
= apsucc ◦ decodex,y.
To show that decode ◦ encode is the identity, we may use path induction. We have
decodex,x(encodex,x(refl)) = decode(transport
code(x,−)(refl, rx)) = decodex,x(rx).
By induction on x, we see that decode(rx) = reflx: this is by definition at 0. We have that
apsucc(reflx) = reflx+1 by definition of ap, so then for the successor case we have
decodex+1,x+1(rx+1) = apsucc(decodex,x(rx+1)) = apsucc(decode(rx)) = apsucc(reflx) = reflx+1.
To show that code(x, y) is a proposition, we proceed by induction on x and y. We have that
code(0, 0) ≡ 1 and code(x, y + 1) = code(x+ 1, y) = ∅. Finally we have
code(x+ 1, y + 1) ≡ code(x, y),
and code(x, y) is a proposition by the inductive hypothesis.
We have that x = y is a retract of a proposition, so by Theorem 1.9, x = y is a proposition
for any x, y : N. Since we also have
λw.w(0, 1) :
(
Π(x, y : N), x = y
)
→ (0 = 1),
and that 0 6= 1, we have ¬ isProp(N).
In the above proof we got lucky: we defined encode using transport, but in the end we didn’t
need to compute the behavior of transport on anything besides the reflexivity paths. This will
not always suffice, so in the next section we discuss some key results concerning transport and
identity types.
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1.8 Transport, identities and the basic types
Identities, and transport along them, are of core importance, so we need some basic results
telling us how to compute with them. The proofs of most of these results are direct application
of path induction which we do not try to motivate here. For our purposes, the results in this
section are technical lemmas characterizing the behavior of identity types and transport. More
detailed discussion (and in some cases, more detailed proofs) can be found in Chapter 2 of the
HoTT Book.
We start with an important characterization of equality in dependent sum types.
Theorem 1.14. Let B : A → U be a type family, and let w,w′ : Σ(a : A), B(a). Then there is an
equivalence
(w = w′) '
(
Σ(p : pr0(w) = pr0(w




Proof. Let S def= Σ(x : A), B(x) and let
codew,w′
def
= Σ(p : pr0(w) = pr0(w
′)), transport(p, pr1(w)) = pr1(w
′)
and define the family of maps
encode : Π(w,w′ : S), (w = w′)→ codew,w′




Now consider w,w′ : S and r : codew,w′ . By induction on all three pairs w,w′ and r, we may
assume w = (a, b) and w′ = (a′, b′) and r = (p, q) with p : a = a′ and q : b =pB b
′. We can
perform path induction on p, with a ≡ a′ and p ≡ refl, so that q : b =B(a) b′. Again, by path
induction, we may treat q as reflb. Then we know that refl(a,b) : w = w′. So we have a family of
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functions
decode : Π(w,w′ : S), codew,w′ → (w = w′).
such that
decode((a, b), (a, b), (refla, reflb)) ≡ refl(a,b).
By induction, proving encode and decode to be inverse reduces to proving that
decode(encode(refl(a,b))) = refl(a,b)
and that
encode(decode(refla, reflb)) = (refla, reflb).
Both of these equations hold definitionally.
We will abuse notation write (p, q) for the path (a, b) = (a′, b′) arising from decode(p, q).
Corollary 1.15. For any w : Σ(a : A), B(a), we have w = (pr0(w), pr1(w)).
Theorem 1.16. Let B : A→ U and let C : (Σ(a : A), B(a))→ U . Define C ′ : A→ U by
C ′(a)
def
= Σ(b : B(a)), C(a, b).
For any p : a = a′ and any pair (b, c) : Σ(b : B(a)), C(a, b), we have
transportC
′
(p, (b, c)) = (transportB(p, b), transportC((p, refl), c)).
In other words, transport works pairwise.
Proof. By path induction, it is enough to show
transportC
′
(refl, (b, c)) = (transportB(refl, b), transportC((refl, refl), c)).
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As we know that (refl, refl) ≡ refl, the definition of transport tells us that this is asking for
(b, c) = (b, c),
which we have by reflexivity.
Lemma 1.17. Given a type Y : U , a path p : X = X ′ between types X and X ′, and a function
f : X → Y , we have
transportλX.X→Y (p, f) = idtofun(p) ◦ f.
Proof. By path induction, we need to see that
transportλX.X→Y (refl, f) = idtofun(refl) ◦ f.
Applying the definition of transport and idtofun, it suffices to see that f = id ◦ f , which follows
from the η rule.
Theorem 1.18. Given a function f : A→ B, a family C : B → U , a path p : x =A y and c : C(f(x))
we have
transportC ◦ f (p, c) = transportC(apf (p), c).
Proof. By path induction, we need to see that
transportC ◦ f (refl, c) = transportC(apf (refl), c).
This reduces to
c = c,
which we have by reflexivity.
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Theorem 1.19. For any A : U and a : A and p : x =A y, we have
transportλx.a=x(p, q) =q  p when q : a = x,
transportλx.x=a(p, q) =p−1  q when q : x = a,
transportλx.x=x(p, q) =p−1  q  p when q : x = x.
This is a special case of the following theorem characterizing transport along identity types
in a type family, by taking B = λx.A and f, g to be constant functions.
Theorem 1.20. Let f, g : Π(a : A), B(a) with p : a = a′ and q : f(a) = g(a). Then,
transportλx.f(x)=g(x)(p, q) = (apdf (p))
−1  aptransportB(p)(q)  apdg(p).
Proof. By path induction on p, we need to see
transportλx.f(x)=g(x)(refl, q) = (apdf (refl))
−1  aptransportB(refl)(q)  apdg(refl).
This reduces to
q = apid(q),
and it is immediate that apid is homotopic to the identity.
1.9 Equivalences and contractible fibers
To conclude this chapter, we show that having contractible fibers, having an inverse, and being
an equivalence are logically equivalent notions. This section therefore provides an important
example of how to use the machinery in the previous section.
Theorem 1.21. For any f : A→ B, the following types are logically equivalent:
1. inverse(f),
2. isEquiv(f),
3. Π(b : B), isContr(fibf (b)).
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To relate contractibility to equivalence, we need to spend some time examining fibers. As
the fiber is a sum over a family valued in path types, we first give two important lemmas about
families of paths.
Lemma 1.22. For any type A and any a : A, the type Σ(x : A), x = a is contractible.
This type Σ(x : A), x = a is sometimes called the singleton (based) at a.
Proof. Wewish to have (a, refla) as the center of contraction, so we need to see that for any x : A
and p : x = awe have
(x, p) = (a, refl)
which we can show by based path induction. We need only see that (a, refl) = (a, refl), which
we have by refl(a,refl).
We could also prove this by a direct computation using the machinery from the previous
section. For any (x, p) : Σ(x : A), x = awe have
(




Σ(q : x = a), transport−=a(p, q) = refl
)
.
By Theorem 1.19, we have that transport−=a(p, p) = p−1  p = refl.
Lemma 1.22 can be read as the (classically trivial) claim that {a} is equivalent to the type
{x ∈ A | x = a}. It will be used frequently and is relevant here because it tells us that the
identity function has contractible fibers:
Lemma 1.23. For any A : U , the identity function idA : A→ A has contractible fibers.
Proof. The fiber of id at a : A is the singleton based at a.
In fact, the equivalence in Lemma 1.22 lifts to any type family over A.
Lemma 1.24. For any type family B : A→ U and any a : A,
B(a) ' Σ((a′, b′) : Σ(a′ : A), B(a′)), a′ = a.
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Proof. The right-hand side is equivalent, by a reshuffling map, to
B
def
= Σ(a′ : A), B(a′)× (a = a′).
There is a map B → B(a) given by (a′, b′, p) 7→ transportB(p, b′), with a candidate inverse
b 7→ (a, b, refl). Since transport(refl, b) = b, the type B(a) is a retract of B. Now, we need to
see for any (a′, b′, p) : B that
(a′, b′, p) = (a, transport(p, b′), refl).
We have by assumption p : a′ = a, and we know refl : transport(p, b′) = transport(p, b′). Finally,
we need to see that transport−=a′(p, p) = refl, which is an application of Theorem 1.19.
We can generalize this one step further.
Lemma 1.25. For any a : A and B : Π(x : A), x = a→ U the map
e : B(a, refl)→ Σ(x : A),Σ(p : x = a), B(x, p)
given by
b 7→ (a, refl, b)
is an equivalence.
Proof. The inverse is given by
f(x, p, b)
def
= transport((refl, w), b)
where w : transport−=a(p, p) = refl comes from Theorem 1.19.
The logical equivalence between having an inverse and being an equivalence is direct, and
by looking at the center of contraction of fibf (b), when f is contractible, we can construct an
inverse for f . The difficulty in Theorem 1.21 is in showing that a map with an inverse has
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contractible fibers. The key insight is to relate the fibers of a section s to the fibers of the map
B → B given by composing with its retraction.
Lemma 1.26. Given r : B → A and s : A→ B together with a homotopy η : r ◦ s ∼ idA, for any b : B













= (s(a), aps(ηa)  p),


















We need to see that (a, p) = r(s(a, p)). By Theorem 1.14 we need to see that there is some
w : a = r(s(a)) such that transportλa.s(a)=b(w, p) = aps(ηa)  p. We have η−1a : a = r(s(a)), so we
compute,
transportλa.s(a)=b(η−1a , p) = transport
λb′.b′=b(aps(η
−1




−1  p by Theorem 1.19
= (aps(ηa))  p by Lemma 1.8.
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Finally, we may prove Theorem 1.21.
Proof (of Theorem 1.21). Given (g, (η, ε)) : inverse(f) we have ((g, η), (g, ε)) : isEquiv(f). Con-
versely, if η : gf ∼ idA and ε : fh ∼ idB , then for any b : B we have g(b) = g(f(h(b))) = h(b),









and so (g, (η, θ)) gives an inverse of f .
The implication from 3. to 1. is only slightly more involved: Define g : B → A to be the
function giving the first component of the center of contraction of fibf (b). In other words, for
any b : B we have by assumption an element
((a, p), w) : isContr(fibf (b)),
and we may define g(b) def= a. Note that p : f(g(b)) = b. Moreover, we know that we have
(a, refl) : fibf f(a), and so we have a = g(f(a)) by Theorem 1.14 and the fact that fibf (a) is
contractible. Then we have that g is an inverse of f .
The implication from 1. to 3. is less obvious. As g is a section of f , we have that fibg(b) is
a retract of fibgf (b), by Lemma 1.26. Since a retract of a contractible type is again contractible,
it suffices to show that fibgf (b) is contractible. However, since we have g ◦ f ∼ idB , we have an
equivalence
fibg ◦ f (b) ' fibidB (b),
and the latter is contractible by Lemma 1.23.
We will see later that being an equivalence and having contractible fibers are in fact equiv-
alent as types.
Before we finish the chapter, we state two results about families of maps; these are Theo-
rems 4.7.6 and 4.7.7 of the HoTT Book. Let P,Q : A→ U and f : Π(x : A), P (x)→ Q(x). Define
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the total map of f by
fΣ : (Σ(x : A), P (x))→ (Σ(x : A), Q(x))
fΣ(x, p)
def
= (x, f(x, p)).
Theorem 1.27. For any f : Π(x : A), P (x)→ Q(x), any a : A and q : Q(a), we have
fibf(a)(q) ' fibfΣ(a, q).
Proof. Expanding the definition of fibfΣ and reshuffling gives an equivalence
fibfσ(a, q) ' Σ(x : X),Σ(u : x = a),Σ(p : P (x)), transport(u, f(x, p)) = q.
By Lemma 1.25, this is equivalent to
Σ(p : P (a)), transport(refl, f(a, p)) = q.
In turn this is equivalent to
Σ(p : P (a)), f(a, p) = q,
which is fibf(a)(q) by definition.
Theorem 1.28. For any f : Π(x : A), P (x) → Q(x) we have that each f(a) is an equivalence iff the
map fΣ is an equivalence.
Proof. Suppose that f(a) is an equivalence for each a : A. Let (x, q) : Σ(x : A), Q(x). By the
previous theorem, fibfΣ(x, q) ' fibf(x)(q), and the latter is contractible since f(x) is an equiva-
lence.
Conversely, let fΣ be an equivalence and fix a : X and let q : Q(x). Then fibf(a)(q) is equiv-
alent to fibfσ(a, q), which is contractible since fΣ is an equivalence.
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1.10 Discussion
A key point in the univalent perspective is the careful distinction between structure and prop-
erty, while taking the former to subsume the latter. This distinction is present in logical systems
(such as CZF or the Mitchell-Benabou language), but properties (formulas) are completely dis-
tinct from structures, which are captured by certain objects of the system. The idea of treating
property as being subsumed by structure is not obvious from this perspective—indeed it is not
clear that there is a way to give a purely logical system capturing the univalent perspective.
Even in type-theoretic contexts, where there has always been some idea that propositions are
types [57], the idea that being a proposition can be an internal statement (a predicate or struc-
ture), rather than a judgement is relatively recent. This view arose in type theory in conjunction
with the consideration of extensionality; bracket types [65], which are used in the first approach
to this way of distinguishing propositions [4], arose as a way to handle proof-irrelevance and
intensionality.
Univalent mathematics is not the only, or the first, type theoretic approach to isolate a type
of propositions. The calculus of inductive constructions [21, 21, 41] (on which Coq is based)
is the canonical example. However, in CiC being a proposition is a judgement, meaning there
is no internal statement correspond to isProp(P ). Moreover, there is no computational content
contained in the propositions of CiC. In short, propositions fit somewhat more naturally in the




We now develop the univalent perspective. Since we use identity types rather than explicit
equivalence relations (as we did in Section 1.2), we need extensionality principles—ways to
prove that types are equal. Pure MLTT gives us no methods for this, so we must extend our
theory. We begin with an examination of function extensionality, which allows us to conclude
that two functions are equal when they are pointwise equal (Section 2.1). We then switch gears
and examine propositional logic in our system (Section 2.2). In order to properly develop logic,
we need a truncation operator, taking a type to its best representation as a proposition. This is
analogous to the truncation operator wementioned for toposes, but in this case we actually use
it as a part of our language.
Before moving on to types of higher homotopy level (Section 2.6), we examine an exten-
sionality principle for propositions and the univalence axiomwhich generalizes this to arbitrary
types (Section 2.4); in order to properly discuss univalence, we first need to take a closer look at
functions (Section 2.3). We end the chapter with some discussion of how to use higher-inductive
types–types generated not only by constructors giving elements of the type, but also by path con-
structors giving paths between them (Section 2.7). This final section and the earlier Section 2.5
discuss principles which can be used, among other things, to define the truncation operator we
assume in Section 2.2.
There is a subtlety with the extensionality principles we consider in this chapter: all of them
depend on a universe U . Until we explicitly introduce them as assumptions, we will treat them
as properties of a universe.
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2.1 Function extensionality
One of the difficulties of working in MLTT is that MLTT gives almost no methods for proving
equalities. This first becomes apparent when we wish to show that two functions f, g : A→ B
are equal. The only equalities between functions arise as reflexivity out of judgmental equali-
ties. For example consider the function f : N→ N defined by recursion with
f(0) = 0
f(succ(n)) = succ(f(n)).
It is not possible to prove that f = idN, even though we can prove that Π(n : N), f(n) = n, and
moreover we can show that for any constructor of N that this equality holds judgmentally. We
expect f to equal idN—we expect two functions to be equal when they are pointwise equal. In
this section we will posit an axiom of function extensionality which tells us that this is the case.
An axiom in type theory is an element of a particular type that is declared to exist by fiat, in-
dependent of the relevant introduction and elimination rules. That axioms do not interact with
introduction and elimination rules makes them potentially dangerous. For example, we could
extend MLTT with an axiom a : N. Then, after defining the predecessor function pred : N→ N,
we would have that pred(a) : N, but we cannot reduce this or compute with it in any way.
However, as we only work up to propositional equality, if we can prove that the type A is
a proposition, then positing an element a : A leads to no problems: For any b : A that we can
construct, we have a = b, and so we can use transport to interchange between a and b. So when
we postulate function extensionality, we wish to ensure that the type representing the axiom
is a proposition. We consider four logically equivalent formulations of function extensionality
below. All but one can be shown to be a proposition.
Theorem 2.1. For any universe U , the following are logically equivalent:
F1 For anyA : U andB : A→ U and any f, g : Π(a : A), B(a), the map happlyf,g : f = g → f ∼ g
is an equivalence.
F2 For any A : U and B : A→ U and any f, g : Π(a : A), B(a), there is a map f ∼ g → f = g.
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F3 The product of any family of propositions is a proposition: for any A : U and P : A→ U ,
(
Π(a : A), isProp(P (a))
)
→ isProp(Π(a : A), P (a)).
F4 The product of any family of contractible types is contractible: for any A : U and P : A→ U ,
(
Π(a : A), isContr(P (a))
)
→ isContr(Π(a : A), P (a)).
Proof. (F1⇒ F2): If isEquiv(happlyf,g), then we have a map f ∼ g → f = g, by definition.
(F2 ⇒ F3): Let P : A → U be a family of propositions, and let f, g : Π(a : A), P (a).
We wish to see f = g. By assumption we have f ∼ g → f = g, so it is enough to show
Π(a : A), f(a) = g(a), but we know that P (a) is a proposition for all a.
(F3⇒ F4): Let P : A → U be a family of contractible types. Then we have some function
f : Π(a : A), P (a) by taking the center of contraction of each P (a). Moreover, we have that each
P (a) is a proposition, and so by assumption, Π(a : A), P (a) is a proposition. As a proposition
with an element, Π(a : A), P (a) is contractible.
(F4⇒ F1): Let B : A→ U and fix f : Π(x : A), B(x). We need to see
Π(g : Π(x : A), B(x)), isEquiv(happlyf,g),
By Theorem 1.28, this happens iff the map
λ(g, p). happlyf,g(p) :
(




Σ(g : Π(x : A), B(x)), f ∼ g
)
is an equivalence. As the type Σ(g : Π(x : A), B(x)), f = g is contractible, it suffices to show
that
Σ(g : Π(x : A), B(x)), f ∼ g
is contractible. We do this by showing that it is a retract of the type
Π(x : A),Σ(b : B(x)), f(x) = b,
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Σ(g : Π(x : A), B(x)),Π(x : A), f(x) = g(x)
)







Π(x : A),Σ(b : B(x)), f(x) = b
)
→ Σ(g : Π(x : A), B(x)),Π(x : A), f(x) = g(x)
J(p)
def
= (λx. pr0(p(x)), λx. pr1(p(x)))
Then we have
J(H(g, p)) = J(λx.(g(x), p(x))) = (λx.g(x), λx.p(x)) = (g, p),
so that J is a left inverse of H .
We wish to posit a form of function extensionality that we can show to be a proposition
without building too much theory. We show that F3 above is a proposition as follows: We
show using F3 and F1 that the property of being a proposition is a proposition. We then use F3
again to show that F3 is a proposition. By Lemma 2.2 below, it turns out that as a result we can
show F3 to be a proposition without the additional assumptions. To aid readability, let us call
a class T : U → U of types an exponential ideal in U when for any B : A→ U we have
(




Π(x : A), B(x)
)
,
so that F3 says that propositions are an exponential ideal, and F4 says that singletons are an
exponential ideal. Note that we are generalizing the usual definition of exponential ideal to
dependent functions.
In order to show that being a proposition is a proposition, we need two results. First, we
show that if A can be shown to be a proposition under the assumption that A has an element,
then A is already a proposition.
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Lemma 2.2. Let A be a type with a function A→ isProp(A). Then A is a proposition.
Proof. Let f : A → isProp(A), and let x, y : A. We have f(x) : Π(y, z : A), y = z, so then
f(x)(x, y) : x = y.
Second, we show that propositions are (−1)-types; from this, it follows that propositions
are sets.
Lemma 2.3. A type P is a proposition iff it is a (−1)-type. That is, P is a proposition iff all path types
in P are contractible.
Proof. Let P be a (−1)-type, so that Π(x, y : P ), isContr(x = y). Then taking the center of con-
traction of x = y gives us Π(x, y : P ), x = y.
Conversely, let w : isProp(P ), and fix x : P . Then u def= λy.w(x, y) has type Π(y : P ), x = y.
Given any p : y = z, we have
apdu(p) : transport
λy.x=y(p, u(y)) = u(z).
By Theorem 1.19, this gives us u(y)  p = u(z), and so
p = u(y)−1  u(z),
but p is arbitrary. Then for z ≡ x, and any p, q : y = xwe have
p = u(y)−1  u(x) = q,
and so x = y is a proposition. Aswe also havew(x, y) : x = y, we have that x = y is contractible.
Corollary 2.4. If P is a proposition, then P is a set.
Proof. As P is a proposition, its path types are contractible, and so path types in P are propo-
sitions.
Theorem 2.5. If propositions form an exponential ideal in U , then for any type X : U , the type
isProp(X) is a proposition.
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Proof. By Lemma 2.2, it is enough to show
isProp(X)→ isProp(isProp(X)).
Let i : isProp(X), so that for all x, y : X , we have that x = y is also a proposition by Lemma 2.3.
Then Π(x, y : X), x = y is a product of propositions, and then Π(x, y : X), x = y is itself a
proposition by assumption.
By a similar argument we have
Theorem 2.6. If propositions form an exponential ideal in U , then for any X , we have
isProp(isContr(X)).
Proof. Let (c, w)(c′, w′) : isContr(x). Then we have c = c′ by some path p = w(c′). Moreover,
since isContr(X) implies isProp(X), we have that Π(x : X), c′ = x is a proposition, so w trans-
ports over p to w′.
Theorem 2.7. If propositions form an exponential ideal in U , then for any A : U and any P : A→ U ,
the type
(
Π(a : A), isProp(P (a))
)
→ isProp(Π(a : A), P (a))
is a proposition.
Proof. Since propositions form an exponential ideal, the type isProp(X) is a proposition for any
typeX . Also because propositions form an exponential ideal, if Y is a proposition, thenB → Y
is a proposition for any type B. Then in particular, we have that
(
Π(a : A), isProp(P (a))
)
→ isProp(Π(a : A), P (a))
is a proposition.
By Lemma 2.2 we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 2.8. The type
(
Π(a : A), isProp(P (a))
)
→ isProp(Π(a : A), P (a))
is a proposition. I.e., the statement that propositions form an exponential ideal is a proposition.
Now that we know that whether propositions form an exponential ideal is a proposition,
we may assert this as an axiom. Here instead, we take it as a property of a universe
Definition 2.9 (Function extensionality). AuniverseU satisfies function extensionalitywhenpropo-
sitions form an exponential ideal in U . That is, the type
ExpPropU
def
= Π(A : U),Π(P : A→ U),
(
Π(a : A), isProp(P (a))
)
→ isProp(Π(a : A), P (a))
has an element.
The axiomof function extensionality is usually given via statements F1 or F2 of Theorem 2.1,




= Π(A : U),Π(B : A→ U),Π(f, g : Π(x : A), P (x)), isEquiv(happlyf,g),
so that function extensionality gives an element ofFunExt. From this for any f, g : Π(x : A), B(x)
we get a map
funextf,g : (f ∼ g)→ (f = g),
which is an inverse to happlyf,g. We will see shortly that isEquiv(f) is a proposition for all f ,
and so FunExt is itself a proposition, but already we know that the type ExpProp is a retract of
FunExt.
Function extensionality is the first extension to MLTT we need to develop the univalent
approach. We will assume function extensionality in Part II, and often use it tacitly—showing
that two functions are equal by showing a homotopy between them. However, we will not
assume function extensionality just yet, as we show in Section 2.4 that function extensionality
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follows from the univalence axiom. The other extensionswe need are truncations and proposition
extensionality, which we cover shortly.
2.2 Logic of propositions
Recall that logic is traditionally interpreted in type theory according to the Curry-Howard in-
terpretation,
P ∧Q ≡ P ×Q
P ∨Q ≡ P +Q
P ⇒ Q ≡ P → Q
¬P ≡ P → ∅
∀(a : A), P (a) ≡ Π(a : A), P (a)
∃(a : A), P (a) ≡ Σ(a : A), P (a).
This interpretation is not always well-behaved. Consider, for example, the image of a function
f : A → B, which is the set of all b : B such that there exists a : A with f(a) = b. Using Σ for
exists, we have the Curry-Howard image, imCH(f) : U as the type
imCH(f)
def
= Σ(b : B),Σ(a : A), f(a) = b.
However, this type is equivalent to A:
Lemma 2.10. For any f : A → B, the second projection pr1 : imCH(f) → A is an equivalence, and f
factors as f(x) = pr0(pr−11 (x)).
Proof. Reshuffling the quantifiers in imCH(f) gives an equivalence
(




Σ(a : A),Σ(b : B), f(a) = b
)
.
As Σ(b : B), f(a) = b is the singleton at f(a) we have
(








and the first projection gives an equivalence. The second projection pr0 imCH(f) → A is the
composition of these two maps, and so is itself an equivalence. An inverse is then given by the
map e(a) = (f(a), refl). Then for any a : Awe have that f(a) = pr0(e(a)).
The point is thatΣ(x : A), P (x) is not guaranteed to be a proposition, even ifP (x) is a propo-
sition for each x : A, so using Σ carries extra structure. In this case, the extra structure allows us
to recover all of A. Instead, we want a logic of propositions in which ∃(x : A), P (x) is guaranteed
to be a proposition, so that to say that the statement b is in the image of f corresponds to a
propositional version of saying that the fiber of b is inhabited. Then we can define the image to
be
im(f) ≡ Σ(b : B), ∃(a : A), f(a) = b.
We immediately see that we cannot in general expect an equivalence between im(f) and the
type
∃(a : A),Σ(b : B), f(a) = b,
as this type is a proposition, but the image need not be.
Topos logic resolves this issue by restricting our attention to subsingletons. We can instead
use isProp in Section 1.5. However, in order to encode a proposition-valued version of ∃, or even
a proposition-valued version of∨, wemust extend our type theorywith propositional truncation.
Definition 2.11. For any type X : U , a propositional truncation of X is a type ‖X‖ which is a
proposition, together with a map
| − | : X → ‖X‖
such that if P is any other proposition, any map f : X → P factors uniquely through the map
| − |.
We say that a type X is inhabited when ‖X‖ has an element.
The truncation can be defined in several ways: by directly extending MLTT; as a higher in-
ductive type (Section 2.7); via resizing (Section 2.5), or by assuming the law of excludedmiddle.
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In particular, if we assume the law of excluded middle: we have A → (¬¬A) for any type
A. Now take any proposition P such that A → P . By contraposition we have ¬P → ¬A, and
then since both ¬A and ¬P are propositions, using excluded middle we can get ¬¬A→ ¬¬P .
As P is a proposition, we may (again using excluded middle) eliminate the double negation in
front of P to get ¬¬A→ P .
The higher-inductive type we give in Section 2.7 directly expresses the universal property
of truncation as a rule of construction, while the resizing and LEM approach encode the propo-
sitional truncation concretely. Formally, in the absence of a general framework for higher-
inductive types (see the discussion in Section 2.8), the higher-inductive type must be added
directly, so the higher-inductive approach corresponds to adding truncations directly. This
was already studied as squash types before univalent type theory arose.
As we are working informally, it is enough for us to say that we are positing directly that
each typeX has a propositional truncation. Oncewe have the truncation, we can begin to study
how it behaves. In particular, truncation is idempotent up to equivalence, which follows from
a more general observation.
Lemma 2.12. If P is a proposition, then P ' ‖P‖.
Proof. We need only see that P ⇔ ‖P‖. Since P is a proposition, we have that id : P → P
factors through the map | − | : P → ‖P‖.
The utility of the above lemma is as follows: Wewill often define some operation T ′ on types
such that T ′(X) = ‖T (X)‖. The type T (X) may contain useful information, but truncation
hides this. Often, however, T (X) is already a proposition, so we have that T ′(X) ' T (X) so we
can extract the information from T (X) already by knowing ‖T (X)‖. More generally, we have
Lemma 2.13. If P is a proposition and P ⇔ X , then P ' ‖X‖.
Proof. AsX → P and P is a proposition, we have ‖X‖ → P . Moreover, we have the composite
map P → X → ‖X‖. Hence, P ⇔ ‖X‖.
Lemma 2.14. Truncation is functorial: for any types X and Y ,
(X → Y )→ (‖X‖ → ‖Y ‖).
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Proof. Suppose f : X → Y . Then we have λx.|f(x)| : X → ‖Y ‖. As ‖Y ‖ is a proposition, we
then have a map ‖X‖ → ‖Y ‖.
By truncating the Curry-Howard interpretation everywhere that it fails to give a proposi-
tion, we get an interpretation of logic at the level of propositions.
P ∧Q def= P ×Q
P ∨Q def= ‖P +Q‖
P ⇒ Q def= P → Q
¬P def= P → ∅
∀(a : A), P (a) def= Π(a : A), P (a)
∃(a : A), P (a) def= ‖Σ(a : A), P (a)‖
WhereP andQ are propositions on the first three lines, andP : A→ U is a predicate on a typeA
in the last two lines. Each of these types is a proposition: The typeP∧Q is a proposition because
P and Q are propositions; the types P ∨ Q and ∃(a : A), P (a) are propositions by definition,
whileP → Q andΠ(a : A), P (a) are propositions by function extensionality. In general, wewill
only use the logical notation just defined when we are using ∃ or ∨, or trying to make explicit
the connection between what we are doing and some traditional logical principle.
This interpretation allows us to define the image as we wanted to above.
Definition 2.15. The image of f is the type
im(f)
def




= Σ(b : B), ∃(a : A), (f(a) = b).
That is, the image of f is the type of all b : B such that there exists (as property) an a : A
with f(a) = b.
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While in general + is not guaranteed to give propositions, the coproduct of disjoint propo-
sitions is always again a proposition.
Lemma 2.16. IfA andB are disjoint propositions (I.e., such that¬(A×B)), thenA+B is a proposition;
hence A+B ' A ∨B.
Proof. Let x, x′ : A+B, and do a case analysis on x and x′:
· Case 1: x = inl a and x′ = inl a′. As A is a proposition, a = a′, and so inl a = inl a′.
· Case 2: x = inr b and x′ = inr b′. Similar to Case 1.
· Case 3: x = inl a and x′ = inr b′. Then we have (a, b′) : A×B, but we assumed ¬(A×B),
and so we get x = x′.
· Case 4: x = inr b and x′ = inl a′ Similar to Case 3.
Definition 2.17. A type P is decidable if P + ¬P .
A predicate P : A→ U is decidable if Π(a : A), P (a) + ¬P (a).
A type A has decidable equality or is discrete when for all a, a′ : A, the type a = a′ is decidable.
This terminology is standard in constructive mathematics, but since we also deal with com-
putability theory, this terminology creates a clash. We will always use recursive or computable
when discussing recursive decidability; nevertheless, to avoid confusionwewill sometimes say
that P is complemented when P + ¬P . The standard example of a discrete type is the type of
natural numbers, which is decidable by the same argument as Theorem 1.13.
Lemma 2.18. For any family of types P : X → U , we have
∥∥Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖ ∥∥ ' ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖
Proof. We need only show logical equivalence. For the implication
∥∥Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖ ∥∥→ ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ ,
it is enough to define a map
(
Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖
)
→ ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ ,
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and by currying, such a map is the same thing as a map
Π(x : X), ‖P (x)‖ → ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ .
Fixing x : X , a map ‖P (x)‖ → ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ arises by functoriality of truncation from any
map P (x)→ Σ(x : X), P (x), and λp.(x, p) suffices.
For the other direction, it is enough to define a map
(
Σ(x : X), P (x)
)
→ Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖ ,
and λ(x, p).(x, |p|) suffices.
Lemma 2.19. IfX is a type andP : X → U is a family of types overX such that isProp (Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖),
then (Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖) ' ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ .
Proof. As isProp (Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖), we have an equivalence
‖Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖‖ ' Σ(x : X), ‖P (x)‖ ,
and the latter is equivalent to ‖Σ(x : X), P (x)‖ by the previous lemma.
2.3 Surjections, embeddings and equivalences
Wecandecompose isEquiv(f) into linv(f)×rinv(f), which correspond to saying that f is a section
and f is a retraction. We can similarly decompose the notion of having contractible fibers: since
isContr(A) is equivalent to A× isProp(A), for f : A→ B, we can restate isContr(f) as
Π(b : B), isProp(fibf b)× ‖fibf (b)‖ .
We can then split these two notions to arrive at the following definitions.
Definition 2.20. A function f : A→ B is
· an embedding if it has propositional fibers:
Π(b : B), isProp(fibf b).
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· a surjection if it has inhabited fibers:
Π(b : B), ‖fibf (b)‖.
Then this directly gives us that a function has contractible fibers iff it is both a surjection
and an embedding. By Theorem 1.21, we have that a function is an equivalence iff it is both an
embedding and a surjection.
Note that we follow the HoTT Book in highlighting the subtlety of the definition by using
the word embedding rather than injection. However, the HoTT Book defines embedding by look-
ing at apf , which is sometimes more useful. Our definition instead gives a symmetry between
embedding and surjection. Nevertheless, the above definition is indeed equivalent to the defi-
nition given in the HoTT Book.
Lemma 2.21. A function f : A → B is an embedding iff apf : (x = y) → (f(x) = f(y)) is an
equivalence for each x, y : A.
Proof. We need to see that apf has contractible fibers iff f has propositional fibers. Fix b : B,
and (x, p), (y, q) : fibf (b). We have
(
(x, p) = (y, q)
)
' Σ(r : x = y), p = apf (r) · q
' Σ(r : x = y), apf (r) = p · q−1
' fibapf (p · q
−1).
So if apf has contractible fibers, then f has propositional fibers. On the other hand, for any
p : f(x) = f(y) we have (x, p) and (y, refl) in fibf (f(y)), so that
(
(x, p) = (y, refl)
)
' fibapf (p).
Then if f has propositional fibers, apf has contractible fibers.
In the case where B is a set, we can simplify the above characterization; in this case, it is
enough to know that there is a map f(x) = f(y) → x = y. We will give a somewhat indirect
proof, in order to introduce an important observation byMartín Escardó concerning retracts of
identity types.
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Lemma 2.22. Suppose R : X → X → U and that we have maps
r : Π(x, y : X), x = y → R(x, y)
s : Π(x, y : X), R(x, y)→ x = y,
such that rx,y is a left inverse of sx,y for all x, y : X . Then rx,y and sx,y are inverse. Hence, there is an
equivalence R(x, y) ' (x = y) for all x, y : X .
Proof. Since we already have that rx,y ◦ sx,y is homotopic to the identity, then we only need
to see that s(r(p)) = p for all p : x = y. Notice that s ◦ r is an idempotent function of type
Π(x, y : X), (x = y) → (x = y), since r is left inverse to s. Then it is enough to show that any
family of functions
f : Π(x, y : X), (x = y)→ (x = y)
such that (f ◦ f) ∼ f is homotopic to the identity. Since refl is the identity with respect to
composition, we have
f(refl) = f(refl)  refl
for any function f : Π(x, y : X), (x = y) → (x = y). Then by path induction, any function
f : Π(x, y : X), (x = y)→ (x = y) satisfies
Π(x, y : X),Π(p : x = y), f(p) = f(reflx)  p.
In particular, if f is idempotent we have
f(p) = f(f(p)) = f(refl)  f(p),
where the second equality is the previous observation. Then composition with f(p)−1, gives
f(refl) = refl. Applying path induction, we then have that for any p : x = y that f(p) = p for
any family of idempotent functions on x = y. In particular, we have that (s ◦ r)(p) = p, so s is
also a left inverse of r.
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Theorem 2.23. If B is a set, then f : A → B is an embedding iff for each x, y : A there is a map
h : (f(x) = f(y))→ (x = y).
Proof. As B is a set, f(x) = f(y) is a proposition, so h tells us that f(x) = f(y) is a retract of
x = y. So, for every x, y : A we have f(x) = f(y) is a retract of x = y, and by Lemma 2.22 we
have an equivalence
(f(x) = f(y)) ' (x = y).
We have stated embedding and surjection as if they were property, not structure. Function
extensionality tells us that this is justified:
Lemma 2.24. In the presence of function extensionality, being an embedding, being a surjection and
having contractible fibers are all propositions.
Proof. Function extensionality tells us that propositions form an exponential ideal and that
isProp(X) is always a proposition, so being an embedding is a proposition; similarly since
isContr(X) is a proposition for any X : U , so is isContr(f) for any f : A → B; again using
function extensionality, since truncations are propositions by definition, we have that being a
surjection is a proposition.
We have alluded to the fact that isContr(f) and isEquiv(f) are equivalent. In the presence
of function extensionality, it is enough to show that isEquiv(f) is a proposition, since isContr(f)
and isEquiv(f) are logically equivalent. First note that if f : A → B has an inverse, then the
composition maps (f ◦−) : (C → A) → (C → B) and (−◦ f) : (B → C) → (A → C) do as
well, by composition with the inverse of f . As a result, we have the following.
Theorem 2.25. If U satisfies function extensionality, then for any A,B : U , if f : A → B has an
inverse, then rinv(f) and linv(f) are contractible.
Proof. Fix f : A → B with an inverse. By function extensionality, linv(f) is equivalent to the
fiber of (−◦ f) over idA. By the above observation, we know that (−◦ f) has an inverse, and so
has contractible fibers. Similarly, rinv(f) is equivalent to the fiber of (f ◦−) over idB .
Theorem 2.26. If U satisfies function extensionality, then for any A,B : U and any f : A → B, we
have that isEquiv(f) is a proposition.
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Proof. Note that isEquiv(f) ' linv(f)× rinv(f). If e : isEquiv(f), then f is invertible, so isEquiv(f)
is a product of contractible types by function extensionality, and so is a proposition. Briefly, we
have
isEquiv(f)→ isProp(isEquiv(f)).
Now apply Lemma 2.2.
Corollary 2.27. If U satisfies function extensionality, then for any A,B : U and any f : A → B we
have
isContr(f) ' isEquiv(f).
Proof. Function extensionality tells us that the types are logically equivalent propositions.
2.4 Proposition extensionality and univalence
As with functions, MLTT provides no way to show that two types are equal, so if we want to
prove types to be equal, we need an extensionality principle for types. Before examining the
situation for all types, we look at propositions.
In logical languages (including the Mitchell-Benabou language), two propositions are con-
sidered equal if they are logically equivalent. This is not possible in MLTT with our definition
of proposition, so we suggest an extensionality principle for propositions.
Definition 2.28. A universe U satisfies proposition extensionality if whenever A : U and B : U are
propositions and A⇔ B, then A = B: Let
PropExtU
def
= Π(A,B : U), isProp(A)→ isProp(B)→ (A⇔ B)→ (A = B).
U satisfies proposition extensionality when there is propext : PropExtU .
Notice that function extensionality tells us already that A ' B is a proposition when A and
B are propositions, since A ' B is a proposition indexed sum of propositions. This gives us
the following slight strengthenings of Lemma 1.7 and Lemma 1.11.
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Lemma 2.29. If U satisfies function extensionality, and A : U and B : U are propositions, then
(A⇔ B) ' (A ' B).
Proof. We have that
(A⇔ B)⇔ (A ' B),
and both sides are propositions, so this implies
(A⇔ B) ' (A ' B).
So in the presence of function extensionality we can reformulate the type of proposition
extensionality as
Π(A,B : U), isProp(A)→ isProp(B)→ (A ' B)→ (A = B).
Since we have that A ' B is a proposition when both types are propositions, this tells us
that A ' B is a retract of A = B, and since A ' B is a proposition, the retraction can
be given by any map (A = B) → (A ' B). We may as well use the map idtoequiv. In
short, we have that proposition extensionality and function extensionality together imply that
idtoequiv : (A = B)→ (A ' B) has a right inverse when A and B are propositions. As a corol-
lary, we have
Lemma 2.30. Proposition extensionality and function extensionality together imply
Π(A,B : U), isProp(A)→ isProp(B)→ isEquiv(idtoequivA,B).
This principle is known as propositional univalence.
In the section on function extensionality, we said we wanted axioms to be propositions, but
we have not yet shown proposition extensionality to be a proposition.
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Theorem 2.31. If U satisfies function extensionality, then propositional univalence implies A = B is
a proposition whenever A and B are propositions. Hence, in the presence of function extensionality,
proposition extensionality is a proposition.
Proof. When A and B are propositions, we already know (A ' B) ' (A⇔ B). As A⇔ B is a
proposition, proposition extensionality implies that A = B is a proposition as well.
As proposition extensionality implies propositional univalence, we have
PropExt→ isProp(A = B),
whenever A and B are propositions. The type of proposition extensionality is of the form
Π(x : X), A = B, and since propositions form an exponential ideal, we have
PropExt→ isProp(PropExt).
Hence, PropExt is a proposition.
In the statement of propositional univalence, we could drop the condition that A andB are
propositions, to get the type
UAU
def
= Π(A,B : U), isEquiv(idtoequivA,B).
This type says that all equivalences arise from a path A = B. The axiom that it is inhabited is
known as the univalence axiom.
Definition 2.32. A universe U is univalent when there is an element of UAU . In particular, if U
is univalent, for A,B : U we have a map
ua : (A ' B)→ (A = B)
such that ua and idtoequiv are inverse.
In fact, by Lemma 2.22, it is enough to say that idtoequiv has a left inverse.
Theorem 2.33. If idtoequiv : (A = B) → (A ' B) has a right inverse for each A,B : U , then
idtoequiv is an equivalence for each A,B : U .
73
Function extensionality andproposition extensionality follow fromunivalence. Proposition
extensionality follows directly, but function extensionality takesmorework. The argument here
is abstracted from Voevodsky’s original proof that univalence implies function extensionality,
as presented in [33]. It hinges around the total type of the identity relation, which we call the
diagonal of a type.
Definition 2.34. Given a type A : U , define the diagonal of A to be the type
∆A
def
= Σ(a, a′ : A), a = a′.
There is then a diagonal map δA : A→ ∆A given by
δ(x)
def
= (x, x, refl).
It is straightforward to check that the diagonal map is an equivalence. In particular, we
have two candidate inverses given by pr0 and pr1. Both are left inverse directly since we have
the equalities pr0(δ(x)) = pr1(δ(x)) = x. For the other direction, we have
δ(pr0(x, y, p)) = (x, x, reflx)),
so we wish to see that (x, x, reflx) =∆A (x, y, p). As refl : x = x, we need to see that we have
q : x = y such that transportx=−(q, reflx) = p. Of course, Theorem 1.19 determines a witness
w : transport(p, reflx) = reflx  p, so the given p suffices. For pr1, the argument is similar.
Now consider the class of maps arising from paths, the path-induced equivalences:
PIEA,B(f)
def
= Σ(p : A = B), f = idtofun(p).
Note that this type is the Curry-Howard image of idtofun. We have rA : PIEA,A(idA) given
by rA
def
= (reflA, reflidA). We can then define a version of idtoequiv for PIE using the function





In particular, we have PIEA,B(idtofun(p)) for any p : A = B. Write A 'P B for
Σ(f : A→ B),PIEA,B(f).
Then we have





Note that idtopie is one direction of an equivalence (A 'P B) ' (A = B) given by Lemma 2.10.
Take SA,B : A 'P B → A = B to be a section of idtopie.
Lemma 2.35. Let P : Π(A,B : U), (A → B) → U such that Π(A : U), P (idA). For every A,B : U
and p : A = B, the map idtofun(p) satisfies P . Formally,
Π(A,B : U),Π(p : A = B), P (idtofun(p)).
Proof. By path induction, we need only see P (idtofun(reflA)) for each A, and we have P (idA) by
assumption.
That is, we can prove something for all path-induced equivalences by looking at the identity
maps
Lemma 2.36. Let P : Π(A,B : U), (A → B) → U such that Π(A : U), P (idA), then every path-
induced equivalence in U satisfies P . That is, for all A,B : U and f : A→ B, PIE(f)→ P (f).
Proof. Note that every e : A 'P B can be written as idtofun(S(e)), and apply the previous
lemma. The key point here is that idtopie has a section.
Corollary 2.37. We have that PIE(f)→ isEquiv(f).
Proof. The identity map is an equivalence.
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In particular, if f is a path-induced equivalence, then f is both a section and a retraction.
Ultimately, univalence tells us that equivalences are exactly path-induced equivalences.
Lemma 2.38. If U is univalent, then for any A,B : U we have
Π(f : A→ B), (isEquiv(f) ' PIE(f)).
Proof. By Theorem 1.28, we have that all maps PIE(f) → isEquiv(f) are equivalences iff the
induced map
e : (Σ(f : A→ B),PIE(f))→ (Σ(f : A→ B), isEquiv(f))
is an equivalence. The inducedmap e factors as the equivalence (A 'P B) ' (A = B) followed
by idtoequiv. Since univalence says that idtoequiv is an equivalence, it says that e is the composite
of equivalences.
However, to show that univalence implies function extensionality, it is enough to assume
that the path-induced equivalences satisfy two properties that are satisfied by equivalences,
namely it is enough to assume
· path-induced equivalences are closed under homotopy;
· all diagonal maps δX : X → ∆X are path-induced equivalences.
We assume these explicitly as needed in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2.39. Suppose path-induced equivalences are closed under homotopies. If f is a path-induced
equivalence, then so is (−◦ f).
Proof. We need only see that (−◦ f) is homotopic to a path-induced map when PIE(f). First
note that for any p : X = X ′ and g : X ′ → Y , we have transportλX.X→Y (p−1, g) = g ◦ idtofun(p),
by path induction: when p ≡ refl both sides are equal to g. So then we have that
transportλX.X→Y (S(f, e)−1, g) = g ◦ f,
and by the discussion in Section 1.7, we know that every transport map is homotopic to a path-
induced function.
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Theorem 2.40. If path-induced equivalences are closed under homotopies, and for each X , we have
PIE(δX), then for any f, g : A→ B we have f ∼ g → f = g.
Proof. Note that for any X we have pr0 ◦ δX = pr1 ◦ δX by definition and the computation rule
for function types. As δX is a path-induced equivalence, so is precomposition with δX , but
then we also have that −◦ δX is a section, and so we have that pr0 =∆(X)→X pr1. Now take
f, g : A→ B with η : f ∼ g. Then we have h : A→ ∆B given by
h(x)
def
= (f(x), g(x), η(x)).
Finally, we have
f = pr0 ◦h = pr1 ◦h = g.
Corollary 2.41. IfU is univalent, then for anyA,B : U and any f, g : A→ B, we have f ∼ g → f = g.
Proof. We need to see that univalence implies that path-induced equivalences are closed un-
der homotopies and that δX is path-induced. As univalence implies PIE(f) ' isEquiv(f), it is
enough to show that equivalences are closed under homotopies, which is immediate by transi-
tivity of homotopy, and that isEquiv(δX), which we showed above.
In fact, the above non-dependent version of function extensionality—which we will call
naive function extensionality—implies full function extensionality. We proceed in two steps:
We first show that non-dependent function extensionality implies that f ◦− is an equivalence
whenever f is, and then that this implies that contractible types form an exponential ideal.
Lemma 2.42. Fix types A,B,X : U and let f : A → B have inverse g : B → A. If U satisfies naive
function extensionality, then g ◦− is an inverse of f ◦− : (X → A)→ (X → B).
Proof. Let h : X → A and x : X . We have that g(f(h(x))) = h(x) since g and f are inverse. Then
we have by naive function extensionality that g ◦ f ◦h = h. Hence, (g ◦−) ◦(f ◦−) ' idX→A.
The other direction is similar.
Lemma 2.43. If B : A → U and each B(a) is contractible, then Π(x : A), B(x) is a retract of
Σ(h : A→ Σ(x : A), B(x)), pr0 ◦h = id.
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Proof. The section map is given by
s(f) = (λa.(a, f(a)), refl),
while the retraction map is given by
r(g, p) = λa. transportB(happly(p, a), pr1(g(a))).
For f : Π(x : A), B(x) we compute
r(s(f)) = λa. transportB(happly(refl, a)), pr1(a, f(a))
= λa. transportB(refla, f(a))
= λa.f(a)
= f.
Theorem 2.44. If U satisfies naive function extensionality, then U satisfies function extensionality.
Proof. Let B : A → U such that B(a) is contractible for each a : A. We wish to see that
Π(x : A), B(x) is contractible. By Lemma 2.43, we know that this type is a retract of the type
Σ(h : A→ Σ(x : A), B(x)), pr0 ◦h = id; since contractible types are closed under retracts, it suf-
fices to show that Σ(h : A→ Σ(x : A), B(x)), pr0 ◦h = id is contractible. Notice that this type is
the fiber of id under the map
pr0 ◦− : (A→ Σ(x : A), B(x))→ (A→ A).
A map is an equivalence if and only if all its fibers are contractible, so it suffices to prove that
pr0 ◦− is an equivalence and so by Lemma 2.42, it is enough to show that the first projection
pr0 : Σ(x : A), B(x)→ A is an equivalence. A candidate inverse for pr0 is given by g(a) = (a, c)
where c is the center of contraction of B(a). Then pr0(g(a)) = a by refl, and then for any pair
(a, b) : Σ(x : A), B(x) we have that (a, b) = (a, c), since contractible types are propositions.
Corollary 2.45. Any univalent universe satisfies function extensionality.
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Proof. Weknow that any univalent universe satisfies naive function extensionality, and that any
universe satisfying naive function extensionality satisfies function extensionality.
In fact, the converse of Lemma 2.38 holds. That is, univalence says exactly that the structure
of a path-induced equivalence is the same as the structure of an equivalence. Univalence is
sometimes stated informally as “all equivalences arise as transport”, or “all equivalences arise
from paths”. We can in fact prove univalence to be equivalent to a very weak interpretation of
this informal statement.
Theorem 2.46. A universe U is univalent if and only if, for all A,B : U and f : A → B we have the
implication
isEquiv(f)→ PIE(f).
Proof. Given a family of maps η : isEquiv(f) → PIE(f), we have function extensionality, by
Theorem 2.40. Fix some f : A → B. Then, by function extensionality we have that isEquiv(f)
is a proposition. Our assumption tells us that isEquiv(f) ⇔ PIE(f), and since isEquiv(f) is
a proposition, we know that any map PIE(f) → isEquiv(f) is a retraction with section η. In
particular, the map ε given by path induction in Corollary 2.37 has η as a section. This then lifts
to a section-retraction pair
s :
(




Σ(f : A→ B),PIE(f)
)
s(f, e) = (f, η(e))
r :
(




Σ(f : A→ B), isEquiv(f)
)
r(f, e) = (f, ε(e))
By Lemma 2.22, we only need to see that idtoequiv has a section, but we defined ε so that
idtoequiv(p) ∼ (idtofun(p), ε(idtofun(p))), which means that idtoequiv factors as r ◦ idtopie. As
the projection pr= : (A 'P B) → (A = B) is a section of idtopie, the composite pr= ◦ s is a
section of idtoequiv.
We are finally in a place to show that univalence is a proposition.
Theorem 2.47. The type UAU , is a proposition.
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Proof. By Lemma 2.2 it is enough to show that univalence implies that UAU is a proposition.
We know that univalence implies function extensionality. Since function extensionality im-
plies that isEquiv(f) is a proposition and that propositions form an exponential ideal, function
extensionality implies isProp(UAU ). Then univalence implies isProp(UAU ).
The use of equivalences instead of functions with an inverse in the statement of univalence
is crucial. Most of the arguments in this sectionworkwhenwe replace isEquiv(f)with inverse(f)
everywhere. In particular, If we replace idtoequiv with the corresponding function
i : A = B → Σ(f : A→ B), inverse(f),
then the corresponding version of univalence tells us that inverse(f) is a section of PIE(f), and
so inverse(f) must be a proposition. However, we mentioned before that if f : A → B has an
inverse, then
inverse(f) ' Π(x : A), x = x.
So, if A is not a set, then inverse(f) is not a proposition. Moreover, both univalence and the
corresponding statement with inverse(f) imply that there are types which are not sets. Conse-
quently, the type
Π(A,B : U), (A = B) '
(




We will limit our use of univalence in the main development, using instead function exten-
sionality and proposition extensionality. The reason is twofold. First, since we work primarily
at the level of sets and propositions, it is usually enough to use these two weaker principles;
the full power of univalence is more than we require. Secondly, the discussion of topos logic
above is not simply for comparison; while proposition extensionality as stated in this section is
not expressible in topos logic, a form of proposition extensionality does hold. As a result, the
technical work in Part II should translate with a little work to a topos-theoretic setting, as long
as we do not use univalence. In other words, we hope that the material in Part II will still have
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technically interesting content to a mathematician who rejects or is otherwise uninterested in
univalent mathematics.
Wewill use function extensionality andproposition extensionality for all universes through-
out. This means in particular that the following all hold in all universe.
· propositions form an exponential ideal (Theorem 2.1.F3);
· contractible types form an exponential ideal (Theorem 2.1.F4);
· all contractible types are equal (Corollary 1.12);
· propositional univalence (Lemma 2.30);
· proposition extensionality is a proposition (Theorem 2.31);
· for any function f : A→ B, we have that isEquiv(f) is a proposition (Theorem 2.26);
· For any f : A→ B, the types isEquiv(f) and isContr(f) are equivalent (Corollary 2.27).
Proposition extensionality and function extensionality allow us to strengthen Lemma 1.11.
Lemma 2.48. The following are equivalent (in fact, equal) for any type A:
· A ' 1; (A is equivalent to 1)
· isContr(A); (A is contractible)
· A× isProp(A); (A is a proposition with an element)
Proof. Each of the above is a proposition: ForA ' 1, this is a sum of propositions over a propo-
sition; for isContr(A), we have already seen that this is a proposition in Theorem 2.6. Finally,
we have (A× isProp(A))→ isProp(A), and so then
(A× isProp(A))→ isProp(A× isProp(A)),
hence by Lemma 2.2, we have A× isProp(A) is a proposition.
As the types are logically equivalent propositions (by Lemma 1.11), they are all equivalent.
2.5 Resizing rules
One difference between MLTT and Topos logic is that Martin-Löf type theory is a predicative
system which uses universe levels to avoid paradoxes of self-reference. However, the stratifica-
tion of types into universe levels limits our ability to make certain arguments. For example, the
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type A → Prop, which we view as the power set of A, is parameterized by the universe level
of Prop. In particular, we have for each universe level i, a type Propi : Ui+1, so that A → Propi
has type Uj , where j is the maximum of i + 1 and the universe level of A. On the other hand
any topos has an object Ω of truth values, so that ΩA is the power set of A. MLTT can be made
impredicative by resizing propositions; we explain this below, and discuss it where relevant,
but we do not make use of resizing principles anywhere in the main development.
In his Bergen lecture [90], Voevodsky introduced two resizing rules, which say informally,
1. if P : Ui is such that isProp(P ), then in fact P : U0;
2. for any Ui, we have that Σ(A : Ui), isPropA : U0.
These allow us to define Ω def= Prop0, and ensure that no new propositions are added at higher
levels. However, Voevodsky posited these as rules in the formal theory, and the consistency of
these rules is an open question.
The HoTT book gives a weaker version of resizing. For any universe level i, we have an
inclusion Propi → Propi+1, where the type Propi → Propi+1 is a type in Ui+2. The HoTT book
assumes that all of these inclusion maps are equivalences, so that all propositions can be re-
placed with a proposition in U0. This allows us to define Ω : U1 by Ω
def
= Prop0, and then we
have an equivalence Ω ' Propn in universe Un+1. Note that this weaker form of propositional
resizing follows already from LEM, since LEM tells us that Propi ' 2 for any universe level i.
If we have some type Ω : U of propositions, then wemay define the truncation for anyX : U
as ‖X‖ as
‖X‖ ≡ Π(P : Ω), (X → P )→ P.
We have | − | : X → ‖X‖ given by
|x| = λP.λf.f(x).
Now if P is any proposition, and we have f : X → P , we can factor f through | − | and a map
‖X‖ → P given by w 7→ f(P,w).
While we will sometimes discuss the consequences of resizing, we will not use it in any of
the main development.
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2.6 Homotopy levels and sets
Now thatwe’ve developed some of the theory of equivalences, we can direct our attentionmore
fully to homotopy n-types, defined in Section 1.5. First, we note that being an n-type is in fact
a proposition, and then we continue onto some closure properties.
Lemma 2.49. For allX , we have isProp(isProp(X)) andmoreover, for anyn, we have isProp(is-n-type(X)).
That is, being a proposition or a homotopy n-type is a proposition.
Proof. For isProp, this is Theorem 2.5 and function extensionality.
For the n-types, we proceed by induction: For n = −2, this is Lemma 2.2 and function
extensionality.
For n = k+1, assume that is-k-type is proposition-valued. Then Π(x, y : X), is-k-type(x = y)
is a proposition.
Lemma 2.50. If e : A→ B is an embedding, and B is an n+ 1-type, then so is A for n ≥ −1.
Proof. We have that (a = a′) ' (e(a) = e(a′)) and the later type is an n-type.
Theorem 2.51. If r : A→ B is a retraction, and A is an n-type, then B is an n-type.
Proof. For n ≥ −1, this follows from the previous lemma, since sections are embeddings. For
n = −2, this is Theorem 1.9.
Theorem 2.52. If e : A→ B is an embedding, and B has decidable equality, then so does A.
Proof. Let a, a′ : A. Since e is an embedding, we have (a = a′) ' (e(a) = e(a′)), and the latter
has decidable equality.
Lemma 2.53. If r : A→ B is a retraction and A has decidable equality, then so does B.
Theorem 2.54. The n-types are closed under equivalence: if A ' B and B is an n-type, then so is A.
Proof. As equivalences are in particular retractions, this follows from Theorem 2.51.
Theorem 2.55. The n-types are closed under Σ, for all n.
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Proof. Induction on n. For n = −2, it suffices to show that Σ(a : 1), P (a) is contractible when
each P (a) is, and in turn it is enough to show that 1× 1 is contractible, which is immediate. So
let A be an n+ 1-type and let B : A→ U such that B(a) is an n+ 1-type for all a : A. We have
that
(








and this is an n-type by the inductive hypothesis.
Theorem 2.56. The n-types form an exponential ideal for each n. In particular if B is an n-type, then
A→ B is an n-type.
Proof. By induction on n. For n = −2, this is function extensionality. Now let B(a) be an
n+ 1-type for each a : A, and let f, g : Π(a : A), B(a). We have
(f = g) '
(
Π(x : A), f(x) = g(x)
)
,
and this is an n-type by the inductive hypothesis.
In general, we will be interested in the level of sets and propositions. Importantly, this
includes all types with decidable equality.
Lemma 2.57. If A is a decidable type, then (¬¬A)→ A.
Proof. By induction on the element p : A+¬A. If p = inl a, then a : A, and so λx.a : (¬¬A)→ A.
Otherwise, we have p = inr n. But then if q : ¬¬A, we have q(n) : ∅, and so we have
(λq.!A(q(n))) : (¬¬A)→ A.
Theorem 2.58 (Hedberg). If A has decidable equality, then A is a set.
Proof. If A has decidable equality, then by Lemma 2.57 we have
Π(x, y : A),¬¬(x = y)→ (x = y).
As ¬¬X is a proposition for any X and X → ¬¬X for any X , we have that ¬¬X is a retract of
X whenever ¬¬X → X . In particular, if A has decidable equality, then for all x, y : A the type
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¬¬(x = y) is a retract of x = y. Then by Lemma 2.22, we know that ¬¬(x = y) ' (x = y). Since
¬¬(x = y) is a proposition, we then have that A is a set.
N.B. the above proof is not Hedberg’s original proof, and uses function extensionality, while
the original proof doesn’t.
Since we are particularly interested in sets, we collect the following facts, which we have
already proved elsewhere.
Theorem 2.59. The types ∅, 1, 2 and N are sets. Sets are closed under all basic type formers: If A is a
set, and B : A → U is such that Π(a : A), isSet(B(a)), then Σ(a : A), B(a) and Π(a : A), B(a) are
sets.
Theorem 2.60. If B is a set, then for any f : A→ B, the following are logically equivalent:
1. f is an embedding,
2. f is a monomorphism: For any g, h : X → A we have
(f ◦ g = f ◦h)→ (g = h).
Proof. Let f be an embedding and g, h : X → A such that f ◦ g = f ◦h. Then for any x : X we
have f(g(x)) = f(h(x)), and since f is an embedding g = h.
Now let f be a monomorphism, and fix x, y : A such that f(x) = f(y). Define cx, cy : 1→ A
as cx(u)
def
= x and cy(u)
def
= x. As f(x) = f(y), we have f ◦ cx = f ◦ cy, and so cx = cy, and x = y,
so f is an embedding.
Corollary 2.61. If B is a set, then for any f : A→ B, f being an embedding and f being a monomor-
phism are equivalent as types.
Proof. As B is a sets, the type
Π(X : U),Π(g, h : X → A), (f ◦ g = f ◦h)→ g = h,
is a proposition, so we have that the type witnessing that f is an embedding and the type
witnessing that f is a monomorphism are logically equivalent propositions.
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2.7 Higher-inductive types
There are two sorts of higher inductive types we will look at: quotient inductive types, which
we will use for comparison of our developments with other approaches to partiality, and the
homotopy circle, which we use as the prototypical example of a type which is not a set to show
when assumptions on types are necessary. This appears, for example, in Section 5.11, when we
discuss the difference between our notion of dominance and the usual one.
Quotient inductive types are given by specifying simultaneously an inductive type together
with a quotient of that type by some relation. The motivating example is that of set quotients:
given a type A and a relation R : A → A → Prop, we define the smallest set A/R for which
there is a map A→ A/R respecting R. Explicitly, the type A/R is defined inductively by
· a quotient map [−] : A→ A/R;
· for each x, y : Awith R(x, y), a path [x] = [y].
· the set truncation: For each x, y : A/R, and p, q : x = y, a path p = q.
Then the recursion principle forA/R says that ifB is any set, andwe have a function f : A→ B
such that R(x, y) → f(x) = f(y), then there is a unique map f/R : A/R → B such that
f(a) = (f/R)([a]) for all a : A.
Lemma 2.62. For any type A and any relation R : A→ A→ Prop, the quotient map [−] : A→ A/R
is surjective.
Proof. For any element of the form [a] : A/R, we know have that refl : [a] = [a]. For the higher
constructors, we need to see that |(a, refl)| = |(b, refl)| for any a, b : A with R(a, b), and that
being a surjection is a set. Since being a surjection is a proposition, both of these facts are
immediate.
The set truncation is necessary for this notion to be well-behaved: suppose we defined the
quotient of A by R as above, but without the truncation constructor, and consider the quotient
of 1 by the relation R with R(?, ?). This has as constructors,
· a point b : 1/R,
· a path b = b.
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This type is exactly the homotopy circle S1 given by Definition 2.64 below, which is not a set if
univalence holds. Then we would have that the quotient of a set by a relation is no longer a set.
On the other hand, we can form the propositional truncation as the set-quotient by the total
relation ∇ def= λx, y.1. We can take the truncation to be X/∇ with the quotient map X → X/∇
as the truncating map. Then any proposition P is in particular a set, and anymapX → P must
respect the equivalence relation, so it factors through X/∇.
It is more typical, however, to give the propositional truncation of X as a higher inductive
type by directly expressing the universal property: the type ‖X‖ is generated by
· a truncation constructor | − | : X → ‖X‖, and
· a family of path constructors Π(x, y : ‖X‖), (x = y).
There is a difference in the elimination principle for ‖X‖ as a HIT and X/∇. We can only
eliminate ‖X‖ into propositions, while we can eliminate X/∇ into any set A, so long as we
have a constant function X → A. However, we will see in Section 3.3 that the elimination
principle for X/∇ also holds for ‖X‖.
The quotient by an equivalence relation can be defined concretely in a higher universe; with
resizing, we can perform this truncation without raising universe levels. Define an equivalence
class of R to be a predicate P : A→ Prop such that P is equivalent to R(a,−) for an anonymous
a : A:
∃(a : A),Π(b : B), (P (b) ' R(a, b)) .
Then define
A R def= Σ(P : A→ U), P is an equivalence class of R.
Note that A R lives in U1. Nevertheless, we then have a map q : A→ A R given by
q(a) = λb.R(a, b).
This map q respects R, and so there is a map A/R→ A R.
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Theorem 2.63. For any type A : U and equivalence relation R : A → A → Prop, the type A  R
is a set, the map q : A → A  R is a surjection which respects R, and moreover the induced map
s : A/R→ A R is an equivalence.
Proof. Wehave thatA→ Prop is a set, and that being an equivalence class is a property, soAR
is a set, as a subtype of a set.
Let P : AR. We wish to see ∃(a : A), P = q(a). As q(a) = R(a,−), this is the definition of
being an equivalence class.
Next we need to see that ifR(a, a′), then q(a) = q(a′). For a fixed b, we have q(a)(b) = R(a, b)
and q(a′)(b) = R(a′, b), so we need to see that R(a, b) = R(a′, b). As both are propositions, we
need R(a, b)⇔ R(a′, b). We have maps in both directions by transitivity and symmetry of R.
Finally, we need to see that the induced map s : A/R → A  R is an equivalence. First, s is
surjective: as q is surjective, for any equivalence relation P , we have
∃(a : A), q(a) = P,
and q factors as s ◦ [−], so we have
∃(a : A), s[a] = P.
Finally, s is an embedding: let x, y : A/R and let s(x) = s(y). As x = y is a proposition, and [−]
is surjective, we may assume that x = [a] and y = [b] for some a, b : A. Then we have for any c
that
R(a, c) = s([a])(c) = s(x)(c) = s(y)(c) = s([b])(c) = R(b, c),
so that R(a, b) = R(b, b), and the latter is inhabited by reflexivity.
We turn now to the homotopy circle, which we use to show deficiencies in proposed no-
tions. The basic idea is that an obvious way of stating a particular notion may not interact as
expected with general types, andwe use S1 to show that we need to bemore subtle when defin-
ing a particular notion. This appears most clearly in Section 5.11, where we see why we cannot
translate definitions from synthetic domain theory directly.
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Definition 2.64. The homotopy circle, S1 : U , is inductively generated by
· an element base : S1,
· a path loop : base = base.
The recursion principle is easy to state:
· For any type C : U , with b : C and l : b = b, we have a unique map f : S1 → C such that
f(base) ≡ b
and
apf (loop) = l.
With ordinary inductive types, it is safe to treat the computation rules associated with recur-
sion and induction principles as judgemental equalities. For higher inductive types, there are
philosophical and technical issues with treating the computation rules as judgemental equali-
ties. More information on the status of higher-inductive types can be found in the discussion
at the end of the chapter (Section 2.8).
The induction principle has the same shape, but is unexpectedly trickier to state explicitly.
The key point is that the image of loop is no longer a simple path, but a path living over loop:
· For any C : S1 → U with b : C(base) and l : transportC(loop, b) = b, we have a unique
f : Π(x : S1), C(x) such that
f(base) ≡ b
and
apdf (loop) = l.
Note that here apdf (loop) must have type transportC(loop, b) = b, so the required equation for
the image of loop does type-check. The induction principle can be stated another way, which
we give as a lemma.
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Lemma 2.65. Given any C : S1 → U , we have that
(




Σ(b : C(base)), transportB(loop, b) = b
)
.
That is, dependent functions from S1 to a type family C are exactly given by an element of
C(base) and a path over loop in C.
Proof. Given f : Π(x : S1), C(x) define b def= f(base) and p def= apdf (loop), so that we have the
pair (b, p) : Σ(b : C(base)), transportC(loop, b) = b. This gives us a map
c :
(
Π(x : S1), C(x)
)
→ Σ(b : C(base)), transportC(loop, b) = b.
Now if (b, p) is any element of Σ(b : C(base)), transportC(loop, b) = b, we have that the depen-
dent function f : Π(x : S1), C(x) defined by f(base) = b and apdf (loop) = p is the unique
function f such that c(f) = (b, p). Hence, c has contractible fibers.
The utility of S1 as a counterexample stems from the fact that it is not a set:
Lemma 2.66. Assuming univalence, S1 is not a set.
There are several ways to prove this; in the HoTT Book, they show that S1 is equivalent to a
type (in a higher universe) which is not a set. We instead follow the proof that π1(S1) = Z. The
type-theoretical proof is an encode-decode proof (See Section 1.7).
Proof. We show that base = base is equivalent to Z, by giving a type family
code : S1 → U ,
along with a family of functions
encode : Π(x : S1), (base = x)→ code(x)
and a family of inverses







So that if code(base) ' (base = base) we have that base = base is equivalent to a set which is not
a proposition. Observe that we have transportcode(loop, z) = z + 1 as follows:
transportcode(loop, z) = idtofun(apdcode(loop), z) = idtofun(ua(succ), z) = z + 1.
Similarly, we have transportcode(loop−1, z) = z − 1.






For the loop case of decode, we need an element of
transportλx.code(x)→(base=x)(loop, loop−) = loop−.
We have
transportλx.code(x)→(base=x)(loop, loop−) = transportλx.→(base=x)(loop) ◦ loop− ◦ transportcode(loop−1)
= (λp.p  loop) ◦ loop− ◦ transportcode(loop−1)
= (λp.p  loop) ◦ loop− ◦ pred
= λn.loopn−1  loop
= λn.loopn.
We need to see that encode and decode are inverse. To show that decodex(encodex(p)) = p
for all x : S1 and p : base = xwe use based path induction:
decodebase(encodebase(refl)) = decode(transport
code(refl, 0)) = decode(0) = loop0 = refl.
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For the other direction, we use the induction principle for S1. The claim is that for all z : Z we
have encodebase(decodebase(z)) = z. That is, we want to see transportcode(loopz, 0) = z, but we
remarked earlier that transportcode(loop, x) = succ(x), and so we have
transportcode(loopz, 0) = 0 + z = z.
Note that even without univalence, we cannot have that S1 is a set, since our type theory is
still consistent with univalence. This means we can still use S1 to see whether a notion behaves
well with general types.
Lemma 2.67. We have Π(x, y : S1), ‖x = y‖.
Proof. By induction on both x and y: fix x ≡ y ≡ base. Then we have refl : x = y. Truncating
this element gives |refl| : ‖x = y‖. We need to give a path over loop in both coordinates from
|refl| to |refl|, but since ‖x = y‖ is a proposition, there is nothing to check.
Corollary 2.68. If Y is a set and f : S1 → Y , then for any x, y : S1 we have that f(x) = f(y).
Proof. Fix x, y : S1. By the previous lemma, we have ‖x = y‖. As Y is a set, f(x) = f(y) is a
proposition, so we may assume we have p : x = y. Then apf (p) : f(x) = f(y).
2.8 Discussion
Truncation was already being studied [60, 65] as squash types and bracket types before the uni-
valent notion of proposition was introduced. In fact, Awodey and Bauer [4] proposed propo-
sitions as bracket types already in 2004, in the context of extensional type theory. When the
general notion of higher-inductive type was introduced, they quickly became a standard exam-
ple. Higher inductive types are, however, poorly understood. The schema is intuitively clear,
but a mathematically satisfying account of their syntax and semantics is surprisingly difficult.
Lumsdaine and Shulman recently released an awaited approach to the semantics of HITs via
cell-monads with parameters [54], but these only work for HITs of a certain form, and it is not clear
if there is a syntactic scheme that corresponds precisely to the semantic notions they give. A
semantic view of HITs from the cubical approach is given in [20], and a view of HITs, focusing
on those that exist at the level of groupoids (which is enough for the HITs we are interested
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in here) is in [27]. On the syntactic side, recent progress can be seen in [45] and in the more
sweeping [15], which also contains a more thorough summary of the state of the art.
Higher-inductive types represent one standard approach to truncation, while propositional
resize represents another. It is open whether Voevodsky’s resizing rules are consistent with
MLTT [23]. The weaker form of resizing discussed in the HoTT Book holds in the simplicial set
model, and in fact in any model which validates the law of excluded middle.
The univalence axiom was first proposed by Vladimir Voevodsky, motivated by his sim-
plicial set model [46]. However, it was noticed (under the name universe extensionality) in the
groupoid model already by Hofmann and Streicher [37] in 1995, although all types in the uni-
verse are sets in the groupoid model. The notion of h-level is also due to Voevodsky. The first
proof of function extensionality from univalence was given by Voevodsky in his Foundations
library [91], and it has been been modified and reworked in various ways since. The proof
of function extensionality from naive function extensionality was first done by Voevdosky in
the Foundations library, but seems to have been overlooked until Martín Escardó found it and
translated it to Agda in his TypeTopology library [29].
Extensionality axioms, such as univalence, have always been treated with some trepidation
in type theory, since axioms break computational properties like canonicity—the metatheorem
that all terms of type N are judgementally equal to a numeral. Since the outset, there has been
hope that the univalence axiom can be given a computational interpretation. Following the
introduction of the first model in cubical sets [40, 8], a great deal of work has been done on
developing cubical type theories [18] which take paths as primitive, and in which the univalence




In the previous chapter, we developed the core ideas of univalentmathematics. Herewe turn to
the more traditional mathematical notions we will need in part 2. Our approach is still heavily
informed by the univalent perspective. In particular, choice principles in Section 3.6 are stated
in a form which is unique to univalent mathematics. We begin by examining relations and a
predicative notion of power set (Section 3.2). Importantly, we will see (in Theorem 3.6) that
assuming the univalence axiom, functions are single-valued relations, which will be a proto-
type of similar results about partial maps in Chapter 5. We then discuss a notion of constancy
introduced in [47] that will appear in a few places, before turning to the natural numbers. The
natural numbers satisfy a property that looks superficially like Markov’s principle, which al-
lows us to remove truncations in certain cases. This is an interesting example, and will be
crucial when working with computability in Part III; we also introduce here a representation
of a predicate on N as a function N→ N (which we give the ad hoc name characteristic function)
that will be used to define computability of predicates. Before turning to choice, we discuss an
internal notion of monad via Kleisli extension.
3.1 Assumptions
In the previous chapter, we introduced several extensions of MLTTwhich are used in univalent
approaches to mathematics. Here we lay out explicitly the assumptions we use in the rest of
the thesis.
Each of the following assumptions is parameterized by a universe U , and we assume them
for all universes.
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Assumption 1 (Function extensionality). Propositions form a strong exponential ideal in every
universe.
Assumption 2 (Proposition extensionality). For every universe U and for every propositions
P,Q : U , if P and Q are logically equivalent, then P = Q.
Assumption 3 (Propositional truncation). For every universe U and any type X : U we have
a proposition ‖X‖ : U and a map |−| : X → ‖X‖ universal among all propositions which X
maps into.
When we need univalence, we will assume it explicitly. We will not assume resizing rules,
but we occasionally discuss their consequences. Similarly, we will not use any higher inductive
types besides truncations, but we will sometimes discuss their properties. In particular, we
will compare our work to work by others using truncations (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2, as well as
Section 5.7), and we will look at the circle for motivation in Section 5.11.
3.2 Predicates and relations
In category theory, a subobject of an objectX is an equivalence class of monos intoX . Replacing
mono with embedding (Section 2.3), we could take a subobject to be an equivalence class of
embeddings into X . Since we should write the type of embeddings into X as
Σ(A : U),Σ(f : A→ X), isEmbedding(f),
an equality between embeddings (A, f,−) and (B, g,−) would consist of a path p : A = B such
that g ◦ idtofun(p) = f . If we have univalence, equality here is exactly the equivalence relation
we need; if not we should replace equality in the first component with equivalence as types.
With univalence, the equivalence relation of interest is simply equality, so there is no quo-
tienting to be done. However, even without univalence, for any embedding f : A → X we
can find a canonical representative of its equivalence class, by looking at the total space of the
fibers over f . In fact, this suggests a definition of subtype which works better in our frame-
work: predicates on X . Explicitly, given any embedding f : A → X , we have the predicate
fibf : X → U , which is proposition valued precisely because f is an embedding. Conversely,
given any predicate P : X → U the first projection
(
Σ(x : X), P (x)
)
→ X is an embedding.
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Lemma 3.1. For any X : U , the type of predicates X → Prop is a retract of the type
Σ(A : U),Σ(f : A→ X), isEmbedding(f)
of embeddings into X . Moreover, assuming univalence, the retraction is an equivalence.




As f is an embedding, R is proposition valued. Conversely, if R is a predicate, define
A
def
= Σ(x : X), R(x),
with f : A→ X the first projection. The fiber of the first projection at x is
Σ((x′, r′) : Σ(x′ : X), R(x)), x′ = x,
which is equivalent to R(x) by Lemma 1.24. Note that by proposition extensionality and func-
tion extensionality, we have that fibpr0 = R, so that (A, f) 7→ fibf (x) is a retraction. Moreover,
by Lemma 2.10, we know that A ' Σ(x : X), fibf (x) and that this equivalence composes with
the projection to give f , so that by univalence, (A, f) = (Σ(x : X), fibf (x), pr0).
With this in mind, we make the following definition.
Definition 3.2. A subtype of a type X is a map X → Prop. If X is a set, we will use the term
subset interchangeably with subtype. We will call the type of subtypes of X the power set of X
and write
PX def= X → Prop .
If A : PX we sometimes write x ∈ A for the predicate A(x). Following our terminology that a
type Y is inhabited when ‖Y ‖, we say that A is an inhabited subtype of X when
‖Σ(x : X), x ∈ A‖ .
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The term power set is indeed justified:
Lemma 3.3. The power set of X is always a set.
Proof. We know that Prop is a set, so by Lemma 2.56, X → Prop is a set.
In a traditional set-theoretic formalization, relations are given either as formulas, or as sub-
sets of a cartesian product, and then functions f : X → Y are defined as relations for which
there is a unique y : Y such that f(x, y). While functions are primitive in type theory, we can
show that this correspondence holds, but to account for general types, wemust replace relations
with arbitrary type families.
Definition 3.4. A type family R : X → Y → U is functional when for each x : X , there is a
unique y : Y such that R(x, y). That is, when
Π(x : X), isContr(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
This definition demonstrates a peculiar feature of univalent definitions. The traditional way
to define a functional relation would be to say that R is functional when for each x : X there is
y : Y such that R(x, y) and whenever R(x, y) and R(x, y′) then y = y′. This becomes,
Π(x : X),Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)×Π(y, y′ : Y ), R(x, y)→ R(x, y′)→ y = y′.
This definition is inadequate in a univalent framework. In the case where Y is not a set, and in
the case whereR is not valued in propositions, the type abovemay havemany elements, but we
would like to use being functional as a property: we would like not only that there is a unique
y : Y such that R(x, y), but that there is a unique pair (y, r) : Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y). This situation is
captured by contractibility.
In the case where Y is a set, any functional type family is already a relation, so the two types
above are equivalent.




Proof. Fix y so that we have
A(y) ' Σ((y′, a) : Σ(y′ : Y ), A(y′)), y = y′,
by Lemma 1.24, and this is the sum of propositions indexed by a proposition.
Given a type family R : X → Y → U with a witness w that R is functional, there is a




Conversely, given any f : X → Y there is a type family Rf : X → Y → U given by
Rf (x, y)
def
= f(x) = y.
Then Σ(y : Y ), f(x) = y is the singleton based at f(x), so is contractible. In the presence of
univalence, this gives an equivalence between the type of functional relations and the type of
functions. And using Lemma 3.5, if Y is a set, then univalence is not needed.
Theorem 3.6 (Rijke, [73]). For anyX,Y : U , the map taking a functional R : X → Y → U to fR is a
left-inverse of the map taking f : X → Y to Rf . Moreover, for any x : X and y : Y , the type RfR(x, y)
is equivalent to R(x, y).
Hence, assuming univalence, the map f 7→ Rf gives rise to an equivalence
(X → Y ) ' Σ(R : X → Y → U),Π(x : X), isContr(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
Moreover, if Y is a set, univalence is not needed in the proof.
Proof. For any f : X → Y we have fRf (x) = f(x) by definition, since (f(x), refl) is the center of
contraction of Σ(y : Y ), f(x) = y.
For the other direction, we wish to see that for any x and y,
RfR(x, y) ' R(x, y).
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By Theorem 1.28, it is enough to find an equivalence
(




Σ(x : X), RfR(x, y)
)
,
which is the identity on the first component.
Now, suppose Y is a set. Let us first verify that not only is Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y) a proposition,
but also that R(x, y) is a proposition for all y : Y . With x fixed, define A : Y → U to be
A(y)
def
= R(x, y), so that byLemma3.5we know isProp(A(y)) for all y : Y . That is, isProp(R(x, y))
for all y : Y as desired.
Letting x vary again, this means that Π(x : X),Π(y : Y ), isProp(R(x, y)). Similarly, since Y
is a set, for any f : X → Y , and elements x : X and y : Y the type f(x) = y is a proposition,
and so both RfR(x, y) and R(x, y) are propositions. Then the result follows from Theorem 3.6
by proposition extensionality, since RfR(x, y) ' R(x, y).
3.3 Constancy
This section covers material from [47, 49]. Our goal is to show that ‖X‖ has the universal
property of the quotient of X by the total relation λx, y.1 : X → X → U . That is, we can map
out of ‖X‖ to sets, even though the universal property of truncation only tells us how to define
maps to propositions.
Definition 3.7. A function f : A→ B is constant if for all x, y : A, we have f(x) = f(y).
Constant functions are called weakly constant in [47, 49].
Theorem 3.8. Let X,Y : U and let P : U be a type for which P → Y . If X implies that P is
contractible, then ‖X‖ → Y . In particular, if f : X → Y is a function which factors through P , then f
factors through ‖X‖.




As isContr(P ) is a proposition, we have the dashed function ‖X‖ → isContr(P ); composition
gives ‖X‖ → Y .
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Now let f : X → Y factor through P as g ◦h. As ‖X‖ → isContr(P ), we have that ‖X‖ × P
is a proposition, and moreover we haveX → ‖X‖×P , given by x 7→ (|x|, h(x)). Since ‖X‖×P
is a proposition, we have a factorization of f as
X ‖X‖ ‖X‖ × P P Y.|−|
h
pr1 g
Note that if P is a proposition and a function f : X → Y factors through P , thenX implies
that P is contractible. Then if f : X → Y factors through any proposition P , then f factors
through ‖X‖.
Theorem 3.9. If f : X → Y is constant and Y is a set, then ‖X‖ → Y .
Proof. We know that f factors through im(f), so it suffices to show that when Y is a set and f
is constant, then im(f) is a proposition.
Let (y, u), (y′, u′) : Σ(y : Y ), ‖Σ(x : X), f(x) = y‖. Since the second component inhabits a
proposition, we need only a path y = y′. As y is a set, we know that y = y′ is a proposition, so
we may untruncate our assumptions u : ‖fibf (y)‖ and u′ : ‖fibf (y′)‖ and use explicit witnesses
(x, p) : Σ(x : X), f(x) = y and (x′, p′) : Σ(x : X), f(x) = y′. Then we have
y
p
= f(x) = f(x′)
p′
= y′,
where the middle equality comes from constancy of f .
Explicitly, the above argument above gives
Π(y, y′ : Y ), fibf (y)→ fibf (y′)→ y = y′,
and since y = y′ is a proposition, we conclude
Π(y, y′ : Y ), ‖fibf (y)‖ →
∥∥fibf (y′)∥∥→ y = y′.
By reshuffling and uncurrying, we get
Π(u, v : im(f)), u = v.
Then f factors through a proposition, so by Theorem 3.8, we are done.
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The factorization of constant functions through propositions is related to another fact about
constancy: if f is constant, then so is apf .
Lemma 3.10. If f : X → Y is constant, then apf : x = x′ → f(x) = f(x′) is constant for all
x, x′ : X . In particular, apf (p) = reflf(x) whenever p : x = x.
Proof. Let k be a witness that f is constant. By path induction, for any p : x = x′ we have that
apf (p) = k
−1
x,x





Now if p, q : x = x′, then
p = (k−1x,x  kx,x′) = q.
3.4 Predicates on N
Since we will be focused on computability theory, we now turn to predicates on N.
Lemma 3.11. The standard ordering on N is decidable and is a total order.
Lemma 3.12 (Bounded search). Let P be a decidable predicate on N. Then for all n : N, the types
Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ n)
and
Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k < n)
are decidable.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by induction: for 0 it holds immediately, since
(Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ 0)) ' P (0).
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For n+ 1, we have
(Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ n+ 1)) ' P (n+ 1) + (Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ n))
If P (n + 1) holds, we’re done. Otherwise, check Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ n), which is decidable
by the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma 3.13. If P is a decidable predicate on N, then
(∃(n : N), P (n)) ' Σ(n : N), (P (n)×Π(k : N), P (k)→ n ≤ k)
In particular, we have ‖
∑
n:N P (n)‖ →
∑
n:N P (n).
Proof. Let Q def= Σ(n : N), (P (n)×Π(k : N), P (k)→ n ≤ k).
We proceed in 3 steps: first we show (Σ(n : N), P (n))→ Q using bounded search. Next, we
show thatQ is a proposition, so that we can apply the universal property of truncation to get a
map
‖Σ(n : N), P (n)‖ → Q.
Finally, we project out of Q to see that Q→ Σ(n : N), P (n).
First, observe that under our assumptions, we have that for all k,
(¬Σ(j : N), P (j)× j < k) ' (Π(j : N), P (j)→ k ≤ j) .
By bounded search, the predicate
P ′(n)
def
= Σ(k : N), P (k)× (k ≤ n)× (¬Σ(j : N), P (j)× j < k)
is decidable. Let n be such thatP (n). IfP ′(n) fails, then a quick argument shows thatP (n)must
also fail, so we must have P ′(n). Let k be such that P (k)× (k ≤ n)× (¬Σ(j : N), P (j)× j < k).
Then we also havem : Π(j : N), P (j)→ k ≤ j, and (k, (p,m)) : Q, where p : P (k).
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If (k,w) : Q and (k′, w′) : Q, we must have k ≤ k′ ≤ k, so we have p : k = k′. Moreover,
P (k) × Π(j : N), P (j)→ k ≤ j is a proposition, so we get transport(p, w) = w′. That is, Q is a
proposition, and Σ(n : N), P (n) implies Q, so then does ∃(n : N), P (n).
Finally, we have the map Q→ Σ(n : N), P (n) defined by
(k, (p,m)) 7→ (k, p).
It is tempting to think of propositions as types which contain no more information than
their inhabitedness. The above shows that this is misleading, as the type
Σ(n : N), P (n)×Π(k : N), P (k)→ n ≤ k
contains useful computational content. Moreover, we see here and in the definition of equiva-
lence that there are predicates for which (∃(x : A), P (x)) → Σ(x : A), P (x). In other words, if
there exists an x such that P (x), then we can find one explicitly. The proof of Lemma 3.13 can
be found in [38], where they explicitly assume function extensionality in the proof. However,
they sketch another way to untruncate ‖Σ(n : N), P (n)‖, without using function extensionality.
The other argument uses ideas from Section 3.3. For an arbitrary type X , if there is a con-
stant function f : X → X , then the type of fixed points of f has the universal property of the
truncation.
For any f : X → X , define the type
fix(f)
def
= Σ(x : X), x = f(x).
Lemma 3.14 (Fixed Point Lemma[49]). Let X be a type and f : X → X be constant. Then fix(f) '
‖X‖.
Proof. Fix k : Π(x, y : X), f(x) = f(y).
First, we need to see that fix(f) is a proposition. Given (x, p), (y, q) : fix(f) we have the path









Wewant a path t : x = y such that transport(t, p) = q, and r does not suffice, as we can compute
transport(r, p) = r−1  p (in a moment, we give this computation for our path of interest). By
Theorem 1.20, for any t : x = y and p : x = f(x), transportλx.x=f(x)(t, p) = t−1  p  apf (t). So
defining t def= p  apf (r)  q−1, we have
transport(t, p) = (q  apf (r
−1)  p−1)  p  apf (p  apf (r)  q
−1).
By Lemma 3.10, we can say that apf (p  apf (r)  q−1) = apf (r), and so we have
q  apf (r
−1)  p−1  p  apf (r) = q  apf (r
−1)  apf (r) = q.
Then, we have (x, p) = (y, q) with witness given by our path t and the above argument. That
is, fix(f) is a proposition.
We have the projection map fix(f)→ X , as well as a map X → fix(f) given by
x 7→ (f(x), k(f(x), x)).
That is, fix(f) is a proposition which is logically equivalent to X . The theorem follows by
Lemma 2.13.
Now fix a decidable predicate P : N → U . This factors through a map f : N → N, which
takes value 0 at x if ¬R(x) and takes value 1 at x if P (x). Consider the type
X
def
= Σ(n : N), f(n) = 1.
We can define a map f : X → X as follows: for (n,w) : Σ(n : N), f(n) = 1, we find the least
k ≤ n with v : f(k) = 1, using a bounded search. Take f(n,w) = (k, v). Since there is at most
one least k such that f(k) = 1, this function f is constant. Then by Lemma 3.14, we have that
fix(f) ' ‖Σ(n : N), f(n) = 1‖ .
Because fix(f)⇔ X , we then get a map ‖Σ(n : N), f(n) = 1‖ → Σ(n : N), f(n) = 1.
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In the above, we used that a decidable predicate P : N → U factors as 2 ◦ p where 2 is the
inclusion 2→ Prop, and some function p : N→ 2. The standard inclusion i : 2→ N is a section
of the function pos : N→ 2 taking 0 to 0 and all positive numbers to 1. Then P factors through
a map χP : N→ N which we will call a characteristic function for P . By function extensionality,
there is a unique characteristic function for P . We can put this together as follows
Definition 3.15. A characteristic function for a predicate P : N→ Prop is a function χP : N→ N
such that
(∀(n), f(n) = 0 ∨ f(n) = 1) ∧ (χP (n) = 0⇔ ¬R(n)) ∧ (χP (n) = 1⇔ R(n)).
Theorem 3.16. The type of characteristic functions for a predicate P is a proposition, and is inhabited
precisely if P is decidable.








. In the first
case, we have ¬P (n) and so g(n) = 0. Otherwise, f(n) = 1 and so P (n); hence, g(n) = 1.
If P has a characteristic function, then since N has decidable equality, P is decidable. Con-
versely, if P is decidable, then i ◦ p is a characteristic function, where p : N→ 2 factors P .
3.5 Monads
A monad on a category C is a functor T : C → C equipped with natural transformations η :
idC → T and µ : T 2 → T such that the following diagrams commute.
T 3(X) T 2(X)




T 2(X) T (X) T 2(X)
T (X)
µX
ηT (X) T (ηX)
µX
Amonad T can equivalently be presented as a Kleisli triple: an operation T on objects, together
with a family of maps ηX : X → T (X) and a Kleisli extension operator which takes a map
f : X → T (Y ) to a map f ] : T (X)→ T (Y ), satisfying the Kleisli laws:
η]X = idT (X)
f = f ] ◦ η
(g] ◦ f)] = (g]) ◦(f ]).
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Given η and (−)] we get the application on morphisms f : X → Y as
T (f)
def
= (ηY ◦ f)]
and µ : T 2 → T as
µX
def
= id]T (X) .
Functoriality of T , naturality of η and µ and the monad laws follow from the Kleisli equations.
Conversely, given a monad (T, η, µ) and f : X → Y in C, define f ] def= µY ◦T (f). Again, the
Kleisli laws follow from the monad laws and naturality of η and µ.
Given a Kleisli triple (T, η, (−)]), we can define Kleisli composition of f : X → T (Y ) and
g : Y → T (Z) by
g  f
def
= (g]) ◦ f.
We may internalize the definition of a monad by looking at type operators.
Definition 3.17. A monad is a map T : U → U together with a family of maps
η : Π(X : U), X → T (X)
and a Kleisli extension operator
(−)] : Π(X,Y : U), (X → TY )→ (TX → TY )
such that
η]X = idT (X)
f = f ] ◦ η
(g] ◦ f)] = (g]) ◦(f ])
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Definition 3.18. If η and (−)] give T : U → U the structure of a monad, a submonad of T is an
operation S : U → U such that for every X there is an embedding iX : SX → TX such that
· for every X : U , ηX factors through iX , and
· the embedding i commutes with Kleisli extension.
That is, we have η′ : X → SX and for every f : X → SY , we have f ]′ : SX → SY such that












We will be interested in the lifting monads L of Chapter 5. However, they are formed via
quantification over a universe U , and so can raise the universe level; naively, we have the lifting
as amapL : U0 → U1; We discuss this discrepancy in Section 5.6, wherewe see that in fact lifting
can be applied at higher universes, and there has type Ui → Ui, so indeed forms a monad as
stated above. However, size issues can also be resolved in anotherway, bymaking the definition
ofmonad universe polymorphic: we can take amonad to be amap T : U → V , for two universes
U and V , and then we have η : Π(X : U), X → T (X), where then the type of η lives in universe
max(U ′,V), where U ′ is the universe above U , as does the type of the Kleisli extension operator
(−)] : Π(X,Y : U), : (X → T (Y ))→ T (X)→ T (Y ).
3.6 Choice principles
The forward direction of the following equivalence is often called the type theoretic axiom of
choice.
Theorem 3.19. For any A,B : U and R : A→ B → U , we have an equivalence,
(














= Σ(f : A→ B),Π(x : A), R(x, f(x)),





λx. pr0(ψ x), λx. pr1(ψ x)
)















pr0(ψ x), pr1(ψ x)
)
= λx.ψ(x) = ψ,
and
h(g(f, ϕ)) = h(λx.(f(x), ϕ(x))) = (λx.f(x), λx.ϕ(x)) = (f, ϕ).
So h and g are inverse.
It is somewhat misleading to call this “the axiom of choice” as the notion of existence given
by Σ is too strong for this to properly interpret the axiom of choice: Σ asserts a given witness,
which we can then extract in a functional way. It is more in line with the usual uses of choice
to instead weaken Σ to exists ∃. However, asserting this for all types and type families is too
strong [86, Lemma 3.8.5], so we can only assert the axiom of choice for sets.
Axiom 3.20. The axiom of choice posits that given sets A and B and a relation R : A → B → U
such that R(x, y) is a proposition for all x : A and y : B, there is an inhabitant of the type
(








We will be interested in various weakenings of the axiom of choice. For simplicity of nota-
tion, we will use an alternate characterization of the axiom of choice for the statement of such
principles.
Lemma 3.21. The axiom of choice is equivalent to the following:
For all sets X and families Y : X → U such that Y (x) is a set for all x, we have
(
Π(x : X), ‖Y (x)‖
)
→ ‖Π(x : X), Y (x)‖
Proof. Fix a type A : U and take X def= A so that for any B : U the map
(f, ϕ) 7→ λx.(f(x), ϕ(x))
defines an equivalence
(




Π(x : A),Σ(y : B), R(x, y)
)
.
So then setting Y (x) def= Σ(y : B), R(x, y), we have the backward direction.
For the forward, direction, assume we have Y : X → U and define B = Σ(x : X), Y (x) and
R : X → B → U by
R(x, y)
def
= pr0(y) = x.
Then we know for any x : X that Σ(y : B), R(x, y) is equivalent to Y (x), and so the type
Π(x : X),∃(y : B), R(x, y) is equivalent to Σ(x : X), ‖Y (x)‖. So if we assume the latter is in-
habited then so is the former. Then by the axiom of choice, we have
‖Σ(f : X → B),Π(x : X), pr0(f(x)) = x‖ .
Then we have ‖Π(x : X), , Y (x)‖ by functoriality of truncation (Lemma 2.14) using the function
λ(f, ϕ).λx. transport(ϕ(x), pr2(f(x)).
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We will call statement of the form
(
Π(x : X), ‖Y (x)‖
)
→ ‖Π(x : X), Y (x)‖








Π(x : X), ‖Y (x)‖
)
→ ‖Π(x : X), Y (x)‖
choice from P to Q. In this language, the full axiom of choice is choice from sets to sets. Two
more crucial examples are countable choice, (choice from N),
(
Π(n : N), ‖Y (n)‖
)
→ ‖Π(n : N), Y (n)‖ ;
and propositional choice, (choice from propositions),
isProp(X)→
(
Π(x : X), ‖Y (x)‖
)
→ ‖Π(x : X), Y (x)‖ .
Neither of these principles are provable in univalent type theory. Coquand et al. [22] recently
gave a model (which validates univalence) but in which countable choice fails, and a similar
modelwhich invalidates a consequence of propositional choice. However, the principle of unique
choice (choice from propositions to propositions) is provable in our type theory.
Theorem 3.22. For any proposition X and any P : X → U such that Π(x : X), isProp(Px) we have
(
Π(x : X), ‖P (x)‖
)
→ ‖Π(x : X), P (x)‖ .
Proof. In fact, the assumptions give
(
Π(x : X), ‖P (x)‖
)
→ Π(x : X), P (x),
by Lemma 2.12.
We also have choice from decidable propositions:
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Theorem 3.23. If P is a decidable proposition, then
(
Π(p : P ), ‖Q(p)‖
)
→ ‖Π(p : P ), Q(p)‖ .
Proof. We do a case analysis on P : if P = 0, then we have Π(p : P ), Q(p), and so in particular,
(
Π(p : P ), ‖Q(p)‖
)
→ ‖Π(p : P ), Q(p)‖ .
If P = 1, then Π(p : P ), ‖Q(p)‖is equivalent to ‖Q(?)‖, and this in turn is equivalent to
‖Π(p : P ), Q(p))‖ .
3.7 Discussion
Lemma 3.13 has been discussed by Martín Escardó, and provides real-world examples of sit-
uations where ‖X‖ → X . This is related to an interesting observation by Nicolai Kraus [48]
that there is a dependent function f such that f(|n|) = n for all n : N, and to work by Kraus,
Escardó and others [47, 49] on constancy and anonymous existence; Section 3.3 is also related
to this work.
While the notion of monad we gave is good enough for our purposes, the universe is not a
category but an∞-category [92, 53, 88], although there is no definition of∞-category in type
theory at the time of writing. Monads in higher categories are somewhat more subtle, due to
the coherence issues that arise. Some recent work by Riehl and Verity [70] is concerned with
the issue of∞-monads.
The axiom of choice has a subtle relationship with constructiveness. On one hand, you have
that choice does not seem to correspond to an effective procedure in any way, and Diaconescu’s
theorem that choice implies excludedmiddle. On the other, you have Bishop’s pronouncement
that “a choice function exists in constructive mathematics, because a choice is implied by the
very meaning of existence,” [9] and the so-called type-theoretic axiom of choice which is a direct
application of the definition of Σ and Π. A good overview of this situation is given by Martin-
Löf [58]. The subtleties discussed by Martin-Löf seem to vanish in a univalent setting: reading
the axiom of choice in the logic of structures (without truncations) gives the version that is
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“implied by the very meaning of existence”, while reading it in the logic of propositions (with





We turn now to partiality. Classically, a partial functionX ⇀ Y is taken to be a relationR ⊆
X×Y such that for each x ∈ X , there is atmost one y ∈ Y such thatR(x, y). While this approach
can be used constructively, there are a few reasons we wish to avoid this representation of
partial functions. Most importantly, expressing application of a partial function represented as
a relation is cumbersome, awkward, and non-rigorous: We express the fact that there is at most
one y such that R(x, y) by saying that Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y) is a proposition. To apply a functional
relation R : X × Y → U to x : X , we first demonstrate that Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y) is inhabited, and
then appeal to the fact that it is a proposition to determine there is at most one, and then apply
the second projection. In the case where f is not defined at x, the notation f(x) does not even
make sense since Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y) is empty.
In settings where functions take a more privileged position than in (e.g.) ZF, a partial func-
tion X ⇀ Y is often taken to be a (total) function X → Y + 1, where the adjoined element
represents an undefined value. This approach only works for partial functions f : X ⇀ Y
where it is decidable whether f is defined on x.
We generalize the undefined value by replacing Y + 1 with a type of partial elements of Y .
This can be expressed by taking a partial element to be a proposition (the extent of definition)
together with a map from that proposition to Y (its value). In a classical setting, this type is
equivalent to Y + 1, since a proposition is either true or false. A partial function X ⇀ Y is
taken to be a total function fromX to the type of partial elements of Y . We can extract the value
of f(x) (as an element of Y ) when we know f(x) to be a total element. However, we need to
be able to lift data about elements of Y to data about partial elements of Y—in short, we need
the operation taking Y to its type of partial elements to be a monad. This approach is directly
related to synthetic domain theory, which we discuss in Section 4.3. One point made through-
out the literature on synthetic domain theory is that the type of all partial elements (and the
type of all partial functions) is often not very interesting; we instead want to focus on a class of
particular partial functions and partial elements. Such a class can be defined by restricting our
extents of definitions. The restricted partial elements operation succeeds in forming a monad
precisely if the set of allowable extents of definition form a dominance (Definition 5.17). Many
sets of propositions of interest arise by truncation from structural dominances (Definition 5.35),
which are just Prop-indexed families of types closed under Σ such that the type indexed by
1 is inhabited. Unfortunately, sets of propositions arising in this way are dominances if and
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only if particular (weak) forms of choice hold (Theorem 5.32). Instead, we consider lifted func-
tions arising by applying the same constructions directly to a structural dominance, instead of
a dominance. The type of lifted functions arising in this way contains many representations
of the same partial function, and while they do compose, there is no guarantee that this com-
position is associative. Nevertheless, we can tame these wild partial functions to get a notion
of disciplined map (Definition 5.42). These maps do indeed compose (associatively), even in the
absense of choice, and the information tracked explicitly by the lifted functions is now implicit.
Of particular interest are the Rosolini structures (a structural dominance) and the Rosolini
propositions (their truncation), which are an abstract form of the affirmable or semidecidable truth
values. This class of propositions are related to the extended naturals, N∞ (defined by adding
a point at infinity to N), and to other approaches to partiality in type theory based on the delay
monad (Section 4.1) and higher inductive-inductive types (Section 4.2). Thesewill play a crucial
role in Chapter 9, as they can be used as to define notions we expect to satisfy the hope of a
notion of partial function which can be used as a surrogate for the computable functions.
This approach allows us to express application of partial functions directly. The statement
that f(x) is defined is a proposition about an existing partial-element, rather than a possibly
non-existent element. There is another, less important benefit of the approach via partial el-
ements: the full univalence axiom is required to identify functions with their graph (Theo-
rem 3.6), and univalence appears repeatedly when trying to prove type families equal. The
approach to partial functions as partial elements does not need univalence.
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CHAPTER4
Partiality in Type Theory and Topos Theory
Before developing our approach to partiality, we quickly review prior work on partiality in
type theory. The standard approach to partiality in type theory center around the delay monad,
which we define concretely using the extended natural numbers in Section 4.1. Kleisli maps
for the delay monad can be viewed as partial functions equipped with intensional information.
This extra intensional information means the delay monad does not work for our purposes:
it makes partiality into structure, rather than property. Chapman, Uustalu and Veltri resolve
this issue by quotienting the delaymonad, but then countable choice is needed to show that the
quotiented delaymonad forms amonad—to show that partial functions compose. Our attempt
to give partial functions via dominances in Chapter 5, leads us to the same place, so we discuss
the details from the perspective of dominances there. More recently, Altenkirch, Danielsson
and Kraus use a higher-inductive type to define the free ωCPO on a type X , and use Kleisli
maps for this monad to give partial functions.
Our approach to partiality will center around a type-theoretic version of the notion of domi-
nance. Dominances andmany of the tools we use to workwith dominances arise from synthetic
domain theory and are also used in synthetic computability theory. Synthetic domain theory
aims to develop domain theory by axiomatizing a particular topos of objects which naturally
have dcpo structure. Synthetic computability theory is analogous. In Section 4.3, we give a
brief overview of this work.
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4.1 N∞ and the delay monad
The extended naturals, N∞, are of central importance in other approaches to partiality in type
theory, and will be important in ours as well. The type is coinductively generated by
zero : N∞
succ : N∞ → N∞
That is, N∞ is the final coalgebra for X 7→ X + 1. The coalgebra map is pred : N∞ → N∞ + 1,
given by
pred(zero) = inr ?
pred(succx) = x
As this type is coinductively generated, there is an element∞ : N∞ satisfying the equation
∞ = succ(∞).
We cannot use the above coinductive definition, however, as we do not have coinduction in
our type theory. We instead must give a concrete type which satisfies the required universal
property. The type N∞ should be thought of as the naturals extended by a point at infinity. As
we cannot separate the extra point from N, the type N + 1 will not suffice. Instead, we we take
N∞ to be the type of binary sequences with at most one 1[30].
Definition 4.1. The Cantor space is the type 2N.
Note that the cantor space can be seen both as the type of infinite binary sequences, and as
the type of decidable predicates on N.
Definition 4.2. For α : 2N, define the type 〈α〉 : U by
〈α〉 def= Σ(n : N), αn = 1.
Define the extended natural numbers to be the type
N∞
def
= Σ(α : 2N), isProp(〈α〉).
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The element∞ : N∞ is defined to be the constantly zero function,
∞ def= λn.0.
Given n : N, the sequence given by the decidable predicate λk.n = k only takes value 1 at input
n, and so for each n : N there is an element n : N∞.
We could instead equivalently define N∞ to be the set of increasing binary sequences.
Definition 4.3. A sequence α : 2N is increasing when
Π(n,m : N), (αn = 1)→ (n < m)→ (αm = 1).
Lemma 4.4. The type N∞ is equivalent to the type of increasing binary sequences.
Proof. Switch all bits after the first 1 in the sequence. Explicitly:
Let α be increasing. Define µ : N→ U by
µ(n)
def
= (αn = 1)×Π(k < n), αk = 0.
The right hand side is a decidable predicate by Lemma 3.13, and so µ factors through a map
p(α) : N→ 2. Moreover, we know that the type
Σ(n : N), (αn = 1)×Π(k < n), αk = 0
is a proposition, and then so is 〈p(α)〉.
Conversely, if µ is a sequence with at most one 1, we may define
i(µ)n = 1⇔ ∃(k ≤ n), µk = 1
Since µk = 1 is decidable, we know that so is ∃(k ≤ n), µk = 1 by bounded search.
We have that for any increasing α : 2N that
i(p(α))n = 1⇔ ∃(k ≤ n), p(α)k = 1.
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Since α is an increasing sequence from 2, this is the same as
i(p(α))n = 1⇔ αn = 1.
Conversely, for any µwith at most one one, we have
p(i(µ))n = 1⇔ (i(µ)n = 1)×Π(k < n), i(µ)k = 0,
which happens at the least n such that µn = 1, but since 〈µ〉 is a proposition, this is the unique
value at which µn = 1, and so
p(i(µ))n = 1⇔ (µn = 1).
As usual with proposition-valued components in sums, we will often suppress the second
component, proving that the requiredwitness exists separately. Wehave themap pred : N∞ → N∞
defined by
pred : N∞ → N∞
pred(α) = (λn.α(n+ 1)).
That 〈pred(α)〉 is a proposition when 〈α〉 is follows from the fact that pred(α)n = 1⇔ αn+1 = 1.
Theorem 4.5. The type N∞ satisfies the correct universal property. That is, if p : X → X + 1 for any
type X : U , then there is a unique ϕ : X → N∞ such that
pred(ϕ(x)) = (ϕ+ 1)(p(x)).
Proof. The idea is to count how long it takes for p to give us inr ?. To do this, first define the
function p′ : X + 1→ X + 1,
p′(inlx) = px
p′(inr ?) = inr ?,
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and then define ϕ′ : X + 1→ N∞
ϕ′(inlx) = 0 if p′(inlx) = inl y
ϕ′(inlx) = 1 if p′(inlx) = inr y
ϕ′(inr ?) = 0
Then ϕ = ϕ′ ◦ p.
It is easy to check that this is correct and unique.





α(n) if α(k) = 0 for all k < n
0 otherwise
Note that we are doing a case analysis on Π(k < n), α(k) = 0, which is decidable by bounded
search. We have that 〈f(α)〉 is a proposition since f(α)(k) = 1 exactly if k is the least such that
α(k) = 1. We call f(α) the truncation of α.
We immediately have,
Lemma 4.6. The map f : 2N → N∞ above is a retraction of the inclusion N∞ → 2N.
Capretta defines, for any typeX , the type D(X) of delayed elements ofX , coinductively gen-
erated by
now : X → D(X)
delay : D(X)→ D(X).
Again, wemust define this type concretely in our type theory. Classically, the elements of D(X)
can be written as delayn(now x), or delay∞. Again, constructively, we cannot do a simple case
analysis to determine which case is satisfied, but we may use the same trick as with N∞.
Theorem 4.7. The following types are equivalent:
(i) Σ(µ : N∞),Π(n : N), Xµ=n,
(ii) Σ(α : N→ (X + 1)), isProp 〈α〉,
where 〈α〉 def= Σ(n : N),Σ(x : X), α(n) = inl(x),
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inlχ(n,−) if µ = n,
inr(?) otherwise.
As there is at most one nwith µ = n, we know that there is at most one nwhich takes the form
inlx.
Conversely, let (α,−) : (ii), and define
µ(n) =

1 if α(n) = inlx,
0 otherwise.
And define ϕ(n) = λy.x.
We will tacitly switch between these two representations of DX , but we make (ii) official.
In particular, we define
now(x)(0) = inlx
now(x)(n+ 1) = inr ?,
and
delay(µ)(0) = inr ?
delay(µ)(n+ 1) = µ(n).
We want DX to be the final coalgebra for Y 7→ Y +X , for which we define the coalgebra map
tick : DX → (DX +X), by
tick(now x) = inr x
tick(delay µ) = inlµ.
The proof of the following theorem is identical to the case for N∞.
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Theorem 4.8. Given any type Y and a coalgebra t : Y → Y + X , there is a unique coalgebra homo-
morphism ϕ : Y → DX such that for all y : Y
tick(ϕy) = (ϕ+X)(ty),
where
(ϕ+X)(inl y) = inl(ϕy)
(ϕ+X)(inr x) = inr x.
now : X → DX gives an obvious candidate unit for D. Given f : X → DY , we have a
Kleisli extension f ] : DX → DY with
f ](now x) = fx
f ](delayµ) = delay(f ]µ).
Explicitly, for x : X , we define η : X → DX by
η(x)(0) = inlx
η(x)(n+ 1) = inr ?
and if f : X → D(Y ), we define f ] : DX → DY by
f ](µ)(n) =

inr ? if Π(k ≤ n), µ(k) = inr ?
f(x)(n− k) if Σ(k ≤ n), (µ(k) = inlx)
Then we have that
(




Σ(k ≤ n),Σ(x:X), (µ(n) = inlx)× f(x)(n− k) = inl y
)
.
That is, f ](µ) takes the value inr ? for as long as µ does, and then takes the value of f(x), where
x is the unique value (if such exists) where µ(n) = inlx for some n.
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Theorem 4.9. The maps now and (−)] give D the structure of a monad.
Proof. Rather than giving the (probably simpler) coinductive proof, we argue concretely. As
η(x)(0) = inlx, we have that
η](x)(n) = η(x)(n− 0).
Similarly, we have
f ](ηx)(n) = f(x).
Expanding the definition of Kleisli extension, we see that (g]f)](µ)(n) = inl z precisely when
Σ(k ≤ n),Σ(x:X), (µ(k) = inlx)×Σ(j ≤ n− k),Σ(y:Y ),
(




g(y)(n−k−j) = inl z
)
.
Call this type A. Pictorially, we have that (g]f)](µ) is
?, . . . , ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
, ?, ?, . . . , ?,︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(x) where µk=x
?, . . . , ?, z, ?, . . . , ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(y) where f(x)j=y
.
In words: g]f ](µ) is composed of a sequence of inr ?with possibly one element of the form inl z.
The terms of the sequence come from µ, until it takes value inlx (for some x), and then from
f(x), until it takes value inl y (for some y), and finally from g(y) thereafter.
Similarly, we have that g](f ]µ)(n) = inl z precisely if
Σ(k′ ≤ n),Σ(y : Y ),Σ(j′ ≤ k′),Σ(x : X), (µ(j′) = inlx)×((fx)(k′−j′) = inl y)×(g(y)(n−k′) = inl z).
Call this type B. Pictorially, we have that g](f ]µ)(n) = inl z is
?, . . . , ?︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ
, ?, ?, . . . , ?,︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(x) where µj=x




We see that these two types are equivalent, by manipulating A as follows: First move all quan-
tifiers to the front and rearrange, so that we have
Σ(k ≤ n),Σ(y:Y ),Σ(j ≤ n− k),Σ(x:X), (µ(k) = inlx)×
(




g(y)(n−k−j) = inl z
)
.
Next, given k ≤ n and j ≤ n − k, define j′ = k and k′ = j + k, so that j′ ≤ k′ and k′ ≤ n. So
then j′ and k′ are of the correct form to satisfy B. That is, we have the map A→ B defined by
(k, x,−, j, y,−,−) 7→ (j + k, y, k, x,−,−,−),
with inverse
(k′, y, j′, x,−,−,−) 7→ (j′, x,−, k′ − j′, y,−,−).
So then g](f ]µ)(n) ⇔ (g]f)](µ)(n). Applying function and proposition extensionality, we get
the Kleisli law.
The goal of the delay monad is to provide a satisfying account of partiality in type theory;
however, the delay monad tracks intensional information—the timer given by delay—which
makes equality on D(X) too strict. The obvious solution is to attempt to quotient D(X) by
some equivalence relation, which is called weak bisimilarity. Capretta showed that the quotient
of the delay monad by weak bisimilarity gives a monad in the category of setoids [14]. Later,
Chapman, Uustalu and Veltri [16] show that this quotient gives a monad in a type theory with
quotient inductive types assuming countable choice, so it seems that Capretta’s result relies on
the fact that countable choice is satisfied by the setoid model.
Weak bisimilarity is defined via a relation − ↓ − : DX → X → U of convergence, defined
inductively by now(x) ↓ x and if d ↓ x, then delay(d) ↓ x. We then define weak bisimilarity
coinductively: if d1 ↓ x and d2 ↓ x, then d1 ≈ d2 and if d1 ≈ d2, then delay(d1) ≈ delay(d2).
We can define both convergence and weak bisimilarity concretely on our representation of
DX .
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Definition 4.10. For d : DX and x : X , we say that d converges to x if x is the unique value such
that d(n) = inlx. That is,





We say that elements d1 and d2 of DX are weakly bisimilar if for all x : X we have d1 ↓ x iff
d2 ↓ x. That is
(d1 ≈ d2)
def
= Π(x : X), (d1 ↓ x)⇔ (d2 ↓ x).
Following [16], let D(X) def= D(X)/≈. They proved the following.
Theorem 4.11 ([16], Section 7). Assuming countable choice, D(X) is a monad.
We will see in Section 5.7 that D(X) is equivalent to our Rosolini lifting, and we will sub-
sequently discuss weakenings of countable choice that are sufficient to show that D(X) is a
monad, culminating in a necessary and sufficient weakening, Theorem 5.30.
4.2 Partiality via higher-inductive types
Altenkirch, Danielsson andKraus insteaddefine a notion of partiality by giving a higher inductive-
inductive type [2]—simultaneous defining a higher inductive typeX⊥ and a binary relation @
on X⊥. Their goal was to give an extensional version of the delay monad which was a monad
even without countable choice. The type X⊥ is essentially the free ωCPO over X .
Definition 4.12. For each type X define simultaneous the type X⊥ : U and a binary relation
v: X⊥ → X⊥ → U inductively with constructors for X⊥
· a map η : X → X⊥,
· an element ⊥ : X⊥,
· for each s : N→ X⊥ and witness p : Π(n : N), sn v sn+1, an element t(s, p) : X⊥,
· a path constructor (x v y)→ (y v x)→ x = y, and
· a set truncation Π(x, y : X⊥),Π(p, q : x = y), p = q;
and constructors for v
· x v x for each x : X⊥,
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· if x v y and y v z then x v z,
· ⊥ v x for each x : X⊥,
· for each n : N we have sn v t(s, p),
· if Π(n : N), sn v x then (t(s, p) v x).
In the paper, they show that X⊥ behaves like the lifting in classical domain theory, in the
sense that X⊥ is the initial ωCPO that X maps into (Theorem 2) and moreover η is injective,
η(x) is maximal with respect to v for each x : X , and η(x) 6= ⊥ for all x : X (Corollary 8).
4.3 Synthetic domain theory and synthetic computability theory
Domain theory arose fromaproblem indenotational semantics: Languageswith non-termination
cannot be directly modeled in the category of sets, since some functions are partial. Since non-
termination behaves in non-trivial ways, there are limits on how functions can interact with the
undefined value. To resolve this, Dana Scott [76] introduced domains, directed- or ω-complete
partial orders with bottom. The bottom element represents an undefined value, and maps
between them are required to be monotone and preserve directed suprema. This structure ef-
fectively captures the behavior of non-termination. However, Scott wondered whether there
was some alternative axiomatization of sets in which sets naturally came equipped with the re-
quired structure. In his PhD thesis [75], Giuseppe Rosolini took up this question, giving a way
to access categories of partial maps from within a category. The basic idea, which we will ex-
plore in more depth from a type-theoretic perspective in Chapter 5, is to isolate a subset Σ ⊆ Ω
of truth values in a topos, and consider the maps X → Y⊥, where Y⊥ is the set
Y⊥ = {A ∈ ΩY | (∀x, y.A(x)→ A(y)→ x = y) ∧ (∃x.A(x) ∈ Σ)}.
In other words, Y⊥ is the set of subsingleton subsets of Y whose extent of definition is in Σ. In
order for these Σ-partial functions to contain total functions, we need the true proposition to be
in Σ. Moreover, in order for the Σ-partial functions to form a category, we need to impose an
additional restriction that for all propositions p, q ∈ Ω,
p ∈ Σ ∧ (p→ (q ∈ Σ))→ ((p ∧ q) ∈ Σ).
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The two conditions make Σ into a dominance.
Rosolini’s approach was concrete: while he considered the internal language of a topos,
he worked with specific toposes in an informal metamathematics; in particular, he examined
the effective and recursive toposes, and considered effective objects in a topos. However, his
work allowed synthetic axiomatizations, which were pursued by a number of authors studying
synthetic domain theory (See, for example [44, 89, 68]). The idea is to pursue Scott’s idea of an
axiomatization of a category of domains.
Since dominances are a way to approach partial functions and effectiveness, the notion fea-
tures in Bauer’s [5, 6] approach to synthetic computability. Here, Bauer is axiomatizing a cate-
gory of sets (the modest sets [43]) arising from realizability toposes.
In both synthetic domain theory and synthetic computability theory, the dominance of
interest is a dominance Σ representing the semidecidable propositions, introduced also by
Rosolini. The dominance is given by
p ∈ Σ⇔ ∃(α : N→ 2), p↔
(
∃(n : N), α(n) = 1
)
.
That is, the propositions in Σ are those which, when true, are observably true.
Most approaches to synthetic domain theory are topos-theoretic in nature, but it is worth
pointing to two (Reus and Streicher [68] and Reus [69]) that use a type-theoretic axiomatization.
We will briefly describe the Approach by Reus here, and compare this approach to synthetic
domain theory to our approach to partiality in Section 5.11. Reus uses a version of the calcu-
lus of construction with an impredicative universe of propositions, which are assumed to be
subsingletons (i.e., propositions in our sense), but note that there it is not required that all sub-
singletons are propositions. Reus also assumes a universe of sets (which need not be sets in our
sense). Reus assumes function extensionality, but not proposition extensionality, which is not
needed in the development there. Additionally, in contrast to a univalent setting, the principle
of unique choice is not available in the calculus of constructions, so it is assumed explicitly in
Reus’s development. Rather than giving a dominance, Reus’s axiomatization of Σ includes a
number of principles that relate Σ to domain theory, without reference to partial functions. We
explain their axiomatization in Section 5.11, where we have more context for understanding it,
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but note that they include a version of Markov’s Principle (see Section 1.3), as well as a version
of Phoa’s Principle [83], both of which are not available in our setting.
4.4 Discussion
The notion of partiality given by the delay monad is intensional. In particular, a single partial
function f : X ⇀ Y has many representations as a function F : X → D(Y ), based on how
many applications of delay occur in the output of F . Quotienting by bisimilarity resolves this
issue at the cost of composability of partial functions, which does not seem like a worthwhile
cost.
The approach using quotient-inductive-inductive types resolves the issue without the cost,
but it doesn’t seem to work for the purposes of Part III: we want it to be possible to use our par-
tial functions as an abstract representation of the computable functions. Our first attempt (the
Rosolini partial functions of Chapter 5) is too big for this—we will instead consider a subtype
of the Rosolini partial functions, the disciplined maps of Section 5.10—but the QIIT approach
expands the set of Rosolini partial functions (compare Lemmas 13 and 14 from [2] with our
Theorem 5.28).
The Kleisli category for the delay monad is morally an intensional version of the category
of Σ-partial maps from synthetic domain theory. The approach via dominances puts this no-
tion of partiality into a more general context; we transfer the relevant parts of this context to
the univalent setting in Chapter 5. In the synthetic approach, however, The core categories of
interest is the effective topos, and its category of effective objects. The effective topos has enough
structure that we can show in its internal logic that Σ is indeed a dominance, as well as enough
structure that we can show externally that the Σ-partial functions capture the functions of in-
terest (the computable or continuous functions). In themore general situation that we consider,
neither of these will be the case. Chapter 5 is concerned with the problem of showing a set of
propositions to be a dominance, while Chapter 9 is concerned with the computability of maps
arising from our version of Σ, which we call the set of Rosolini propositions.
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CHAPTER5
Partiality in Univalent Mathematics
Wenow turn in earnest to the notion of partial function. Recall that amotivating goal is to find a
notion of partial function forwhich it is consistent that all such partial functions are computable.
We expect such partial functions to include all total functions, and to be composable, even in the
absence of countable choice and Markov’s principle. A great deal of this chapter is concerned
with attempting to satisfy those requirements.
In Sections 5.1-5.4, we examine the class of all partial functions. In Sections 5.5-5.9 we at-
tempt to restrict the class of partial functions using dominances (Definition 5.17)—subsets ofProp
satisfying certain closure conditions which ensure that the partial functions just defined are
composable (see Theorems 5.20 and 5.21). We examine in particular the Σ1 propositions, which
we call Rosolini propositions, and relate this to prior work on partiality. A weakening of count-
able choice is required to show that the partial functions arising from Rosolini propositions
are closed under composition (see Theorems 5.29, 5.30, and 5.33). This fact generalizes (Theo-
rem 5.32) to any dominance arising by truncation from structural dominances (Definition 5.35).
The consequence is that some amount of choice is required to restrict partial functions via dom-
inances. In Section 5.10 we give a different approach using what we call disciplined maps. This
approach still builds off of the theory of dominances. Notably, the disciplined maps can be
shown to compose without countable choice, and in the presence of countable choice, the dis-




We saw in Theorem 3.6 that assuming univalence we have an equivalence
(X → Y ) ' (Σ(R : X → Y → U),Π(x : X), isContr(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y))).
That is, we saw that a function is relation with a unique value for each x : X , matching the
classical intuition. Classically, the partial functions arise by considering instead relations for
which there is instead at most one y : Y with R(x, y) for each x : X .
Definition 5.1. A relation R : X → Y → U is single-valued when
Π(x : X), isProp(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
Note that being single-valued is a proposition. As with the definition of functional rela-
tion in Section 3.2, the more traditional definition doesn’t work in general. In this case, the
traditional definition would say that a relation is single-valued when
Π(x : X),Π(y, y′ : Y ), R(x, y)→ R(x, y′)→ y = y′.
Again, if Y is not a set, then y = y′ may have many witnesses, and so the above type may
have interesting structure. Instead, we want to say that a relation R is single-valued not only
when all y : Y such that R(x, y) are equal, but when there is at most one pair (y, r) such that
r : R(x, y). In the case where Y is a set, the traditional definition is equivalent to the definition
we give.
There is another traditional approach to the definition of partial function, more common
in category theoretic settings. A partial function X ⇀ Y is a function f : A → Y for some A
which embeds into X . We can then represent partial functions X ⇀ Y via two separate types
in the next universe: via the type
Π(x : X), isProp(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)), (5.1)
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or via the type
Σ(A : U), (e : A→ X), isEmbedding(e)× (A→ Y ). (5.2)
We havemaps between them as follows: Given a single-valued relationR : X → Y → U , define
A : U by
A
def
= Σ(x : X),Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y),
with e : A → X the first projection and f : A → Y the second projection. We need to see that
for any x : X the type
Σ((x′, y, r) : Σ(x : X), (y′ : Y ), R(x′, y)), x′ = x
is a proposition. By Lemma 1.24, this type is equivalent to
Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y),
which is a proposition since R is single-valued. This gives us a function F : (5.1)→ (5.2),
F (R,−) def= (Σ(x : X),Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y), pr0,−, pr1).
Conversely, given an embedding e : A ↪→ X with a map f : A→ Y , define R : X → Y → U by
R(x, y)
def
= Σ(a : A), (e(a) = x)× (f(a) = y).
We need to see that for any x, the type
Σ(y : Y ),Σ(a : A), (e(a) = x)× (f(a) = y)
is a proposition. By reshuffling, this type is equivalent to
Σ(a : A), (e(a) = x)× Σ(y : Y ), f(a) = y,
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and since Σ(y : Y ), f(a) = y is the singleton at f(a), this type is in turn equivalent to
Σ(a : A), e(a) = x,
which is a proposition since e is an embedding. This gives us a function G : (5.2)→ (5.1),
G(A, e,−, f) =
((





We want G and F to be equivalences, but they are only equivalences up to equivalence. That
is, we have the following
Lemma 5.2. For any single-valuedR : X → Y → U , we have that the first projection ofG(F (R,−)) is
equivalent toR. Similarly, For any e : A ↪→ X and f : A→ Y we have an equivalence between the type
A′
def
= pr0(F (G(A))) and A. Hence, in the presence of univalence, the type of single-valued relations is
equivalent to the type of functions from a subtype of X to Y .
Proof. Let R : X → Y → U be single-valued. We need to see that for any x : X and y : Y , the
type
Σ((x′, y′, r)Σ(x′ : X), (y′ : Y ), R(x, y)), x′ = x× y′ = y
is equivalent to R(x, y), which follows by two applications of Lemma 1.24.
Conversely, let e : A ↪→ X and f : A→ Y . We need to see that A is equivalent to the type









This type reshuffles to
Σ(a : A), (Σ(x : X), e(a) = x)× (Σ(y : Y ), f(a) = y),
which is a sum of contractible types over A.
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5.2 Partial elements
We will take a third approach to partial functions, via partial elements. By analogy with the
equivalence Y ' (1→ Y ), we expect a partial element of A to correspond to a partial function
1 ⇀ A. Taking partial functions as relations, this would give us the type
Σ(A : Y → U), isProp(Σ(y : Y ), Ay).
We could instead define partial elements directly as follows.
Definition 5.3. For a type X , the lift of X , or the type of partial elements of X , is the type
L(X) def= Σ(P : U), isProp(P )× (P → X).
The first component of a partial element is called its extent of definition and the third component
is its value ; so we have maps
defined : LY → U ,
value : Π(u : LY ), definedu→ Y .
A partial element y : LY is defined or total if defined(y). For any type Y , there is a unique
undefined element ⊥ : LY with extent of definition ∅.
A partial function fromX to Y is a function f : X → LY . If f : X → LY , we will sometimes
write fe
def
= defined ◦ f and fv
def
= value ◦ f .
To see the comparison with partial elements as partial functions from 1, write
L′(Y ) def= Σ(A : Y → U), isProp(Σ(y : Y ), A(y)).
We have a map





(λy.Σ(p : P ), ϕ(p) = y) , w
)
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where w : isProp(Σ(y : Y ), (p : P ), ϕ(p) = y) is constructed by observing that this is equivalent
to isProp(Σ(p : P ), (y : Y ), ϕ(p) = y), and this is a sum of a contractible type over a proposition.
Similarly, we have





(Σ(y : Y ), A(y)) , w , pr0
)
.
Lemma 5.4. rel is a section of ele, and for any A : Y → U with w : isProp(Σ(y : Y ), A(y)) and y : Y
the type A(y) is equivalent to the first component of rel(ele(A,w)) applied to y.





Re-associating, this is equivalent to
Σ(y′ : Y ), A(y′)× (y = y′).
This in turn is equivalent to A(y) by the map (y′, a′, p) 7→ transport(p−1, a′) with inverse map-
ping a to (y, a, refl).
Now let x def= (P,w, ϕ) : L(Y ). We need only see that the extent of definition of ele(rel(x)) is
equivalent to P , since P is a proposition. We have
defined(ele(rel(x))) = Σ(y : Y ), (p : P ), (ϕ(p) = y).
Re-associating as above, this type is equivalent to P × 1.
Note that without univalence the equivalence
Ay ' Σ((y′, a) : Σ(y′ : Y ), Ay′), (y′ = y),
is insufficient to prove that ele is an equivalence, even in the presence of proposition extension-
ality. While Σ(y : Y ), Ay is a proposition, we don’t know in general that A(y) is. In the case
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that Y is a set, however, we can show that A(y) must be a proposition, by Lemma 3.5. Then we
have the following.
Lemma 5.5. For any set Y , the functions rel and ele determine an equivalence between the types L(Y )
and L′(Y ).
Proof. We have already seen that rel is a section of ele, so we need to see that ele is a section of
rel. Fix (A,w) : L′(Y ) By function extensionality, and since the second component of L′(Y ) is a
proposition, it suffices to turn the equivalenceA(y) ' pr0(rel(ele(A,w)))(y) into an equality. As
Y is a set andΣ(y : Y ), A(y) is a proposition by assumption, we have by Lemma 3.5 thatA(y) is a
proposition. Then sinceA(y) ' pr0(rel(ele(A,w)))(y), we may apply proposition extensionality
to get the desired equality A(y) = pr0(rel(ele(A,w)))(y).
By considering maps into L′(Y ) and L(Y ), we can collect Lemmas 5.5 and 5.2 into the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 5.6. For any type X and any set Y , the following types are equivalent:
(i) Σ(R : X → Y → U),Π(x : X), isProp(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y))
(ii) Σ(A : U), (e : A→ X), isEmbedding(e)× (A→ Y )
(iii) X → L(Y ).
Moreover, in the presence of univalence, we may drop the condition that Y is a set.
We have an embedding





Lemma 5.7. The map η : Y → LY is an embedding.
Proof. Since 1 = 1 is contractible, η(x) = η(y) is equivalent to
λu.x =(1→Y ) λu.y.
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By function extensionality and the induction principle for 1, this is equivalent to
(λu.x)(?) = (λu.y)(?),
which reduces to x = y.
Moreover, we can extend a function f : X → LY to a function f ] : LX → LY given by
f ](P : U ,−, ϕ : P → X) def= (Q : U ,−, γ : Q→ Y ),




where thewitness thatQ is a proposition comes from the fact that propositions are closed under
sums.
For predicativity reasons, (L, η, (−)])does not actually give amonad, sinceL raises universe
levels. We discuss these issues in 5.6, but we still prove the monad laws here: for our purposes,
we only need (−)] for composition of partial function, and η to give us the total elements.
Theorem 5.8. The maps η and (−)] give L : U → U1 the structure of a monad.
Proof. For notational convenience, we will completely suppress the witness that the extent of
definition of a partial element is a proposition.
η](P,ϕ) = (Σ(p : P ), defined(η(ϕp)) , λ(p, q). value(ϕp)q)
= ((Σ(p : P ), 1), λ(p, q).ϕp)
= (P × 1, λ(p, q).ϕp)
= (P,ϕ),
where the last equality follows from proposition extensionality.
f ](ηx) = f ](1, λp.x)




Now let g : Y → LZ and f : X → LY . We compute
(g]f)](P,ϕ) =
(



















Σ(p : P ), fe(ϕp) , λ(p, q).fv(ϕp)q
)
= g](f ](P,ϕ)).
The first 3 equalities are just expansion of definitions; the third follows from the equivalence
between Σ(a : A), (b : Ba), C(a, b) and Σ((a, b) : Σ(a : A), B(a)), C(a, b), and the last two again
apply definitions.
This gives us a Kleisli composition operator we denote with “”. That is, we have
g  f
def
= g] ◦ f.
We said that a partial element p : LY is defined if defined(p). It would also be natural to say
that p is defined if p is in the image of η. In fact, these are equivalent. Moreover, since η is an
embedding, we know that fibη(p) is a proposition, so we have
Theorem 5.9. The following types are equivalent for any p : LY .
1. defined(p),
2. ∃(y : Y ), p = ηy,
3. Σ(y : Y ), p = ηy.
Proof. The type Σ(y : Y ), p = ηy is the fiber of η over p. As η is an embedding, it has propo-
sitional fibers, so Σ(y : Y ), p = ηy is a proposition. Hence, we have an equivalence between
(∃(y : Y ), p = ηy) and Σ(y : Y ), p = ηy.
As defined(p) is a proposition, we only need to see that defined(p)⇔ ∃(y : Y ), p = ηy.
Let p be defined so that defined(p) = 1. Then we have by definition that p = η(value(p)(∗)).
Conversely, if ∃(y : Y ), p = ηy, since defined(p) is a proposition, it is enough to define a map
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(Σ(y : Y ), p = ηy)→ defined(p). If p = ηy, then we have that defined(p) = 1 by the characteriza-
tion of equality in Σ types.
Definition 5.10. A partial function f : X → LY is total if it is defined everywhere:
total(f)
def
= Π(x : X), defined(f(x)).
A total function is a function X → Y , and we expect the above notion to align with the
notion of total function. Indeed, this is the case:
Lemma 5.11. For any partial function f : X → LY , the following types are equivalent:
1. the type of factorizations of f through Y :
T (f)
def
= Σ(g : X → Y ), f = η ◦ g.
2. the type D(f) def= Π(x : X), defined(f(x)).
Proof. We have that T (f) is equivalent by function extensionality to
T (f)
def
= Σ(g : X → Y ),Π(x : X), f(x) = η(g(x)).
Recall that by Theorem 3.19 we have for any type family R
(




Π(x : X),Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)
)
.
In particular, for R(x, y) def= f(x) = η(y), we have that T (f) is equivalent to
Π(x : X),Σ(y : Y ), f(x) = η(y).
By Theorem 5.9, this type is equivalent to D(f).
Corollary 5.12. There is at most one factorization of a partial function f : X → L(Y ) through a total
function g : X → Y . That is, the type T (f) above is a proposition.
The takeaway here is that from the knowledge that f : X → LY is defined everywhere, we
can treat f as a function X → Y . Justified by the above results, we will call f a total function
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both to mean that f : X → L(Y ) such that total(f) is inhabited, but also to emphasize that f is
an ordinary function f : X → Y .
5.3 Domain and range of partial functions
A function f : X → L(Y ) can be viewed either as an ordinary function from X to L(Y ), or as
a partial function from X to Y . When we view such a function as a partial function, we want
the notion of image and domain to be different. If we view a partial function X ⇀ Y instead
as a relation R : X → Y → U , then the range of R is Σ(y : Y ),∃(x : X), R(x, y), and the domain
of R is Σ(x : X), ∃(y : Y ), R(x, y). Similarly, if we view a partial function X ⇀ Y as a function
f : A → Y for a subtype A of X , then the range of f is Σ(y : Y ),∃(a : A), f(a) = y, and the
domain is A. These notions align, and moreover, we can translate the notion to the view of
partial functions as functions into a type of partial elements. To separate the image of a partial
function from the image of an ordinary function, we stick to the name range. We will be more
interested in the predicates for range and domain than the total types of these predicates.
Definition 5.13. The range of a partial function f : X → L(Y ) is the predicate




= ∃(x : X), f(x) = ηy.
The domain of f is the predicate





That is, y is in the range of f if there exists x : X such that the value of f(x) is y, and x is in
the domain of f if f is defined at x.
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5.4 Liftings are DCPOs
Given a type Y , we can define a type family − ≤ − : LY → LY → U by
u ≤ v def= Σ(t : defined(u)→ defined(v)),Π(p : defined(u)), value(u)(p) = value(v)(t(q)).
For a general type Y , there may be multiple witnesses that u ≤ v, but if Y is a set, then − ≤ −
is proposition-valued. Moreover, we have
Theorem 5.14. If Y is a set, then (LY,≤) is a directed-complete partial order with bottom ⊥.
Here, a directed-complete partial order X must have a prop-valued order relation, and for
any inhabited family u : I → X such that Π(i, j : I), ∃(k : I), ui, uj ≤ k, there is a least upper
bound in X .
Proof. Let Y be a set. We need to see that ≤ is proposition-valued, so let x, y : u ≤ v. Then we
have
(x = y) ' Σ(p : defined(u)→ defined(v)),Π(p : defined(u)), value(u)(p) = value(v)(t(q)).
As Y is a set, we know that value(u)(p) = value(v)(t(q)) is a proposition, and as defined(u) is a
proposition, we have that Π(p : defined(u)), value(u)(p) = value(v)(t(q)) is as well. Then x = y
is equivalent to a sum of propositions over a proposition.
If u ≤ v and v ≤ w, then u ≤ w by composition in the first coordinate and concatenation
in the second. We have that u ≤ u by (id, λp.refl). Finally, let u ≤ v and v ≤ u. Then we have
t : defined(u) → defined(v) and t′ : defined(v) → defined(u), and by proposition extensional-
ity we have p : defined(u) = defined(v). We wish to see that u = v, so we need to see that
transportλP.P→Y (p, value(u)) = value(v). This is equivalent to value(u) ◦ idtofun(p−1) = value(v).
This in turn is equivalent to
Π(q : defined(v)), value(u)(t′(q)) = value(v)(q),
and this type has an element by the assumption that v ≤ u. In other words, we have an element
p : defined(u) = defined(v) and value(u) =p value(v). So then u = v.
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Given a directed family ui : I → LY , take the extent of definition of the join u∞ to be
defined(u∞)
def
= ‖Σ(i : I), defined(ui)‖. Then by construction we have isProp(defined(u∞)). To
define the value, we first define a function ϕ :
(






As the family is directed, for any i and j, there is a k such that ui, uj ≤ uk. So then we have for
any p : defined(ui) and q : defined(uj) we have
ϕ(i, p) = ϕi(p) = ϕk(p
′) = ϕk(q
′) = ϕj(q) = ϕ(j, q)
where ϕi = value(ui), for p′, q′ : defined(uk) witnessing that ui ≤ uk and uj ≤ uk respectively.




We have defined(ui)→ defined(u∞) by p→ |(i, p)|. If v : LY with Π(i : I), ui ≤ v, we have a
map (Σ(i : I), ui)→ defined(v), and this factors through u∞ as defined(v) is a proposition.
5.5 Dominances and partial functions
The traditional way to examine restricted classes of partial functions [75, 44, 89] is to restrict
the available extents of definition via dominances—subsets of Prop satisfying certain closure
properties. We develop this approach here.
Definition 5.15. A set of propositions is a map d : U → U together with
D1 a map Π(X : U), isProp(d(X)),
D2 a map Π(X : U), d(X)→ isProp(X).
Note that these pieces of data are propositions. We say that d is proposition valued when it
satisfies D1, and that d selects propositions when it satisfies D2.
Given any set of propositions d, the type Ld(Y ) of d-partial elements of a type Y is given by
Ld(Y )
def
= Σ(P : U), d(P )× (P → Y ).
The next lemma is simple but invaluable, and we will make tacit use of it.
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Lemma 5.16. Any set of propositions d : U → U is closed under equivalence. That is, if d(P ) and
P ' Q, then d(Q).
Proof. As d selects propositions, we have isProp(P ). Then sinceQ ' P , we know isProp(Q), and
so P = Q by proposition extensionality. Hence, d(Q), by transport.
We may then define the d-partial functions X ⇀d Y to be functions
X ⇀d Y
def
= X → Ld Y.
In general, the d-partial functions might not be well-behaved: we do not necessarily have that
the d-partial functions compose, or that total functions can be viewed as d-partial. In order to
ensure these two properties, Rosolini introduced the notion of dominance.
Definition 5.17. A dominance is a set of propositions d : U → U , which we call dominant, satis-
fying
D3 The unit type is dominant: we have υ : d(1),
D4 d has conditional conjunction: For any P,Q : U we have
d(P )→ (P → d(Q))→ d(P ×Q).
Note that both pieces of data are property by D1.
In [6], Bauer calls D4 the dominance axiom, but does include D3 in the definition of domi-
nance; since he works in the internal language of a topos, D1 and D2 are redundant. Reus and
Streicher [68] call D4 dependent conjunction; since they are axiomatizing a particular dominance
(the Rosolini dominance of Section 5.7), the relevant versions of D1, D2, and D3 are theorems.





= (X = 0) + (X = 1), dΩ
def
= isProp,
with liftings corresponding to
Ld1(X)
def
= X , Ld2(X)
def




In a type theoretic context, it is usually more convenient to let the conditional propositionQ in
D4 also depend on the witness of P . Generalizing D4 to this case gives us
D4’ we have map
σ : Π(P : U), (Q : P → U), d(P )→ (Π(p : P ), d(Q(p)))→ d(Σ(p : P ), Q(p)).
This condition is perhaps more immediately recognizable: it says that a set of propositions is
closed under Σ. In fact, we have this already from conditional conjunction.
Lemma 5.18. For a set d of propositions, D4 is equivalent to D4’.
Proof. For fixed P andQ, the constant family λ(p : P ).Q(p) is such that P ×Q = Σ(p : P ), Q(p)
and P → Q = Π(p : P ), Q(p), so closure under Σ gives D4.




= Σ(p : P ), R(p).
We need to see that d(Q). First note that for any p : P we have R(p) = Q, by r 7→ (p, r) with
inverse (p′, r′) 7→ transport(−, r′), where “−′′ is the path p′ = pwhich exists since P is a propo-
sition. But then we have Π(p : P ), d(Q), by assumption that R is d-valued. By the condition,
we then have d(P × Q). But Q ' P × Q by (p, r) 7→ (p, (p, r)) with inverse given again by
transport.
The following result is the motivation for the notion of dominance.
Theorem 5.19. A set of propositions d is a dominance iff Ld : U → U1 is a submonad of L : U → U1.
Proof. Let d be a dominance. The map Ld Y → LY is given by inclusion. We only need to see
that the unit and Kleisli extension forL respectLd. As d(1), we have that η(y) is a d-proposition.
We need to see that for all (P,−, ϕ) : Ld(X) and f : X → Ld(Y ), that the extent of f ](P,−ϕ) is
d-partial. But the extent of f ](P,−, ϕ) is
Σ(p : P ), defined(f(ϕ(p))),
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but by assumption P is a d-proposition and defined(f(ϕ(p))) is d-partial, so by condition D4’,
we are done.
Now let Ld be a submonad of L, and let ρ : d(P ) and σ : P → d(Q). Define
p : 1→ Ld(P )
p(?)
def
= (P, ρ, id)
and
q : P → Ld(1)
q(x)
def
= (Q, σ(x), λw.?)
As Ld is a monad, we have
q] ◦ p : 1→ Ld(1).
Moreover, Ld is a submonad of L, so we can calculate,
q](p(?)) = q](P,−, id) = ((Σ(p : P ), Q), w, v).
We do not need to calculate the explicit value of w , as we have that w inhabits a proposition.
We also do not need to calculate the explicit value of v, sincewe know there is a unique function
X → 1 for any type X .
Aswith the dominance of all propositions, we can consider relations valued in a dominance.
That is, a d-valued relation between X and Y is a relation R : X → Y → U such that
Π(x : X), d(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
Theorem 5.20. A set of propositions d is a dominance iff the d-valued relations are closed under com-
position and contain the identity relation.
Proof. It is easy to check that the identity relation is d-valued iff d(1) since Σ(y : Y ), x = y is
contractible.
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Let d be a dominance and consider d-valued relationsR : X → Y → U and S : Y → Z → U .





= Σ(z : Z), (y : Y ), R(x, y)×R(y, z)
is dominant. By the reshuffling map (z, (y, (r, s))) 7→ ((y, r), (z, s)), this type is equivalent to
∑
(y,r):Σ(y:Y ),R(x,y)
Σ(z : Z), S(y, z).
By assumption, both Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y) and Σ(z : Z), S(y, z) are dominant. As d is closed under
Σ, we have that R;S is d-valued.
Conversely, let the d-valued relations be closed under composition, and suppose d(P ) and








For any p : P we have Σ(u : 1), S(p, u) ' S(p, ?) = Q, so that
Π(p : P ), d(Σ(u : 1), S(p, u)),
That is, S is d-valued. Similarly, we have (Σ(p : P ), P ) ' (P × P ) ' P , so that R is d-valued.
Then by assumption, R;S is d-valued. Calculating R;S(?, ?) we see
R;S(?, ?)
def
= Σ(p : P ), P ×Q.
As P is a proposition, this type is equivalent to P ×Q.
Collecting Theorems 5.19 and 5.20 and recalling Definition 3.18, we have
Theorem 5.21. The following are equivalent for any set of propositions d:
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1. d is a dominance;
2. Ld is a submonad of L.
3. There is a composition function
− − : (Y → Ld(Z))→ (X → Ld(Y ))→ (X → Ld(Z)),
restricting Kleisli composition for the L monad.
4. The d-valued relations are closed under composition.
Theorems 5.19 and 5.20 express essentially the same fact: the d-partial functions are closed
under composition iff d is a dominance. Theorem 5.19 expresses this fact by viewing d-partial
functions X ⇀d Y as functions X → Ld(Y ), while theorem 5.20 does so by viewing d-partial
as d-valued relations. We can relate the two views by restricting the functions ele and rel given
above for the dominance of all propositions.
Theorem 5.22. Assuming univalence, for any set of propositions d, the maps ele and rel lift to a section-
retraction pair on the d-valued relations and d-partial functions.
Proof. Letting X ⇀Rd Y be the type of d-valued relations from X to Y , the lifted functions are
r : (X ⇀Rd Y )→ (X → Ld(Y ))
r((R,ϕ)) = λx.
(




s : (X → Ld(Y ))→ (X ⇀Rd Y )
s(f) = λx, y.(Σ(p : fe(x)), fv(p) = y, w),
where w arises from the fact that fe(x) is always a d-proposition, and that
(
Σ(y : Y ),Σ(p : fe(x)), fv(p) = y
)
' fe(x),
using Lemma 5.16. The identity r ◦ s ∼ id follows directly from proposition extensionality.
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The pair of functions given above are the restriction of the maps in Lemma 5.5. They fail
to determine an equivalence, because we require equality between general types. Hence, they
would be equivalences in the presence of univalence.
Corollary 5.23. Assuming univalence, for any set of propositions d andX,Y : U , the typeX → Ld(Y )
is equivalent to the type
Σ(R : X → Y → U),Π(x : X), d(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
Lemma 5.5 also restricts to an arbitrary dominance. As it relies on the fact that when Y is
a set, the sum Σ(y : Y ), A(y) is a proposition iff each A(y) is (Lemma 3.5), this may be surpris-
ing: the corresponding fact does not hold for an arbitrary dominance. However, it is not the
dominance of propositions that gives us Lemma 3.5, but the h-level of propositions.
Corollary 5.24. If Y is a set, then for any set of propositions d and any typeX : U , the typeX → Ld(Y )
is equivalent to the type
Σ(R : X → Y → U),Π(x : X), d(Σ(y : Y ), R(x, y)).
5.6 Size issues
Because the lifting raises universe levels,L andLd do not formmonads as defined in Section 3.5.
However, if we restrict our attention to propositions at universe U0, then the universe levels do
not go past U1: the lifting operation is a monad on U1. We use the current section to explain
this.
If X : U0, then L(X) : U1, so L raises universe levels. However, it turns out that the raising
stops at U1, assuming we take Prop to be Prop0. Our operations are of the form d : U0 → U0, so
for each j and X : Uj , we have Lj ,
Ljd(X)
def
= Σ(P : U0), d(P )× P → X.
Since this quantification is over U0, we have that Ljd(X) : Umax(j,1). That is,
Ljd : Uj → Umax(j,1).
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In other words, for j > 0, we have Ljd : Uj → Uj . If we use resizing axioms, then we would have
Prop : U0, so that the quantification in the definition of L(X) can be over a type in U0. Then
L0d : U0 → U0, and lifting would not raise universe levels at all.
When d satisfies D3, the unit η can similarly be indexed by universe levels, with type
ηj : Π(X : Uj), X → Lj(X).
Similarly, when d satisfies D4’, the Kleisli operator has type
Π(X : Uj), (Y : Uk), (X → Lk(Y ))→ Lj(X)→ Lk(Y ),
so Kleisli composition has type
Π(X : Uj), (Y : Uk), (Z : Ul), (Y → Ll(Z))→ (X → Lk(Y ))→ (X → Ll(Z)).
The point here is that even though lifting raises universe levels, it does so in a coherent way. In
particular, if X,Y, Z : U0, then we have that Kleisli composition has type
(Y → L0(Z))→ (X → L0(Y ))→ (X → L0(Z)).
It is worth noting, moreover that the set of propositions we are most interested in, the Rosolini
propositions (Definition 5.25) arises in such a way that Rosolini liftings are equivalent to a small
type (Lemma 5.27), so the lifting of interest is predicative.
5.7 Rosolini propositions
A particularly important dominance in synthetic domain theory is the dominance of Rosolini
propositions. We approach Rosolini propositions via the extended naturals, N∞. Recall the map
〈−〉 : N∞ → U which takes a sequence (with at most one 1) to the proposition that it takes the
value 1 (Section 4.1). The Rosolini propositions are the types in the image of this map. Explicitly,
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Definition 5.25. P : U is Rosolini when
‖Σ(u : N∞), P = 〈u〉‖ .
Traditionally, the family of Rosolini propositions is denoted with Σ, which we avoid here due
to notational clashes; we will use isRosolini.




= Σ(u : N∞), P = 〈u〉,
so that isRosolini(P ) = ‖rosoliniStructure(P )‖.
The Rosolini propositions arise from computational considerations: ifP is a Rosolini propo-
sition, we can see a sequence α : N∞ such that P ⇔ 〈α〉 as a “semi-decision procedure” for P .
Then, a proposition is Rosolini if there exists a semi-decision procedure for it. However, this
procedure is abstract: we have made no assumption that there is an actual algorithm for such
a procedure. In Chapter 8, we will consider semi-decidable propositions and examine to what
extent the Rosolini and semi-decidable propositions align.
The Rosolini propositions also have a connection to analysis, discovered togetherwith Auke
Booij: call a proposition P Cauchy if there exists a Cauchy real number r : R such that




= ‖Σ(r : R), P ⇔ (0 < r)‖ .
Here the Cauchy reals are defined following Bishop [9] as equivalence classes of regular se-
quences s : N→ Q. A sequence s : N→ Q is regular when,
isRegular(s)
def








We will not discuss here the full construction of R; what matters for us is that for any real
number r : R, there exists a sequence of rationals converging to it:
Π(r : R),∃(s : N→ Q), isRegular(s)×
(





Theorem 5.26. A proposition is Cauchy iff it is Rosolini.
Proof. Let P be Rosolini. As being Cauchy is a proposition, we can untruncate the witness that







Then s is regular. We have that the real r : R defined by s is greater than 0 iff ∃(n : N), sn > 0,
which happens precisely if ∃(n : N), αn = 1. Then we have
P ⇔ 〈α〉 ⇔ (0 < r).
Conversely, let P be Cauchy. As being Rosolini is a proposition, we have r : R such that
P = (0 < r), and hence
∃(s : N→ Q), isRegular(s)×
(





and again, since we are trying to prove a proposition, we may assume an explicit regular se-
quence s.
Define β : 2N by βn
def
= (0 ≤ sn + 1/n). Then take α : N∞ to be the truncation of β. We have
〈α〉 ⇔
(




⇔ (0 ≤ r)⇔ P.
It is worth noting that countable choice is not used in the above argument.
Before we consider whether the Rosolini propositions form a dominance, let us examine
the relationship to the delay monad and its quotient by weak bisimilarity. Observe that we
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may form a lifting relative to Rosolini structures by
LRS(X)
def
= Σ(P : U), rosoliniStructure(P )× (P → X).
Note that since rosoliniStructure is not a proposition, the same element x : X has multiple repre-
sentatives inLRS(X). Neverthelesswe can form a (non-canonical) inclusion η : X → LRS(X) by
taking η(x) to be (〈α〉, (α, refl), λu.x) where α = 0 = λn.n = 0. This makes LRS a reorganization
of the definition of the delay monad.
Lemma 5.27. For any type X , there is an equivalence
LRS(X) ' D(X).
Moreover, η : X → LRS(X) lifts over this equivalence to now : X → D(X).
Proof. Simply manipulate the definition of LRS(X). We have
LRS(X) = Σ(P : U), rosoliniStructure(P )× (P → X)
= Σ(P : U),Σ(µ : N∞), (P = 〈µ〉)× (P → X)
' Σ(µ : N∞), 〈µ〉 → X
= Σ(µ : N∞), (Σ(n : N), µn = 1)→ X
' Σ(µ : N∞),Π(n : N), Xµ=n
' D(X).
We have a map q : LRS(X)→ LisRosolini(X) given by
q(P, d, ϕ)
def
= (P, |d|, ϕ).











Proof. To show that q is surjective, we need to see that for any x : LisRosolini(X) the fiber of q over
x is inhabited. I.e., we want an inhabitant of
‖Σ(y : LRS(X)), q(y) = x‖ .
Consider x = (P, r, ϕ), so that we have r : ‖RS(X)‖. As we are trying to show a proposition,
we may assume we have some r′ : RS(X). Then for y = (P, r′, ϕ), we have q(y) = x.
Composing q with the equivalence e : D(X)→ LRS(X) determines a map
f : D(X)→ LisRosolini(X).
It is clear that f respects bisimilarity; if x, y : D(X) are bisimilar, then we must have that the
sequences determining µx, µy : N∞ defining x and y are such that
〈µx〉 ⇔ 〈µy〉;
when x and y do take a value, it must be the same value, and so value(f(x)) = value(f(y)).
Then f factors through a map
f/≈ : D(X)/≈ → LisRosolini(X),
so long as LisRosolini(X) is a set; this happens wheneverX is a set. This map is again surjective,
as f is.
It remains to show that the extension f/≈ has propositional fibers. It is enough to show
that if f(x) = f(y) then x ≈ y. We have that f(x) = f(y) precisely when both µx = µy and if
µx(n) = µy(n) = 1, then x and y are equal to delayn(a) for some a : X . These two conditions
are the definition of bisimilarity.
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5.8 Choice principles and the dominance axiom
The Rosolini propositions form a dominance in, for example, the effective topos [75], but in
general we cannot show that they do. We give in this section a characterization of the amount
of choice needed to show that the Rosolini propositions form a dominance, starting with a
weakening of countable choice.
Theorem 5.29. For any type A, the following are equivalent
1. Choice from N to families of the form n 7→ (αn = 1)→ A, with α : 2N.
2. Choice from Rosolini propositions to A.
Proof. Consider the following propositions:
(1) 〈α〉 → ‖A‖,
(2) (Σ(n : N), αn = 1)→ ‖A‖,
(3) Π(n : N), ((αn = 1)→ ‖A‖),
(4) Π(n : N), ‖(αn = 1)→ A‖,
(5) ‖Π(n : N), (αn = 1)→ A‖,
(6) ‖(Σ(n : N), αn = 1)→ A‖,
(7) ‖〈α〉 → A‖.
The implication (4)→ (5) is the above instance of countable choice, and the implication (1)→
(7) is the above instance of propositional choice. Note that (3) → (4) holds because αn = 1 is
decidable. Hence the chain of implications (1) → (2) → (3) → (4) → (5) → (6) → (7) gives
propositional choice from countable choice, and the chain of implications (4) → (3) → (2) →
(1)→ (7)→ (6)→ (5) gives countable choice from propositional choice.
The above form of countable choice, where A takes the form rosoliniStructure(P ) for some
P is sufficient to prove that the Rosolini propositions form a dominance. In fact, we can do no
better.
Theorem 5.30. The following are equivalent
1. Choice from Rosolini propositions to Rosolini structures. I.e.,
isRosolini(P )→ (P → ‖rosoliniStructureQ‖)→ ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖
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2. The Rosolini propositions form a dominance.
We omit the proof as we generalize this theorem to Theorem 5.32 below.
Corollary 5.31. Choice from N to families of the form n 7→ (αn = 1) → A implies that the Rosolini
propositions form a dominance. Hence, countable choice implies that the Rosolini propositions form a
dominance.
Proof. We need to see that choice from N to families of the form n 7→ (αn = 1) → A gives us
Rosolini choice. So let P and Q be propositions. We wish to see
‖rosoliniStructure(P )‖ → (P → ‖rosoliniStructure(Q)‖)→ ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖ .
In fact, we may untruncate rosoliniStructure(P ), so let α : N∞ such that P = 〈α〉. Then we need
(〈α〉 → ‖rosoliniStructure(Q)‖)→ ‖〈α〉 → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖ .




we have (αn = 1) → ‖A‖. Since αn = 1 is decidable, we have choice from αn = 1 (Theo-
rem 3.23). Hence, we have
Π(n : N), ‖(αn = 1)→ A‖ .
This is exactly the assumption of our choice principle, so we conclude
‖Π(n : N), (αn = 1)→ A‖ .
As (Π(n : N), (αn = 1)→ A) ' (〈α〉 → A), we have
‖〈α〉 → A‖ .
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And this concludes the proof, since
‖〈α〉 → A‖ ' ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖ .
The reliance on choicewe saw inTheorem5.30 is an instance of amore general phenomenon.
Theorem 5.32. Let D : U → U select propositions (D2) and have conditional conjunction (D4) and
define d(X) def= ‖D(X)‖. Then the following are equivalent
1. Choice from d-propositions to D-structures; i.e., for all X,Y : U ,
D(X)→ (X → ‖D(Y )‖)→ ‖X → D(Y )‖
2. The d-propositions satisfy the dominance axiom.
Proof. We need to show that under the assumptions of ‖D(X)‖ and X → ‖D(Y )‖ that we have
‖X → D(Y )‖ ' ‖D(X × Y )‖ .
By properties of truncation, it is enough to assume D(X) and X → ‖D(Y )‖ and give maps
(X → D(Y ))↔ D(X × Y ).
From left to right is simply the fact that D has conditional conjunction. From right to left, if
(X → D(Y )) thenX → isProp(Y ). SinceX → ((X × Y ) = Y ) whenX and Y are propositions,
we have (X → D(Y ))→ (X → D(X × Y )). By modus ponens, we are done.
Rosolini choice (choice from Rosolini propositions to Rosolini structures) is actually quite
weak. We saw above that it follows from even a weakening of countable choice, but it is quite
a bit weaker than countable choice.
Theorem 5.33. Each of the following principles alone implies Rosolini choice:
1. countable choice;
2. the weakening of countable choice in Theorem 5.29;
3. “untruncated” LPO: Π(α : 2N), 〈α〉+ (α = λn.0);
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4. “untruncated” WLPO: Π(α : 2N), 〈α〉+ ¬〈α〉;
5. “truncated” WLPO: Π(α : 2N), ‖〈α〉+ ¬〈α〉‖;
6. Propositional choice: for all P,A : U with isSet(A) and isProp(P ),
(P → ‖A‖)→ ‖P → A‖ .
Proof. 1. This follows from 2;
2. Rosolini choice is the specialization of this principle to types of the form rosoliniStructure(Q)
for some Q : U ;
3. LPO implies WLPO, so this follows from 4;
4. This follows from 5, since the truncated form is weaker;
5. Let isRosoliniP and let Q be a proposition such that P → isRosolini(Q). Then
∃(α : 2N), P ' 〈α〉.
By WLPO, we then have ‖P + ¬P‖. However, P is a proposition, so then so is P + ¬P ,
and we have P + ¬P ' ‖P + ¬P‖. Then we may perform a case analysis on P : if P is
true, then so is ‖rosoliniStructure(Q)‖, and so we have ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖. If P is
false, then we vacuously have ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖.
6. If isRosolini(P ), then P is a proposition, so by propositional choice we have
(P → isRosolini(Q))→ ‖P → rosoliniStructure(Q)‖ .
In light of the above, it is worth wondering how far we can go towards specifying a class
of partial maps via a class of propositions—indeed we cannot prove that any dominance is
different from both isProp and isContr without violating classicality.
So, if we were to work with dominances, choice would be unavoidable. The first attempt at
a solution is to allow D(X) to be structure, rather than property. This commits us to handling
structure explicitly; in particular, we would need to use definitions and constructions which re-
spect structure. This seems unduly cumbersome, but we develop this line of reasoning some-
156
what in the next section. We will subsequently make use of this development in finding an
approach to partial functions which works for our purposes.
Note that Rosolini choice is not enough to give a version of Theorem 5.14 for Rosolini propo-
sitions. However, full countable choice is enough to show that the Rosolini propositions are
closed under countable joins.
Theorem 5.34. If countable choice holds, then the Rosolini propositions are closed under countable joins
in the lattice of all propositions. Hence, countable choice implies that the Rosolini lifting is an ω-CPO.
Proof. Let Pi : N → Prop be a countable chain of Rosolini propositions. We need to see that
‖Σ(i : N), Pi‖ is a Rosolini proposition. We have by assumption,
Π(i : N), ‖Σ(αi : N∞), Pi = 〈αi〉‖ .
By countable choice we then have
‖Π(i : N),Σ(αi : N∞), Pi = 〈αi〉‖ .
Since being Rosolini is a proposition, to prove that ‖Σ(i : N), Pi‖ is Rosolini, it is enough to
prove this from
Π(i : N),Σ(αi : N∞), Pi = 〈αi〉.
Define β : N∞ to be the sequence such that β(n) = 1 iff there is a lexicographically minimal
(i, j) : N× N with i+ j = n such that αi(j) = 1. It is clear that isProp〈β〉.
Now observe that ‖Σ(i : N), Pi‖ is equivalent to ‖Σ(i, j : N), αi(j) = 1‖. By construction we
have that
〈β〉 ' ‖Σ(i, j : N), αi(j) = 1‖ .
Then β provides a witness that ‖Σ(i : N), Pi‖ is Rosolini.
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5.9 Structural Dominances
In order to define the notion of disciplined map below in Section 5.10, we need to relax the
notion of dominance to allow D(X) to be structured. This structural version of a dominance is
as follows.
Definition 5.35. A structural dominance is a map d : U → U together with witnesses of Condi-
tions D2, D3, and D4’. That is, we have
D2. a map Π(X : U), d(X)→ isProp(X),
D3. The unit type is dominant: we have υ : d(1),
D4.’ we have map
σ : Π(P : U), (Q : P → U), d(P )→ (Π(p : P ), d(Q(p)))→ d(Σ(p : P ), Q(p)).
Note that D3 and D4’ are structure rather than property in the absence of D1.
Lemma 5.18 gives an equivalence between D4 and D4’ under the assumption that d satisfies
both D1 and D2. It is enough to show only logical equivalence because both D4 and D4’ are
propositions in this case. When we only have D2, this is not enough. It seems that in this case,
we can only show that D4’ is a retract of D4.
Before giving the argument in detail, a sketch is useful: let d select propositions, and fix
P : U with d(P ). The type of closure under conditional conjunction, when applied to a type Q
is the same as the type of Σ-closure applied to λp.Q, since we have defined P ×Q as Σ(p : P ), Q
and P → d(Q) as Π(p : P ), d(Q). Conversely, since P is a proposition, we can show that any
type family Y : P → U is equal to the constant type family λq.Σ(p : P ), Y (p). Then given a
witness of Σ-closure, we get a witness of closure under conditional conjunction, by treating a
type as a constant type family; given a witness of closure under conditional conjunction, we get
a witness of closure under Σ by passing back and forth along this equality.
We will give the required homotopy by applying the following lemma.
Lemma 5.36. Let X be a type and A,B : X → U with f : Π(x : X), A(x) → B(x). Let p : x = x′
for x, x′ : X . Then
idtofun(apB(p
−1)) ◦ fx ◦ idtofun(apA(p)) = fx′ .
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Proof. By path induction on p. In the case that p = refl, both apA(p) and apB(p) are reflexivity,
and so we need to see fx = fx, which is obvious.
For fixed P : U and d : d(P ), define the type families A,B : (P → U)→ U by
A(Y ) = Π(p : P ), d(Y p)
and
B(Y ) = d(Σ(p : P ), Y p).




Π(Y : P → U), A(Y )→ B(Y )
)




Defining the candidate retraction requires some more work.
Lemma 5.37. For X : U and Y : X → U , let Z def= Σ(x : X), Y (x). If isProp(X), then
Π(x : X), (Y (x) ' Z),
and
Z ' (X × Z).
Proof. For the first equivalence, fix x : X , we have Y (x) → Z by y 7→ (x, y), with inverse given
by transport.
Moreover, we have Z → X × Z by (x, y) 7→ (x, x, y) with inverse again given by transport.
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In the case where Y is also proposition valued (that is, Π(x : X), isProp(Y x)), these equiv-
alences are equalities, as all types involved are propositions. Moreover, the above gives us an
equality of predicates, by function extensionality.
Lemma 5.38. If X is a proposition and Y : X → U is a predicate, then
Y = λx.Σ(x : X), Y (x).
This lemma allows us to define, for our fixed P : U .
F :
(
Π(Q : U), A(λp.Q)→ B(λp.Q)
)





Y )) ◦ δΣ(p:P ),Y p ◦ idtofun(apA(wY ))
where wY : Y → λp.Σ(p : P ), Y (p) arises from Lemma 5.38. Finally, we can compute the com-
posite F ◦E:
Lemma 5.39. The map E is a section of the map F .
Proof. Fix θ : Π(Y : P → U), A(Y )→ B(Y ). Then
F (E(θ)) = λY. idtofun(apB(w
−1
Y )) ◦ θλp.Σ(p:P ),Y p ◦ idtofun(apA(wY ))
Note that θ has the type of f in Lemma 5.36, with X = P → U , and so we have for each Y ,
F (E(θ))(Y ) = θ(Y ),
and so F ◦E is homotopic to the identity.
In the above, we fixed P : U and d : d(P ). Letting P and d vary again, we see that closure
under Σ is a retract of closure under conditional conjunction That is, we have
Corollary 5.40. If d : U → U selects propositions, then the type that d is closed under Σ is a retract of
the type
Π(P,Q : U), d(P )→ (P → d(Q))→ d(P ×Q).
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Themain example of a structural dominancewe are interested in is the dominance of Rosolini
structures.
Lemma 5.41. The map rosoliniStructure is a structural dominance.
Proof. D2 is immediate. For υwe take 0. To getσ, by Lemma5.40 and the definition of rosoliniStructure,
we first define a conditional addition −+∗ − : Π(α : N∞), (〈α〉 → N∞)→ N∞, such that
〈α+∗ β〉 ⇔ ∃(k : N), (αk = 1)× ∃(j : N), β(k)j = 1.
In fact, this specification is almost a complete definition. Define,
(α+∗ β)n = 1⇔ ∃(k ≤ n), (αk = 1)× ∃(j ≤ n), β(k)j = 1.
Since this is a bounded quantification of decidable predicates, this is again a decidable property
on N. Moreover, since there can be at most one such k and j, we have isProp(〈α+∗ β〉).
Now, we define σ as follows. Fix P : U andQ : P → U with α : N∞ withw : 〈α〉 = P and for
each p : P a βp : N∞ such thatQ(p) = 〈βp〉. We then have a map β′ : 〈α〉 → N∞ with β′(a) = βp
where a transports over w to p. Then a Rosolini structure for Σ(p : P ), Q(p) is given by α+∗ β′
together with the fact that α+∗ β′ takes value 1 precisely when there is a : 〈α〉, and β′(a) takes
value 1.
5.10 Disciplined maps
The takeaway from Section 5.8 above is that the Rosolini partial functions are not useful in the
absence of choice principles: we need choice a principle to compose Rosolini partial functions.
Another approach is necessary. We could instead work with Rosolini structures—with the
delay monad—but doing this means carrying around extra information, in particular, distin-
guishing between partial elements based not on their eventual value, but on how long it takes
to compute this value. This is unsatisfactory; instead, we need a predicate on partial functions
which is closed under composition without choice.
The predicate on partial functions given by a dominance arises by restricting the avail-
able extents of definition. Instead, we will give a predicate on partial functions directly: Any
proposition-index family D : Prop → U gives rise to a function from the lifting relative to
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that family LD(Y ) to the general lifting L(Y ), and so we get a map from D-partial functions
X → LD(Y ) to general partial functions X → L(Y ). If D is a set of propositions, this map
is an embedding, and so X → LD(Y ) is equivalent to its image, but this is not true if D is
not proposition-valued. Then, instead of looking at X → LD(Y ), we will look at its image in
X → L(Y ).
We can think of the space X → LD(Y ) as being too wild for our purposes, so we first tame
the space; the tamed maps we will call disciplined. The rest of the section lays this out precisely.
Given any family D : U → U which selects propositions and X : U , we have a map
eD : LD(Y )→ L(Y )
eD(P, d, ϕ) = (P,−, ϕ),
where the omitted “−” follows from Condition D2. By post-composition, this gives us a map
tame : (X → LD(Y ))→ (X → L(Y )).
This map always factors through (X → Ld(Y )), where d(Y ) = ‖D(Y )‖, and if D satisfies Con-
dition D1, then this map is an embedding. We will thus call eD the canonical embedding, even
when D carries structure.
We call a function in the image of tameD D-disciplined. That is,
Definition 5.42. A function f : X → L(Y ) isD-disciplined if it is in the image of tameD. Formally,
isDisD : (X → L(Y ))→ U
isDisD(f)
def
= ∃(f ′ : X → LD(Y )), tame(f ′) = f
DisD(X,Y ) : U
DisD(X,Y )
def
= Σ(f : X → L(Y )), isDisD(f)
Lemma 5.43. If D is a structural dominance, for any f : X → LY and g : Y → LZ, we have
isDisD(f)→ isDisD(g)→ isDisD(g  f).
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Proof. As isDis(g  f) is a proposition, we may assume f ′ : X → LD(Y ) and g′ : Y → LD(Z)
such that tame(f ′) = f and tame(g′) = g. We need h′ : X → LD(Z) with tame(h′) = g  f . We
claim that h′ def= g′  f ′ suffices. Note that tame is post-composition with e, that e acts indepen-
dently on the components of z : LD(Z), and that e is the identity on extent and value, so to see
that e(g′](f ′x)) = g](fx), we need only the component witnessing that defined(x) satisfies D.
However, since this component takes values in a proposition, there is nothing to check.
Theorem 5.44. If D is a structural dominance, then there is a composition operator,
−− : DisD(Y,Z)→ DisD(X,Y )→ DisD(X,Z).
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.43.
Observe that since the truncation d of any structural dominance is proposition-valued, the
disciplined maps are a subset of the d-partial functions. Also notice that if D is in fact a domi-
nance, then for any f : X → LY the type
Σ(g : X → LD(Y )), tame(f) = g
is a proposition, and so we can remove the truncation. That is, for a dominance D, we have that
the D-disciplined maps are exactly the D-partial functions. The situation is more interesting
when D is not proposition-valued. In this case, a lifting
DisD(X,Y )→ (X → LD(Y ))
corresponds to untruncating the existential in the definition of isDis. To show this rigorously,
we use the following lemma.
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= Σ(g : X → LD(Y )), f = tame(g),
we have equivalences
Σ(f : X → L(Y )), A(f) ' X → LD(Y )
' Σ(f : X → L(Y )), B(f).
The composite equivalenceE is the identity on the first component, and Ff on the second. That
is, E arises as FΣ from Section 1.9, and so by Theorem 1.28, each Ff is an equivalence.
Theorem 5.46. Fix a structural dominance D and its associated set of propositions d. If countable choice
holds, then for any f : N → L(N), we have that f is disciplined iff for all n : N , the extent of f(n) is a
d-proposition. Then, in particular, countable choice implies that f : N → L(N) is Rosolini-disciplined
iff f factors through a Rosolini partial function.
Proof. By the above lemma, we have an equivalence
isDis(f) ' ‖Π(n : N),D(defined(fn))‖ .
We know there is an implication
‖Π(n : N),D(defined(fn))‖ → Π(n : N), d(defined(fn)),
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and the implication in the other direction is an instance of countable choice.
Finally, every disciplined map factors through a d-partial function. Moreover, we have that
f : N→ L(N) factors through a d-partial function iff Π(n : N), d(defined(fn)), and by the above
argument, this implies that f is disciplined.
Note that we cannot use the dominance choice principle for Theorem 5.46, since there does
not seem to be away towrite the type Π(n : N), ‖D(defined(fn))‖ in the form Π(a : A), ‖D(Pa)‖,
where A is dominant.
Note, moreover, that the above is a theorem about disciplined maps from N. Since we will
look at first-order computability theory, we are interested in partial functions from N to N. In
particular, the Rosolini-disciplined maps form the most likely candidate for a notion of partial
function that can be consistently posited to be the computable functions.
5.11 Comparison with synthetic domain theory
In synthetic domain theory (for example, in [75, 44, 68, 83, 89]), a dominance is defined to be a
map d : Ω→ Ω with the object of all partial elements of Y is given by
{A ∈ PY | ∀x, y.A(x)→ A(y)→ x = y},
and the object of d-partial elements of Y by
{A ∈ PY | (∀x, y.A(x)→ A(y)→ x = y) ∧ d(∃x.A(x))}
which translates into type theory as
Σ(A : Y → Prop), (Π(x, y : Y ), A(x)→ A(y)→ x = y)× d(Σ(x : Y ), A(x)).
However, this does not work in a univalent setting, unless Y is a set. In particular, recall
that all maps from the homotopy circle S1 into Prop are constant (Lemma 2.68). In particular,
we do not have the unit map S1 → LS1; indeed,
η(base) = λx.(x = base),
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is not valued in propositions. So we must change A to have type Y → U , but then we run into
the issue that A(x) → A(y) → x = y may have non-trivial structure, because the type x = y
is not a proposition. Again, we have that (x = base) → (y = base) → x = y has numerous
witnesses. In short, we must change the total lifting in two ways:
Σ(A : Y → Prop)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ(A:X→U)
, (Π(x, y : Y ), A(x)→ A(y)→ x = y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
isProp(Σ(x:Y ),A(x))
.
This gives the lifting of Y as single-valued relations with 1. As we saw in Theorem 5.6 this is
equivalent to the lifting we give in Definition 5.3, assuming univalence. Even without univa-
lence, our lifting is a retract of this lifting. The application of univalence here occurs becausewe
cannot establish equality between maps Y → U without an extensionality principle for types.
As a result, our lifting Σ(p : U), isProp(P ) × (P → X) is more useful in the absence of uni-
valence: we need only proposition and function extensionality to establish equality between
elements of L(Y ).
Typical axiomatizations of synthetic domain theory include a subset of propositions, writ-
ten Σ, which are our Rosolini propositions. In the settings of interest to synthetic domain the-
orists, the dominance axiom typically holds—usually as a consequence of countable choice.
The axiomatization given by Reus [69] is of note for not requiring Σ to be a dominance. There,
they are not interested in Σ to define liftings, but instead are interested in developing domain
theoretic ideas abstractly. They give the following axiomatization of Σ ⊆ Prop:
(aSig) True and false are in Σ;
(bSig) Σ is closed under ∨ and ∧;
(cSig) Σ is closed under existential quantification over N;
(dSig) Σ embeds into Prop;
(PHOA) ΣΣ is equivalent to the graph of the standard ordering relation on Σ× Σ;
(S) For any P : (N → Σ) → Σ such that P (λn.>), there exists an n : N such that P (n), where
n = λk.k < n;
(MP) propositions in Σ have double-negation elimination.
Axioms (aSig), (bSig), and (dSig) are true for the Rosolini propositions, while (cSig) and (S)
require some amount of choice. In fact, (cSig) implies Rosolini choice in our context, so implies
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that the Rosolini propositions form a dominance. Note, however, that our proof relies on the
fact that the Rosolini propositions arise via truncation from a structural dominance, in contrast
to their direct axiomatization. Both (PHOA) and (MP) are not available in our setting: (PHOA)
implies that there are propositionswhich are not Rosolini propositions (the negation ofKripke’s
schema, and hence negating excluded middle), and (MP) already implies we are working in a
computation setting.
5.12 Discussion
The Rosolini dominance plays a fundamental role in Rosolini’s PhD Thesis [75], which is con-
cernedwith investigating notions of effectiveness. It seems that the notion of effectiveness leads
one inexorably to consider partiality, since the notion of dominancewas introduced by himhere
specifically to deal with partiality in toposes, where (like in type theory), the notion of (total)
function is primitive. Historically, the set of Rosolini propositions has been denoted Σ, clashing
with type-theoretic notation. The Rosolini propositions correspond to the Sierpinski space in
formal topology and to the Σ1 propositions from the arithmetic hierarchy. Several traditional
taboos can be stated in terms of Rosolini propositions:
· Kripke’s Schema says that all propositions are Rosolini.
· Markov’s Principle is double-negation elimination for Rosolini propositions.
· LPO says that true and false are the only Rosolini propositions.
· WLPO says that Rosolini propositions are either false or not false.
This viewmakes it clear that Kripke’s Schema andMarkov’s Principle together imply excluded
middle.
Until the last year or so, the relationship between partiality and dominances has only been
studied in the context of synthetic domain theory and synthetic computability theory, where
countable choice holds, and so the problem with composition is not apparent. The form of
Choice in Theorem 5.29 was isolated by Martín Escardó when examining what was necessary
to compose partial functions. Theorem 5.32 was generalized from Theorem 5.30, which we
showed already in our paper [31]. In that paper, Theorem 5.28 was left as a conjecture, and Bas
Spitters quickly proved it independently. The fact that the Rosolini-structure lifting is equiva-
lent to the delay monad means that it does not raise universe levels. The same is true for the
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Rosolini lifting. Besides the proof via Theorem 5.28, there is a result due to Egbert Rijke [71]
giving conditions under which an operation does not increase universe levels.
The notion of disciplined map was proposed, but not worked out in the conclusion to [31],
inspired partially by comments fromMike Shulman. Chapman, Uustalu, and Veltri [16] briefly
proposed dealing with the problem of composition by viewing the quotiented delay monad as
arrow (in the sense of [42]); this is morally the same as the approach via disciplined maps. To
my knowledge, they have not pursued this line, although Uustalu and Veltri have continued to
examine partiality and monads [87].
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CHAPTER6
Partiality in Bishop Mathematics
Our approach to partiality in Chapter 5 relies crucially on univalent definitions. However, it
is worth examining the extent to which we can do the work contained there in a Bishop-style
approach using setoids. Since the aim of this thesis is not to work with setoids, this chapter
will be short and less detailed. Moreover, we will not use univalent definitions in this chapter.
In particular, a proposition is simply any type, a relation is any type family, we do not use any
h-levels, and we use the Curry-Howard interpretation of logic from Section 1.2.
We cannot approach general partial functions from the setoid perspective with our tools.
First we require quantification over the universe, but there is no reasonable way to turn the
universe into a setoid—no universe setoid was given by Martin Hofmann in his thesis on se-
toids [35], and it is not clear that is possible [23]. Second, we rely on the definition of Prop,
which we are avoiding in the setoid approach. Instead, we will restrict our attention to func-
tions arising from the Rosolini lifting, which can be treated as a setoid. Since the definition of
Rosolini propositions we gave relies also on Prop, we will instead approach the Rosolini domi-
nance in this chapter via the delay monad and its quotient by bisimilarity. Recall Lemma 5.27
and Theorem 5.28, which show that this presentations is sound. The setoid approach does re-
solve one difficulty from the previous chapter: countable choice holds in the setoidmodel. This
result seems to be folklore, so we prove it in Section 6.6.
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6.1 Setoids
Recall that a setoid is a type together with an equivalence relation. In this context, an equivalence
relation on X is a type family R : X → X → U together with witnesses,
r : Π(x : X), R(x, x)
(−)−1 : Π(x, y : X), R(x, y)→ R(y, x)
(−) · (−) : Π(x, y, z : X), R(y, z)→ R(x, y)→ R(x, z).
Wewill abuse notation and refer to a setoid by its underlying type. Wewill also use≈ (or, when
we need to be more precise, ≈X ) for the relation on a setoid X , while leaving the data for ≈
implicit.
The equivalence relation ismeant to capture equality on the underlying type. This allows us
to impose extensionality principles as we wish, at the cost of bookkeeping. For example, if we
wish to have function extensionality, we equip each function typeX → Y with the equivalence
relation
f ≈ g def= Π(x : X), f(x) ≈ g(x).
The bookkeeping required is substantial: we must ensure that any construction on setoids re-
spects equivalence. In particular, if X and Y are (the underlying types of) setoids, we will call
an element of the typeX → Y an operation, and we will say that an operation f is extensional or
is a functionwhen
Π(x, y : X), (x ≈ y)→ f(x) ≈ f(y).
Then the type of functions from X to Y is given by
Σ(f : X → Y ),Π(x, y : X), (x ≈ y)→ f(x) ≈ f(y).
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Except when we state otherwise, we take ≈ on function types to be extensional equality:
(f, w) ≈ (g, u) def⇔ Π(x : X), f(x) ≈ g(x).
Note that in this definition of ≈, we are treating the evidence that f is a function as property,
regardless of the underlying type. Wewill consequently talk about a function f : X → Y rather
than an operation f : X → Y with a witness w : Π(x, y : X), (x ≈ y)→ f(x) ≈ f(y).
6.2 Families of setoids
The requirement that a function f respects equivalence corresponds to the function apf . In
Part 1.7, we followed the definition of apf with a dependent version apdf which relied on trans-
port. As a consequence of the uniform definition of identity types, we were able to construct
transport for general type families. Since the equivalence relation on a setoid is ad-hoc, we have
to give our notion of transport in an ad-hoc way. The typical way to do this is via what Palm-
gren [64] calls proof-irrelevant families of setoids, which treat the equivalence relation on the
index type as property. A more nuanced approach, called proof-relevant families by Palmgren,
treats the equivalence relation on the index type as structure. The context is a setoid (A,≈) and
a family of types B : A→ U where each B(a) is a setoid. In order to be a family of setoids, we
need at least reindexing bijections
ϕ : Π(x, y : A), x ≈ y → (B(x) ' B(y)).
We call B a proof-irrelevant family of setoids when
(i) ϕp ≈ idBx whenever p : x ≈ x and
(ii) ϕq ◦ϕp ≈ ϕr whenever p : x ≈ y, q : y ≈ z and r : x ≈ z.
We call B a proof-relevant family of setoids when
(a) ϕr(x) ≈ idBx for all x : X ;
(b) ϕp−1 ◦ϕp ≈ idB(x) and ϕp ◦ϕp−1 ≈ idB(y) for any p : x ≈ y; and
(c) ϕq ◦ϕp ≈ ϕq·p whenever p : x ≈ y and q : y ≈ z.
Note that any proof-irrelevant family of setoids is also a proof-relevant family of setoids. In
either case, we then have a version of transport, or substitution given by the reindexing bijec-
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tions. We can then say that a dependent function f : Π(x : A), B(x) is extensional when B is a
family of setoids and
Π(x, y : A),Π(p : x ≈ y), ϕp(f(x)) ≈ f(y).
In other words, a dependent function on setoids is extensional when it satisfies a version of apd.
We are interested also in predicates P : A→ U . For these cases, we usually don’t care about
any setoid structure on P (a), so let us say that a extensional predicate on a setoid A is a type
family P : A→ U with reindexing bijections
transport : Π(x, y : A), x ≈ y → (P (x) ' P (y)).
6.3 Truncation and quotients
A setoid X is proof-irrelevant when x ≈ y for all x, y : X . This notion of proof-irrelevance is a
setoid-version of being a homotopy proposition. Indeed, given a setoid X , we have the setoid
‖X‖ with x ≈‖X‖ y for all x, y : X . Then the operation | − | : X → ‖X‖ which is identity on
elements is indeed a function. Moreover, ‖X‖ has the universal property of truncation with
respect to proof-irrelevant setoids: let P be any proof-irrelevant setoid, and f : X → P be a
function. Then the operation f is also a function ‖X‖ → P , as for any x, y : X we have that
f(x) ≈ f(y), and so in particular, when x ≈‖X‖ y, we have f(x) ≈ f(y). Moreover, if we take
two functions ‖X‖ → P to be equal when they are extensionally equal as operations, then
f : ‖X‖ → P is the unique factorization of f : X → P through ‖X‖.
We can generalize this construction to any equivalence relation in the expected way. Let X
be a setoid and letR be an equivalence relation which respects≈. That is,R is a family of types
such that x ≈ y → R(x, y). Then the quotient X/R of X by R is the setoid with base type X
and equivalence relation R. Any function X → Y which respects ≈ will then also respect R,
and so extends (uniquely) to a function X/R→ Y .
Even more generally, Dybjer and Moeneclaey [27] showed that any Higher-inductive type
whose highest constructor is a path between points (i.e., of type x = y for some elements x, y)
can be interpreted in the setoid model.
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6.4 The Delay monad
We now turn to the delay monad. We need to ensure that the definition given in Chapter 4
makes sense in the context of setoids. To do this, we need to define N∞. In turn, we need
setoid representations of N and 2. Fortunately, this last task is easy: we equip N and 2 with the
equality relation given by the identity type. Note that for N we can define this without having
the identity type using Theorem 1.13. Equality on 2 can be represented in a similar way.
Then we may define N∞ to be the setoid whose underlying type is
Σ(α : 2N),Π(j, k : N), (αj = 1)→ (αk = 1)→ (j = k),
and whose equivalence relation is extensional equality on the first component: (α,−) ≈ (β,−)
when Π(n : N), αn = βn. Then, for a setoid X , we may define D(X) via one of the representa-
tions in Chapter 4:
D(X)
def
= Σ(µ : N∞),Π(n : N), (µn = 1)→ X,
The equivalence relation that gives rise to the setoid D(X) is
(µ, ϕ) ≈ (ν, ψ) def= Σ(p : µ ≈ ν),Π(n : N), transport(p, ϕ)(n) ≈(νn=1)→X ψ(n).
In order for this to be well-defined, we need to know that the type family
Π(n : N), (µn = 1)→ X
is a family of setoids.
In order to show that D(X) forms a monoid, we need to give η and (−)], and moreover,
show that these operations are extensional. Showing η to be extensional is easy. Showing (−)]
to be extensional is a little more work, but ultimately corresponds to the computation given in
Theorem 4.9.
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6.5 Rosolini partial elements and functions
By Theorem 5.28, we can represent the Rosolini lifting via the quotient of the delay monad
by weak bisimilarity. To quotient by weak bisimilarity, we will replace the underlying type of
D(X) with the (equivalent) uncurried form
D(X)
def
= Σ(µ : N∞), 〈µ〉 → X,
where 〈µ〉 is again Σ(n : N), µn = 1, and consider instead the equivalence relation
(µ, ϕ) ≈ (ν, ψ) def= (〈µ〉 ↔ 〈ν〉)×
(
Π(m : 〈µ〉),Π(n : 〈ν〉), ϕ(m) ≈ ψ(n)
)
.
Note that by using the above representation instead of the curried form
D(X)
def
= Σ(µ : N∞),Π(n : N), (µn = 1→ X),
we avoid needing to know that Π(n : N), (µn = 1) → X is a family of setoids, since we do not
need to reindex. Above, where we defined the equivalence relation on the unquotiented D(X),
this reorganization doesn’t help us, since we also needed the sequences to agree at every point.
6.6 The axiom of choice
It may come as a surprise that the monad data for the delay monad is also extensional with
respect to this coarser equivalence relation; i.e., that the quotiented delay monad, D(−)/≈, is
again a monad when we work with setoids. However, countable choice holds in the setoid
model, on account of the fact that the setoid structure on N is discrete—that it arises from the
identity type.
Theorem 6.1. Let X be any setoid, and R : N→ X → U a relation such that for all n : N there exists
an x : X such that R(n, x). Then there is a function f : A→ B such that R(n, f(n)) for all n : N.
Proof. The hypothesis of the theorem gives us a witness
w : Π(n : N),Σ(x : X), R(n, x).
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Then we get an operation f : N→ X defined by
f(n) = pr0(w(n)),
and moreover, we have for any n : N that pr0(w(n)) : R(n, f(n)). All the remains is to see
that f is extensional. Let n, k : N with n ≈ k. But if n ≈ k we must have that n = k, and
so f(n) = f(k).
Unfortunately, retaining witness data is not enough for the full axiom of choice, since we
need our operations to be extensional [58]. In more detail, the general situation is that we have
a relation R : A → B → U such that for all a : A there exists a b : B with R(a, b). We wish to
find a choice function f : A→ B. The operation f can always be found in the setoid model, by
projecting from the type ∃(b : B), R(x, y), but this operation is not guaranteed to be extensional.
For the setoid of natural numbers, the equivalence relation is such that all operations out of N
are extensional, and so we have the above theorem.
6.7 Discussion
It is possible to construct the Rosolini lifting in the setoid approach, and moreover, this does
form a monad, as a result of the fact that countable choice holds in the setoid model. Recent
work by Coquand, Mannaa, and Ruch [22] gives a model of univalent type theory in which
countable choice does not hold. Tomake the Rosolini propositions form a dominance, we could
perhaps abandon the univalent setting in favor of setoids, but this approach won’t allow us to
place the Rosolini lifting in the context of amore general lifting. To resolve this, we could follow
other authors (such as [35] and [21]), and introduce an impredicative type of propositions to
have access to a type Prop that could be used to form a general lifting. In this case, to get the
Rosolini lifting as a subtype of the lifting, we would need to ensure our axiomatization of Prop
allowed us to isolate some of those propositions as the Rosolini propositions, and form a lifting
setoid of those; whether the resulting lifting would be equivalent to the quotient of the delay
monad, and whether this lifting would form a monad would depend on choices made about
the behavior of Prop. Reus and Streicher [68] give one approach along similar lines, although
they do not use setoids. It would be worth examining the interpretation of their type theory in
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the setoid model. Unless Prop is chosen to behavemuch like the univalent type of propositions,
we lose the relationship between structure and property in this approach.
Nevertheless, the setoid approach is limited by the fact that there is no clear way to interpret
the universe in setoids. Beyond the fact that this makes the univalent definition of propositions
impossible, this strictly limits the types, the logical principles [81], and more importantly, the
computable functions which can be described in our system. Indeed, work by Aczel [1], Fe-
ferman [32], Griffor and Rathjen [34], Rathjen [66, 67], and Setzer [78, 79, 80] shed light on
the ordinal analysis of Martin-Löf type theory with universes. In short, adding universes to
type theory allows the construction of larger ordinals; using a hierarchy of recursive functions,
such as the Löb-Wainer hierarchy [52], these larger ordinals can be used to define faster grow-
ing computable functions. Consequently, having universes in our system gives a more fine-
grained analysis of the limits of the partial computable functions. This thesis is focused on
first-order computability, but we hope to set the stage for a constructive approach to studying
computability at higher types, and computability with more interesting objects, such as metric
spaces, manifolds and algebraic structures. In this case, we need a universe not only to define
particular computable functions, but also to describe the objects we wish to compute with.
To summarize and add to the above, the setoid approach has the following advantages over
the univalent approach:
1. The setoid approach allows us to use extensionality principles in a simpler version of
MLTT [35]. In particular, quotients and truncations can be described without extending
the type theory.
2. countable choice holds in the setoidmodel, so the Rosolini lifting becomes amonadwith-
out assuming additional principles. If we include a small type of propositions, we can
indeed mimic the general lifting, and get the Rosolini lifting as a submonad of this.
3. The setoid approach fits squarely with the traditional account of constructive mathemat-
ics proposed by Bishop.
On the other hand, the univalent approach has the following advantages over the setoid ap-
proach
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1. The univalent approach allows us to make use of universes; in particular, this allows us
to define more computable functions, and to develop computability in more interesting
domains.
2. Definitions are more uniform. As we use the inductively defined identity types instead
of explicitly chosen equivalence relations, we can state muchmore general theorems, and
all concepts are already extensional. Moreover, in the setoid approach, choice of repre-
sentation is important: the equivalence relation on the quotient D(X)/≈ is more difficult
to state for the representation
D(X)
def
= Σ(µ : N∞),Π(n : N), (µn = 1)→ X,
as it requires us to make use of the fact that the type family Π(n : N), (µn = 1) → X is
a family of setoids. This fact is not-obvious, and the result is somewhat technical. So
with this representation, a non-trivial theorem is required to even form the quotient in
the setoid approach.
3. The univalent perspective fits squarely with a structural account of mathematics, and
extends the traditional account of constructive mathematics.
4. A type of propositions fits naturally into the theory, and clarifies the relationship between
structure and property.
5. There are computer proof systems with native support for formalization in univalent
styles. No such support exists for the setoid approach. In particular, cubicaltt [17] and
Cubical Agda implement cubical type theory. There is some support for univalentmathe-





We are now able to turn our attention to computability theory. In Chapter 7, we develop
a theory of computability as structure, via a modest abstraction of Turing machines (which we
call recursive machines), based on primitive recursive combinators. Here, we follow Section 1.6
in calling a type family X → U a structure and calling a type family property when it is valued
in propositions. In particular, in Chapter 7 we define a type family CompStruct : (N⇀ N)→ U
of computation structures, while in Chapter 8, we truncate this notion to arrive at the property
isComputable : (N⇀ N)→ Prop.
Our abstraction is motivated by the fact that the initialization and transition functions of a
Turing machine are primitive recursive, and so we can represent any Turing machine via a pair
of (descriptions of) primitive recursive functions. This approach is easier to work with in our
system than Turing machines or µ-recursive functions: Turing machines contain a great deal
of data that needs to be tracked, while handling minimization takes more technical computa-
tion than handling the other basic recursive operations. We develop some basic results in com-
putability theory using recursivemachines, and there are no surprises here. The point is to give
evidence that our notion of partial function is sound—that we can view the computable partial
functions as certain functions N → L(N)—and that recursive machines are indeed capable of
being used for a development of computability theory. The only novelty from a computability
theorist’s perspective is the language. It is worth noting, on this regard that we have no need of
specifying Kleene equality ("f ≈ g iff for all x, either both f(x) and g(x) are defined and equal,
or both f(x) and g(x) are undefined"), since Kleene equality is simply equality in N → LN;
our approach again allows us to dispense with an ad hoc notion of equality. This definition
also allows us to remove the implicit use of excluded middle in the usual statement of Kleene
equality.
In the first three sections of Chapter 8, we truncate notions of Chapter 7 to arrive at a notion
of computability as property. Sincemost results have quite short proofs using Lemma 2.14, these
sections are short. After this, we prove the undecidability of the halting problem, in particular
demonstrating the existence of a function d : N → L(N) (Turing’s diagonal function) which is
not computable. Any total function we can define is computable, and moreover, constructive
intuition tells us that a constructive definition should give rise to a computer program. Indeed,
while it may be consistent in a constructive framework that all total functions N→ N are com-
putable, the partial function d : N⇀ N is not computable. We return to the implications of this
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fact in Chapter 9, but first isolate a subset of the Rosolini propositions which we call semide-
cidable—those propositions for which there exists a computable witness that they are Rosolini.
The semidecidable propositions are introduced and compared to computable functions in Sec-
tion 8.5.
Chapter 9 turns to the question of which functions can be computable. We first (Section 9.1)
demonstrate that computable partial functions and semidecidable maps fit into the Rosolini
partial functions and Rosolini propositions, and then turn to the question of which functions
are computable. Aswe have two notions of computability (structure and property), we can state
Church’s thesis in two ways: one in the logic of structures, and one in the logic of propositions.
The former turns out to be false (Theorem 9.9), by an argument due to Troelstra [84]. The second
is more plausible; the argument given by Troelstra can be reworked slightly to give a weaker
result: Church’s thesis is incompatiblewith the existence of an embedding from the computable
functions intoN. This result can be leveraged to resolve the conflict between the topos-theoretic
and type-theoretic facts discussed in the introduction. From there, we can consider a version
of Church’s thesis for partial functions. In fact, Church’s thesis tells us that the Rosolini partial
functions and the semidecidable partial functions coincide. Countable choice tells us that each
type of partial functions coincideswith the associated type of disciplinedmaps. Together, these
results tell us (Theorem 9.14) that under Church’s thesis and countable choice, the computable
partial functions are the Rosolini partial functions. Since we know the effective topos to be a
model of countable choice andChurch’s thesis, this suggests that it is consistent that all Rosolini
partial functions are computable; unfortunately, a univalent version of the effective topos is





We develop in this chapter computability theory with computability as structure (C.f. 1.6) The
results here are essentially the same as classical results in computability; as we shall see, the
classical development of basic computability theory goes through with only minor changes. In
particular,
· we use partial functions as in the previous chapter, as functions X → L(Y );
· we make explicit reference to structure throughout.
This makes the statements of theorems slightlymore cumbersome, but otherwise presents little
change. In the next Chapter 8, we develop computability as property and compare it to com-
putability as structure. For the most part, we get the standard results in computability theory
for computability as property from the equivalent results for computability as structure, by
functoriality of truncation. However, when we look at how computability interacts with the
broader mathematical universe, things seem to change. For example, we have an embedding
from “functions with computability structure” to N, but such an embedding from “functions
with the property of being computable” to Nwould imply a decidability result that we cannot
expect to hold constructively.
7.1 Primitive recursion
In order to undertake a study of computability, we need to introduce a model of computation;
Turing machines are intuitively convincing, but we would like a model that is somewhat less
cumbersome to work with, so we will abstract away many internal details. We will make use
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of primitive recursive functions for this, so we briefly recall the definition and some basic facts.
The material here can be found in any standard reference such as Odifreddi [62] or Rogers [74].
Definition 7.1. The type family PR : N → U of primitive recursive combinators (of arity n) is
defined inductively by
1. s : PR1;
2. for any n : N and k < nwe have pnk : PRn;
3. for any n, k : N we have cnk : PRn;
4. if f : PRn and gi : PRm for each 0 < i ≤ n, then f〈g1, . . . , gn〉 : PRm.
5. if f : PRn+2 and g : PRn, then rf,g : PRn+1.
We will sometimes write PR for the total type Σ(n : N),PRn. Similarly, we define a type family
PrimRec : Π(n : N), (Nn → N)→ U inductively by
1. PrimRec1(succ);
2. for any n : N and k < nwe have PrimRecn(prk);
3. for any n, k : N we have PrimRecn(λx.k);
4. ifPrimRecn(f) andPrimRecm(gi) for each 0 < i ≤ n, thenPrimRecm(λx.f(g1(x), . . . , gn(x)))
5. if PrimRecn+2(f) and PrimRecn(g), then PrimRecn+1(recf,g), where
recf,g(0, x1, . . . , xn) = g(x1, . . . , xn)
recf,g(k + 1, x1, . . . , xn) = f(k, recf,g(k, x1, . . . , xn), x1, . . . , xn),
and where we leave the constructors for PrimRecn(f) unnamed.
We can then define a function app : Π(n : N),PRn → Nn → N in the obvious way:
app(s) = succ,
app(pnk) = λ(x1, . . . , xn).xk,
app(cnk) = λx.k,
app(f〈g1, . . . , gn〉) = λx.f(g1(x), . . . , gn(x)),
app(rf,g) = recf,g .
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It is easy to check that PrimRec(app(t)), and that app induces an equivalence
PRn ' Σ(f : Nn → N),PrimRec(f),
for all n : N. We say that f has primitive recursive structure when PrimRec(f).
Definition 7.2. A primitive recursive relation is a primitive recursiveR : Nk → N valued in {0, 1}.
We also say that a relationR : Nk → Prop has primitive recursive structure if it has a characteristic
function (as in Section 3.4) χR with PrimRec(χR).
The following constructions are routine.
Theorem 7.3. The following all have primitive recursive structure.
(i) the standard ordering ≤ on N.
(ii) equality on N.
(iii) the addition function −+− : N2 → N;
(iv) the multiplication function − · − : N2 → N;
(v) the predecessor function with definition
pred(0) = 0,
pred(n+ 1) = n;
(vi) truncated subtraction
n− 0 = n,
n− (k + 1) = pred(n− k);
(vii) bounded sums: for fixed (primitive recursive) f : Nn+1 → N, and x : Nn,
∑
y<0
f(x, y) = 0,
∑
y<(k+1)





(viii) bounded products: for fixed (primitive recursive) f : Nn+1 → N, and x : Nn,
∏
y<0
f(x, y) = 1,
∏
y<(k+1)




(ix) sn : N→ N,
sn(0) = 0,
sn(n+ 1) = 1;
(x) sn : N→ N,
sn(0) = 1,
sn(n+ 1) = 0;
alternatively, sn(n) = 1− sn(n);





Using the above, we can lift primitive recursive structure over logical operations as follows:
let P andQ have primitive recursive structure, thenwe have characteristic functions with prim-
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itive recursive structure
(p ∧ q)(n) def= p(n) · q(n),
(p ∨ q)(n) def= sn(p(n) + q(n)),
(p→ q)(n) def= p(n) ≤ q(n),
(¬p)(n) def= sn(p(n)),








for (respectively) P ∧Q, P ∨Q, P → Q, ¬P , ∃(k ≤ n), P (k) and ∀(k ≤ n), P (k). Then we may
show a relation has primitive recursive structure by defining it in terms of known primitive
recursive relations. Likewise, we can build primitive recursive structure piecewise
Lemma 7.4. Let f, g : Nk → N have primitive recursive structure and let Q : Nk → Prop have





has primitive recursive structure
Proof. First define h : Nk+1 → N by h(0, x) = g(x) and h(1, x) = f(x). That is,
h = recg,f ′
where f ′(n, k, x) = f(x). Then h has primitive recursive structure. Now define
r(x) = h ◦〈Q(x), pr1(x), . . . , prn−1(x)〉,
which has primitive recursive structure. Now let x : Nn. If Q(x), then r(x) = h(1, x) = f(x)
and if ¬Q(x), then r(x) = h(0, x) = g(x). Hence, r(x) is the function defined by case analysis
above.
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The last piece required before continuing the standard presentation of the primitive recur-
sive functions is bounded minimization. Let P : N → Prop be a primitive recursive predicate,
fix an n : N and consider the type mink<n(P )
Σ(k : N),
(
(k < n× P (k)) + (k = n)
)
×Π(j < k),¬P (j)),
and the map mink<n(P ) → N given by the first projection. That is, µk<nP (k) is the least value
of k ≤ n such that P (k) holds, if such exists, and n otherwise.
Lemma 7.5. For any predicate P : N → Prop with primitive recursive structure and any n : N, the
type mink<n(P ) is contractible. Hence, the partial element (mink<n P (k), pr0) is defined.





(k < n× P (k)) + (k = n)
)
×Π(j < k),¬P (j)).
Since P has primitive recursive structure, it is decidable. Hence, we can do a bounded search
to determine
(Σ(k < n), P (k)) + Π(k < n),¬P (k).
In the first case, take the minimum such k, which must exist. In the second, nmust satisfy Q.
To show that mink<n P (k) is a proposition, take any k, j satisfying the predicate Qwe must
have k = j, since otherwise we have k < j (or conversely), and then we must have both P (k)
and ¬P (k), a contradiction, and equality on N is decidable.
Then we may define for any predicate P with primitive recursive structure




I.e., µk<n(P ) is the first projection applied to the center of contraction of mink<n(P ).
Theorem 7.6. IfP has primitive recursive structure, then the function µk<−(P ) has primitive recursive
structure.
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Proof. Note that the predicate Q used in the definition of mink<n P (k) is itself primitive recur-
sive, being built up of bounded quantifiers and basic logical operations. So let q be a primitive






f(k + 1, n) =

min(k + 1, f(k, n)) if Q(k + 1);
min(n, f(k, n)) if ¬Q(k + 1).
Note that f is defined by primitive recursion over the base function g : N → N which takes
value 0 if Q(0) and is the identity otherwise, and recursive step given by
h(k,m, n) =

min(k + 1,m) if Q(k + 1);
min(n,m) if ¬Q(k + 1).
So then we see that h has primitive recursive structure as a case analysis, and f has primitive
recursive structure as h and g do. Now, consider the value of f(n− 1, n): If n = 0 or n = 1, this
is 0. Otherwise, we know that either there is a least k < n with Q(k) or else there is no k < n
withQ(k). If there is no such k, then f(k, n) = n for each k < n, and so f(n− 1, n) = n. If there




P (k) = f(n− 1, n),
and the function n 7→ f(n − 1, n) is defined by composition from functions with primitive
recursive structure.
We can continue to mimic the classical development of primitive recursion; from here, on
there will be no surprises. However, we stop to mention encodings of sequences, since we
will use them when working with general computability: we will deal with higher arities via
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a primitive recursive encoding. Specifically, for each n, we we fix a bijective pairing function
〈−〉 : Nn → Nwhich is primitive recursive and such that the projection functions pri : N→ N are
primitive recursive. Defining such functions, and indeed even a primitive recursive function
〈−〉 :
∑
(n : N),Nn → N is a standard exercise—for 〈−〉 :
∑
(n : N),Nn → N, we can use
Gödel’s β. Then we define an n-ary function to be computable if its composition with 〈−〉−1
is computable. Note that by precomposition with 〈−〉, any function can be viewed as an n-ary
function for any n.
In fact, if both 〈−〉 : Nk → N and f : N → N have primitive recursive structure, then the
composite function f ◦〈−〉 : Nk → N does as well. A direct converse doesn’t type check, but we
can do the following: For any k : N fix a pairing function 〈−〉 : Nk → N and projection functions
pri : N→ N all of which have primitive recursive structure and such that
〈pr0(n), . . . , prk−1(n)〉 = n
and
pri(〈x0, . . . , xk−1〉) = xi.
For f : Nk → N with primitive recursive structure define f ′ : N→ N by
f ′ = f ◦〈pr0, . . . , prk−1〉
so that
f ′(n) = f(pr0〈n〉, . . . , prk−1〈n〉) = f(n).
In short, we can encode all primitive recursive functions of k variables as primitive recursive
functions of 1 variable. We will tacitly switch between a function of a single variable and a
function of k variables when it suits us.
Similarly, wemay encode the typeN+N via functions inl, inr : N→ N, given by, for example,
inl(n) = 2n and inr(n) = 2n + 1. Now given two functions (with p.r. structure) f, g : N → N
we can extend them along N + N to a function f + g : N→ Nwith primitive recursive structure
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defined by
(f + g)(n) =

f(k) if n = 2k;
g(k) if n = 2k + 1.
This gives us a primitive recursive encoding of N + N, which we will use to define a notion of
computation.
7.2 Recursive machines
We abstract away the details of initializing a Turing machine, and the transition function. The
central ideas that captures how a Turing machine computes are
· a Turing machine can be initialized by a simple process;
· checking whether a Turing computation has completed is simple;
· the transition function updating a Turing machine is a simple process.
We capture these properties in the following definition.
Definition 7.7. A recursive machine, is a pair (i, s) : PR1×PR1. The function i is called the
initialization function, and we treat it as a function i : N → N, while s is called the transition
function, and we treat it as a function s : N→ N + N.
We use RM for the type of recursive machines.
We can evaluate recursive machines via a function
eval : RM→ (N→ LN)
as follows: Given (i, s) : RM, let s′ : N + N→ N + N be the function
s′(inlx) = s(x),
s′(inr y) = inr y.
As we will use this function s′, we will abuse notation and refer to s′k as sk.
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And so we have for fixedm = (i, s),
Rm(x, y)
def
= ∃(k : N), runk(m,x) = inr y.
Then eval(m) is the partial function withRm as its graph. Note thatRm can be defined without
truncation using the results of Section 3.4.
The partial function eval(m) is the function computed by m. We will sometimes abuse nota-
tion and writem(x) instead of eval(m,x). For a partial function f : N→ LN, let CompStruct(f)
be the type of recursive machines computing f :
CompStruct(f)
def
= Σ(m : RM), f = eval(m).
Say that m is a computability structure for f or that f has recursive structure, when m computes
f , i.e., when (m,−) : CompStruct(f). Note that we have
RM ' Σ(f : N→ L(N)),CompStruct(f).
If f : N→ N is an ordinary function, then f has recursive structure when η ◦ f : N→ LN does.
Functions with recursive structure are closed under composition. Indeed, given machines
m and n, we can define a composite machinem;n as follows: First define i′ : N→ N + N by
i′(k) = inl(imk);
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and a function s′ : N + N→ ((N + N) + N) by
s′(inl k) = inl(inl y) if sm(k) = inl y;
s′(inl k) = inl(inr(iny)) if sm(k) = inr y;
s′(inr k) = inl(inr y) if sn(k) = inl y;
s′(inr k) = inr y if sn(k) = inr y;
Then the three components in the codomain (N + N) + N correspond (from left to right) to
"we are still computing m"; "we have computed m and are now computing n"; and "we have
finished computing the composite". By post composing with a primitive recursive bijection
c : N + N→ N, we get (c ◦ i′, c ◦ s′) as a recursive machine.
Lemma 7.8. Ifm and n compute f and g respectively, thenm;n computes g  f .
Proof. We show that the relationRm;Rn used in the definition of eval is the same as the relation
Rm;n.
Suppose that (Rm;Rn)(x, z). That is,
∃(y : N),∃(k : N), (skm(imx) = inr(y))× (∃(j : N), skn(iny) = z).
We could give a non-truncated equivalent type, but this is not necessary here: by currying and
properties of truncation, to get Rm;n(x, z) it is enough to show
Π(y : N),
(




Σ(j : N), sjn(y) = z
)
→ Rm;n(x, z).
The definition ofm;nwas chosen specifically to satisfy this.
Conversely, if Rm;n(x, z), then take k least such that s′(inl(imx)) = inr y for some y, so that
skm(imx) = inr y
′ with in(y′) = y. Then we must have sjn(y) = z for some j, sinceRm;n(x, z).
For convenience, we will often describe recursive machines in an informal way, making
reference to “configurations”, “continuing”, and “halting”. As an example, we again describe
the machine form;n:
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To initializem;n, initializem. For the transition function, the input is in one of two states:
1. the input represents a partially computed output ofm;
2. the input represents a partially computed output of n.
In each case, do the following:
1. if one step ofm completes the computation ofm(x) with value y, then output the initial-
ization of n at y in state (2). Otherwise, take one more step of m and continue in state
(1).
2. if one step of n completes the computation of n(x) with value y, then output y and halt.
Otherwise, take one more step ofm and continue in state (2).
7.3 Recursive predicates and minimization
Definition 7.9. A recursive relation is a total function R : Nk → N valued in {0, 1} with a com-
putability structure. We also say that a relation R : Nk → Prop has recursive structure if it has a
characteristic function χR with CompStruct(χR).




= Σ(k : N), f(k) = η0×Π(j < k),Σ(n : N), f(j) = η(n+ 1),
and value(µf) def= pr1. More generally, wemay define theminimization µy.R(y) : LN of a predicate
R : N→ Prop
defined(µy.R(y))
def
= Σ(y : N), R(y)×Π(x < y),¬R(x).
and value(µy.R(y)) def= pr1.
When there is a least such y, this does indeed choose it. Moreover, the extent of µy.R(y) is
a proposition. That is
Lemma 7.11. For any predicate R : N → Prop, the type Σ(y : N), R(y) × Π(x < y),¬R(x) is a
proposition.
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Proof. For any predicate R : N → Prop and any y : N we have that R(y) × Π(x ≤ y),¬R(x) is
a proposition, as a product of propositions, so we need only check the first component. That
is we need to see that m = n whenever we have witnesses w : R(m) × Π(x < m),¬R(x) and
v : R(n) × Π(x < n),¬R(x). As the ordering on N is decidable, we have either m < n, m = n
or n < m. Ifm < n, then we have ¬R(m) by v and R(m) by w, a contradiction. Symmetrically,
we cannot have n < m, and so n = m.
Note that if there is a unique y : N satisfying a predicate, thenwe can find y byminimization.
Then expanding the definition of eval and µ, we see that for any recursive machinem, we have
eval(m)(x) = µy.∃(k : N), runk(m,x) = inr y.
Using this fact we can prove that the minimization of a relation with primitive recursive struc-
ture has recursive structure.









inr(n) if R(x, n);
inl〈x, n+ 1〉 otherwise.
Pairing has primitive recursive structure, and case analysis on a primitive recursive predicate
has a primitive recursive structure, so we know i and s have primitive recursive structure.
Hence m = (i, s) is a recursive machine. We need to see that eval(m)(x) = µy.R(x, y). We
have that runk(m,x) = inl〈x, k + 1〉 until R(x, k). Then runk(m,x) = inr k precisely when k is
least such that R(x, k).
It is tempting to use the same argument to show that this works for any recursive predicate,
but we need to be more careful: the function s defined in the proof is only primitive recursive
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becauseR is. For a general recursive predicate, more work needs to be done. The tools required
are discussed in the next section.
7.4 The Normal Form Theorem
In this section we prove a version of the normal form theorem for recursive machines. That
is, we define encodings of recursive machines, such that we may define Kleene’s predicate
T : N3 → Prop and function U : N → N. The meaning of T(m,x, y) is that y represents a
full computation trace of the application of the function encoded by m to x—such a y exists
only when m(x) produces a value. The function U then extracts the value produced by m(x).
Wewill then prove that theminimization of an arbitrary predicatewith computability structure
defines a function with computability structure.
In order to prove this, we first prove a version for primitive recursive combinators.
Theorem 7.13 (Kleene’s normal form theorem for Primitive recursive functions). There is an
injection encode : PR → N, a predicate T′ : N3 → Prop with primitive recursive structure, and a
function U′ : N→ Nwith primitive recursive structure such that for any primitive recursive combinator
t and any x : N we have that Σ(y : N),T′(encode(t), x, y) is contractible, and moreover
app(t, x) = U′(y),
whenever y is such that T′(encode(t), x, y).
Theorem 7.14 (Kleene’s normal form theorem for recursive machines). There is an injection
encode : RM → N, a predicate T : N3 → U with primitive recursive structure, and a function
U : N→ N with primitive recursive structure such that for any recursive machinem and any x : N we
have that Σ(y : N),T(encode(m), x, y) is a proposition, and moreover
eval(m,x) = ((Σ(y : N),T(encode(m), x, y)),U ◦ pr1).
Recall that we have a primitive recursive onto coding of finite sequences, along with projec-
tion and length functions. We use 〈a0, . . . , an〉 for the encoding of the sequence (a0, . . . , an), and
+ for concatenation. If x is a number representing a sequence, then (x)i is the i-th coordinate
of x.
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Now, we define an interpretation
encode : PR→ N
encode(s) = 〈0〉,
encode(pnk) = 〈1, n, k〉,
encode(cnk) = 〈2, n, k〉,
encode(f〈g1, . . . , gn〉) = 〈3〉+ encode(f) + encode(g1) + · · ·+ encode(gn),
encode(rf,g) = 〈4〉+ encode(f) + encode(g).
To arrive at T′ and U′, we first define a type of computation trees. Each node of the tree will
have 3 labels:
· (The code of) a primitive recursive combinator,
· an integer x, representing a sequence of inputs,
· an integer z representing an output.
We define
1. [s, x, y] is a leaf computation tree;
2. [pnk , x, y] is a leaf computation tree;
3. [cnk , x, y] is a leaf computation tree;
4. [f〈g1, . . . , gn〉, x, y] is the root of a computation tree with n+ 1 branches;
5. [rf,g, 〈0, x〉, y] is the root of a computation tree with 1 branch;
6. [rf,g, 〈n+ 1, x〉, y] is the root of a computation tree with 2 branches;
A computation tree t is correct when
1. the root of t is [s, x, x+ 1] for some x : N;
2. the root of t is [pnk , x, k] for some x : N;
3. the root of t is [cnk , x, (x)0], for some x : N;
4. the root of t is [f〈g1, . . . , gn〉, x, y], the branches of t are all correct, and
· the 0-th branch has root [f, 〈z1, . . . , zn〉, y], and
· for 0 < k ≤ n, the k-th branch has root [gk, x, zk];
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5. the root of t is [rf,g, 〈0〉+ x, y], the branch is correct and has label [g, x, y].
6. the root of t is [rf,g, 〈n+ 1〉+ x, y], both branches are correct, and
· the 0-th branch has root [rf,g〈n〉+ x, z], and
· the first branch has root [f, 〈n〉+ x+ 〈z〉, y];
In short, a computation tree with root [t, x, y] is correct precisely when app(t, x) = y.
Now we can encode a tree twith root label [c, x, y] and branches {ti}i<n as
t̂ = 〈〈encode(c), x, y〉, t̂0, . . . , t̂n−1〉.
By expanding the definition of the coding of sequences, and using the definition of “correct”
above, we get a primitive recursive predicate C(x) expressing "x encodes a correct computation
















so that we can define {−}PR to be
{n}PR(x) = U′(µy.T′(n, x, y)).
We need to see that for any t : PR and x : N
app(t, x) = {encode(t)}PR(x),
i.e., that
app(t, x) = U′(µy.T
′(n, x, y)).
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But we’ve constructed T′ such that
T′(n, x, y)⇔ eval(t, x) = y.
Note that for a fixed k and recursive machine m, runk(m) : N → N has primitive recursive
structure. In fact, we can do better.
Lemma 7.15. The function
source : N→ N→ N
taking a number k and 〈encode(i), encode(s)〉 to encode(runk(i, s)) has primitive recursive structure.
Proof. Straightforward induction on k and the combinators for i and s.
Then we may use T′ and U′ to define T and U for recursive machines:
T(e, x, 〈k, y〉) = T′(source(k, e), x, y).
and
U(〈k, y〉) = U′(y).
This result gives us the Kleene-bracket function {−} : N→ (N→ LN), defined by
{e}(x) def= LU(µy.T(e, x, y)).
In order to be able to apply {−} to a partial natural number, we may Kleisli extend {−} in the
first component. We will abuse notation and write also {−} : LN→ (N→ LN) for this map.
Theorem 7.16. If R : N → Prop has recursive structure, then case analysis on R has recursive struc-








Proof. The initialization function initializes R for the transition function with 3 states:
1. the input represents a pair (x, y), where x is the input to f , and y is a partially computed
value of R(x);
2. the input represents a partially computed value of e(x);
3. the input represents a partially computed value of e′(x).
The transition function does the following on y in each case
1. if one step of sR(pr1 y) completes the computation ofR(x), then check ifR(x) returns 1 or
0, and return the initialization of e or e′ at x accordingly, and continue in the correspond-
ing sates. If not, then return (x, sR(pr1 y)), continuing in state (1);
2. if one step of se(y) completes the computation of e(x), then return this and halt, otherwise
take one step and continue in state (2);
3. if one step of se′(y) completes the computation of e′(x), then return this and halt, other-
wise take one step and continue in state (3).
As this returns e(x) when R(x) = 1 and e′(x) when R(x) = 0, this machine is correct for f .
Theorem 7.17. If R : Nk → Prop has recursive structure, then λx.µy.R(x, y) has recursive structure.
Proof. The initialization function initializes x to 〈x, 0, iR(x, 0)〉. The transition function does the
following on input 〈x, y, c〉:
If one step of R applied to c finishes the computation of R(x, y) with output 1, then return
y and halt. Otherwise, if one step of R applied to c finishes the computation of (x, y) with
output 0, then return 〈x, y + 1, iR(x, y + 1)〉 and continue. Finally, if neither of these cases hold,
then we must continue computing R at c, so output 〈x, y, sR(c)〉 and continue.
Theorem 7.18. If f : Nn+2 → N and g : Nn → N have recursive structure, then recf,g has recursive
structure.
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Thanks to Theorem 7.17, the classical proof of elimination of primitive recursion via Gödel’s
β function also gives this result.
Proof. Define
t(x, y) = µz.
(




recf,g(x, y) = β(t(x, y), y).
Using the above, we get the most difficult cases of the classical characterization of Turing
computability in terms of µ-recursiveness.
Theorem 7.19. 1. All constant functions Nk → N have recursive structure;
2. the successor function has recursive structure;
3. all projections have recursive structure;
4. if f : Nk → N has recursive structure and gi : Nn → N has recursive structure for each i < k,
then λx.f(g0(x), . . . , gk−1(x)) has recursive structure
5. if f : N⇀ N and g : N⇀ N have recursive structure, then g  f has recursive structure;
6. If R : N2 → Prop has recursive structure, then λx.µy.R(x, y) has recursive structure.
Proof. Parts (1), (2) and (3) are immediate; part (5) is Theorem 7.18; part (6) is Theorem 7.17.
For (4), we use a similar trick as for part (5): let
t(x) = µz.
(
β(z, 0) = g0(x) ∧ . . . ∧ β(z, k − 1) = gk−1(x)
)
,
and then we have (t; f)(x) = λx.f(g0(x), . . . , gk−1(x))).
There is one last result to prove using the techniques of this section, before we can develop
recursion theory without worrying about the details of how to encode computable functions
Theorem 7.20 (Smn Theorem). There is a primitive recursive s : N2 → N such that for all e, x, y : N
we have {s(e, x)}(y) = {e}〈x, y〉.
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Proof. Let e encode a recursive machine computing f : N ⇀ N, let x : N and define f ′ : N ⇀ N
by f ′(y) = f(〈x, y〉). Bymanipulating the tree defining e, we can get amachinem computing f ′,
whichwe can encode as e′. This manipulation is primitive recursive in e and x, since it amounts
to simple operations on finite sequences. Take s(e, x) = e′. Then
{s(e, x)}(y) = {e′}(y) = {e}〈x, y〉.
7.5 Basic Recursion Theory
We are now able to show how to develop basic recursion theory via recursive machines. We
roughly follow the presentation in Odifreddi [62]; in fact, the proofs given by Odifreddi for the
results stated here translate to our framework with only minor adjustment.
Rogers’ Fixed Point Theorem and Kleene’s Second Recursion Theorem can be proved in the
standard way.
Theorem 7.21 (Rogers’ fixed point theorem). For any total f : N→ N with recursive structure, we
have n : N with {n} = {f(n)}.
Proof. Let g : N→ N be defined by
g〈x, y〉 def= {{x}(x)}(y).
Note thatwe areKleisli-extending along the first argument of {−}(−) tomake sense of {{x}(x)}(y).
As this has recursive structure, it has a code eg : N. Define h(x) = s(eg, x), and consider
e = encode(f ◦h) and n = h(e). Then we have
{n}y = {h(e)}y = {s(eg, e)} = {eg}〈e, y〉 = {{e}(e)}(y) = {f(h(e))}(y) = {f(n)}(y).
Theorem 7.22 (Kleene’s Second Recursion Theorem). For any function f with recursive structure
we have p : N such that
Π(y : N), ({p}(y) = f(〈p, y〉)) .
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Proof. Let g : N→ N be defined by
g(x)
def
= s〈ef , x〉,
where ef : N is a code of the recursive structure for f . This function g has primitive recursive
structure, so g is a total function with recursive structure. By Rogers’ fixed point theorem, there
is then a p such that {p} = {f(p)}. Then,
{p}(y) = {f(p)}(y) = {g(p)}(y) = {s(ef , p)}(y) = f(〈p, y〉).
Definition 7.23. A recursive enumeration of a subsetA : N→ Prop is a recursive machinem such
that range(eval(m)) = A.
Theorem 7.24. A subset A of N has recursive structure if and only if it is complemented and both A
and its complement have recursive enumerations.
Proof. It is immediate that recursive sets are complemented, r.e. and co-r.e. so consider A com-
plemented with f witnessing that A is r.e. and g witnessing that A is co-r.e. according to the
characterization in Theorem 7.25. To see that A is recursive, consider the ATM with initializa-
tion function i(n) = 〈if (n), ig(n)〉 and step function
s(〈x, y〉) def=

inl〈n,m〉 if sf (x) = inln, sg(x) = inlm,
inr 1 if sf (x) = inr n,
inr 0 if sg(x) = inrm.
It is clear that this computes the characteristic function ofA. We requireA to be complemented
for this case analysis to be exhaustive.
Equivalence at the type level, rather than logical equivalence, seems impossible, as we
would need to ensure that we respect changes in recursive structure.
Likewise we have the classical characterization of recursively enumerable sets.
Theorem 7.25. A subset A of N has a recursive enumeration iff it is the domain of a function with
recursive structure.
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Proof. Let f have recursive structure such that defined f(x)⇔ A(x). Define f ′ : N⇀ N by
f ′(x)
def
= (η ◦ cx)](fx).
f ′ has recursive structure as the composition of functionswith computable structure. Moreover
we have
f ′(x) = (defined(f(x)), λy.x),
so that defined f ′(x) = defined f(x). Then we have that A(x)⇔ defined f ′(x).
For the other direction, let g have recursive structure m and
(
∃(x : N), g(x) = ηn
)
= A(n)
for all n. Define h : N → N + N by h(〈k, y〉) = runk(m, y). We know that this has primitive
recursive structure, so define j : N→ N to be
j(x)
def
= µz.h(z) = inr x.
It is then easy to check that j is defined exactly on the image of g. Let defined(j(x)). Then there
are (k, y) such that runk(m, y) = inr j(x). So we have m(y) = j(x). Conversely, let x be in the
image of g. That is,
∃(y : N),∃(k : N), runk(m, y) = x.
But then ∃(z : N), g(z) = x, and from this we see j(x) is defined.
A slightly better classical characterization requires some modification to be true construc-
tively.
Theorem 7.26. If A is a subset of N with a : A, then the following are logically equivalent.
1. There is a partial function f : N⇀ N with recursive structure whose domain is A.
2. There is a partial function f : N⇀ N with recursive structure whose range is A.
3. There is a total function f : N→ N with recursive structure whose range is A.
4. There is a total function f : N→ N with primitive recursive structure whose range is A.
Proof. (1⇔ 2) is Theorem 7.25.
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(2⇒ 3) Let f : N⇀ N be computable with image A, and let a : A. Define
g(〈y, k〉) =

x if runk(f, y) = inr x,
a otherwise.
(2⇒ 4) In fact, the function g above is primitive recursive, as a case analysis over a primitive
recursive predicate.
(4⇒ 3) and (3⇒ 2) are obvious.
7.6 Discussion
Except for nuances in the way the results are stated, the results here are the classical ones, and
better discussion of their history and importance can be found in more complete texts on com-
putability theory. Instead, let’s focus on the goals of this chapter. As stated in the introduction,
the goal was not to give a complete constructive account of computability theory, but to exam-
ine the notion of partiality in a univalent setting, and to compare computability as structure
with computability as property in a setting where we can formally distinguish them. On the
first point, we hope the above gives a satisfying enough account to believe that our notion of
partiality is robust enough to handle computability theory. It is worth remarking on the fact
that when taking partial functions N ⇀ N to be functions N → L(N), Kleene equality between
partial functions is simply equality.
The distinction between computability as structure and computability as property justifies
the nonstandard and sometimes awkward statement of results: we need to keep computable
functions separate from functions equipped with computability structure.
The only remaining comment is on the use of recursive machines. The aim of introducing
recursive machines was to minimize the number of “moving parts”, while capturing the in-
tuitive clarity of Turing machines. Moreover, since minimization is not a total operation, and
the primitive recursive combinators all give total functions, it felt natural to separate minimiza-
tion. Once this separate is made, there is no reason besides history to insist on a minimization




In Chapter 7, we developed a notion of functions with computable structure, as those functions
which are computed by given recursive machines. Here we turn to computability as prop-
erty. Since most of the results of this section follow by functoriality of truncation from corre-
sponding results about computability as property, this chapter is quite short. Sections 8.1, 8.2,
and 8.3 summarize these results. Section 8.4 contains the proof of the undecidability of the
halting problem, and leverages this to define a non-computable partial function, Turing’s di-
agonal function. As all total functions which we can define in the empty context (i.e., without
additional assumptions) are computable and constructive intuition suggests that our construc-
tively definable objects ought to be computable; it is not obvious that non-computable partial
functions ought to be definable. Their existence means that we cannot simply extend Church’s
thesis to partial functions in a consistent way. Instead we must weaken the statement that all
partial functions are computable. We will chose to do so by restricting the class of computable
functions using machinery from Chapter 5, but we will put that off until Chapter 9. In the
meantime we give restriction of the partial functions, which is explicitly tied to computation
(Section 8.5). This restriction is more concrete than the Rosolini partial functions, since it is tied
explicitly to the definition of computability, but this explicit connection to computability makes
it less suited for our purposes, since one of our goals is an abstract notion of partial function
which could be a surrogate for the computable partial functions.
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8.1 Primitive recursive functions




We say that f is primitive recursive when isPR(f).
Then the primitive recursive functions are the image of the primitive recursive combinators
under app.
Definition 8.2. A predicate R : Nn → Prop is primitive recursive if it has a primitive recur-




= Σ(f : Nn → N), isPR(f)× (f(n) = 0⇔ ¬R(n))× (f(n) = 1⇔ R(n))
As characteristic functions for predicates are unique when they exist, isPR(R) is a proposi-
tion.
As the basic functions of Theorem 7.3 have primitive recursive structure, we have
Theorem 8.3. The following are all primitive recursive
(i) the standard ordering ≤ on N,
(ii) equality on N,
(iii) the addition function −+− : N2 → N,
(iv) the multiplication function − · − : N2 → N,






(xi) the factorial function.
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Similarly, the primitive recursive predicates are closed under the logical operations.
Theorem8.4. IfP andQ are primitive recursive, then so areP∧Q,P∨Q,P → Q,¬P , ∃(k ≤ n), P (k)
and ∀(k ≤ n), P (k).
8.2 Computable functions




The partial function f is computable when isComputable(f).
The type Comp is the type of all computable partial functions:
Comp
def
= Σ(f : N→ LN), isComputable(f)
Then Comp is the image of RM under eval.
The distinction between CompStruct(f) and isComputable(f) is necessary. By the enumera-
tion theorem for primitive recursive functions, we have a map
(Σ(f : N⇀ N),CompStruct(f))→ N,
given by (i, s) 7→ 〈ei, es〉, which is easily seen to be an embedding.
On the other hand, we cannot expect there to be an en embedding F : Comp→ N.
Theorem 8.6. If there is an embedding F : Comp→ N, then equality between computable functions is
decidable. In particular, an embedding F : Comp→ N implies WLPO for computable functions.
Proof. Let F : Comp → N be an embedding, and let f, g : Comp, so (f = g) ' (F (f) = F (g)).
As N has decidable equality, F (f) = F (g) is decidable.
Then taking g to be λx.0, which we know to be computable, we have that it is decidable
whether f(x) = λx.0.
We do not expect to be able to decide whether two computable functions are equal, as then
the halting problem would be a decidable predicate. Decidable means complemented rather
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than recursive here, but we expect any predicate which can be proved to be complemented in
our system to be recursive. We will re-examine this situation more closely in Chapter 9.
A consequence of Theorem 8.6 is that we also cannot even expect to have an embedding
Comp→ Σ(f : N⇀ N),CompStruct(f).
That is, we have no way of finding a program for a function just by knowing one exists.
However, many basic facts about functions with computable structure also apply to com-
putable functions.
Theorem 8.7. If f and g are computable, then so is g  f .
Proof. By functoriality of truncation (Lemma 2.14), we know
(
CompStruct(f)→ CompStruct(g)→ CompStruct(g  f)
)
→
isComputable(f) → isComputable(g) → isComputable(g  f),
and the antecedent of this implication is Theorem 7.8.
Theorem 8.8. If R : N2 → Prop is primitive recursive, then
isComputable(λx.µy.R(x, y)).
Proof. Functoriality of truncation and Theorem 7.12.
Definition 8.9. A predicate R : Nk → U is recursive when it has a computable characteristic
function.








Proof. Functoriality of truncation from Theorem 7.16.
Theorem 8.11. If R : Nk → Prop is recursive, then λx.µy.R(x, y) is computable.
Proof. Functoriality of truncation from Theorem 7.17.
Theorem 8.12. If f : Nn+2 → N and g : Nn → N are computable, then recf,g is computable.
Proof. Functoriality of truncation from Theorem 7.18.
8.3 Recursion theory
Most of the results of Section 7.4 are results that deal explicitly with machines, as such, they
do not lift directly to computable functions. However, the theory the results allow can be lifted
to computable functions. In particular, we have T, U and {−}, which we saw have recursive
structure, and so these functions are computable. From this, we can prove Roger’s fixed point
theorem and Kleene’s second recursion theorem for computable functions.
Theorem 8.13. For any total computable function f : N→ N,
∃(n : N), {n} = {f(n)}.
Theorem 8.14. For any computable function f : N→ LN,
∃(p : N),Π(y : N), ({p}(y) = f(〈p, y〉)) .
These follow by functoriality of truncation from the corresponding version for recursive
machines.
Similarly, we have the characterization of recursive and recursively enumerable sets.
Definition 8.15. A subset A of N is recursively enumerable when
∃(f : N→ LN), isComputable(f)× range(f) = A.
Notice that being recursively enumerable is a proposition, and it is the truncation of having
recursively enumerable structure.
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Theorem 8.16. A subset A of N is recursive if and only it is complemented and both A and its comple-
ment are recursively enumerable.
Theorem 8.17. A subset of N is r.e. iff it is the domain of a computable function.
Theorem 8.18. If A is an inhabited subset of N, then the following are equivalent.
1. A is the domain of a computable partial function.
2. A is the range of a computable partial function.
3. A is the range of a computable total function.
4. A is the image of a primitive recursive function.
8.4 The halting problem
Consider the predicate H : N→ N→ U defined by
H(e, x) = defined({e}(x)).
One of the first results in computability theory is that this predicate is not recursive. We repeat
the proof here. First, let us define the diagonal function
d : N→ LN
defined d(x)
def




Lemma 8.19. The function d is not computable.
Proof. Since we are trying to prove a proposition, we may assume we have a machine m com-
puting dwith code e. Then we have
{e}(e) = eval(m, e) = d(e).
Then we have defined{e}(e) = ¬(defined{e}(e)), which is impossible.
Theorem 8.20 (Undecidability of the halting problem). The predicate H is not recursive.
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Proof. We wish to derive a contradiction from the assumption isRec(H). As ∅ is a proposition,
we may assume we have a computable total function f : N → N → N such that f(e, x) = 1 iff
{e}(x) is defined and f(e, x) = 0 iff {e}(x) is not defined.
Then d(x) is pointwise equal to the function
d(x) =

0 if f(x, x) = 0
⊥ if f(x, x) = 1,
so that d(x) is defined iff ¬H(x, x) and d(x) is undefined iff H(x, x).
We claim that d(x) is computable. By assumption, f is a total computable function. More-
over, we have that λx.⊥ is computable: we know that the constant functions λx, y.0 has com-
putable structure, and this is the characteristic function for the relation λx, y.false. Hence,
λx.µy.false has computable structure. But as there is no y such that false, we must have that
µy.false = ⊥. So then d is a computable case analysis, and has computable structure. But this
contradicts Lemma 8.19.
8.5 Semidecidable propositions
The Rosolini partial functions provide an abstract notion of semidecidable proposition. Amore
concrete notion is given by restricting our attention to computable sequences.
Definition 8.21. A semidecision procedure for a proposition P is a function f : 2N with com-
putable structure and at most one 1 such that P ' 〈f〉. That is,
SemiDecision(P )
def
= Σ(f : 2N), isProp〈f〉 × isComputable(f)× (P ' 〈f〉).
A proposition P is semidecidable when SemiDecision(P ) is inhabited:
isSemiDecidable(P )
def
= ‖SemiDecision(P )‖ .
The semidecidable propositions are exactly those which arise as the value of a program.
That is,
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Theorem 8.22. For allA : U , there exists a computable partial function f : N⇀ N such thatA = f(0)↓
if and only if A is semidecidable. That is,
isSemiDecidable(A) '
(
∃(f : N⇀ N), isComputable(f)× (A = f(0)↓)
)
.
Proof. Suppose we are given a function f : N ⇀ N with computability structure t such that
such that A = f(0)↓. We may define
α(n) =

0 if runn(t, 0) = inr k for some k, and α(m) = 1 form < n,
1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that α is recursive, that 〈α〉 is a proposition and that A = 〈α〉.
Conversely, suppose we are given α with recursive structure. Consider the constant func-
tion f(x) = µk.(α(k) = 0). which also has recursive structure. Moreover, it is clear that
f(0)↓ = A.
The desired equivalence follows by functoriality of truncation.
Unfortunately, the semidecidable propositions do not form a dominancewithout additional
assumptions (recall Section 5.8, and see Section 9.3), andmoreover, the semidecisionprocedures
do not even form a structural dominance (recall Section 5.9). We say more about this in the
discussion below, but the key obstacle is the fact that we use a computable function rather than
a function with recursive structure. Regardless, we can talk about disciplined maps for the
semidecision procedures, but since the semidecision procedures are not closed under Σ, we
cannot apply Theorem 5.44 to determine that the semidecidably-disciplined maps compose.
8.6 Discussion
Chapter 7 contains the proofs one sees in a classical course on computability theory, while this
chapter contains the results. This split is a result of handling structure and property separately.
The careful distinction, and the resulting awkward phrasing in Chapter 7 may seem like un-
necessary work. The discussion of decidable equality for computable functions in Section 8.2 is
the first hint that this distinction is actuallymeaningful. Chapter 9 providesmore evidence that
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there is technical value in using a framework that allows a distinction between computability
as structure and computability as property.
The statement that every partial function N → LN is computable is false, as the diagonal
function d : N → LN is not computable. This is the technical reason why we must restrict the
available partial functions. If we want to make any sense of the claim “all partial functions are
computable”, then we must discount partial functions like the above from consideration.
The Rosolini propositions can be seen as an abstract version of the semidecidable propo-
sitions, ignoring computability. The restriction to semidecidable propositions not only fails to
form a dominance, but does not even give a structural dominance without countable choice.
The immediate barrier is that a semidecision procedure comes with a computable function, not
a recursive machine. Therefore, we cannot lift the dependent composition used in Lemma 5.41
to the semidecision procedures, unless we use countable choice.
The obvious solution is to use a recursive machine (or a function with recursive structure)
in place of a computable function. Indeed, this resolves the issue of choice. However, we will
see in Chapter 9, and we saw already in Theorem 8.6 that computable functions and functions
with recursive structure are not interchangeable. In particular, the developments in Section 9.3
are more natural with the above notion of semidecision procedure. Since for our purposes the
notion of semidecision procedure is an intermediate notion between Rosolini structure and
computability, the above notion is more useful. A more focused analysis of semidecidable




There are three basic threads running through this thesis: restricted notions of partiality; the
distinction between structure and property; and the notion of computability. Here we tie these
three threads together. Section 9.1 relates partiality and computability by showing that all com-
putable functions must be Rosolini partial functions. Section 9.2 expands on a remark in Chap-
ter 8 concerning the embedding from recursive machines to N, and resolves the two paradoxes
set forth in the introduction. Finally, Section 9.3 gives an explicit conjecture concerning which
partial functions can be computable, tying together the material of Parts II and III.
9.1 Semidecidable propositions and disciplined maps
We saw in Section 8.4 that there exists non-computable partial functions N ⇀ N. We spent
Chapter 5 foreshadowing this by looking at restrictions of the set of all partial functions. In par-
ticular, we examined the set of Rosolini propositions. In computational contexts, the Rosolini
propositions correspond to the semidecidable propositions.
Indeed, all computable functions are valued in Rosolini propositions. Recall the relation
Rm from Section 7.2 used in the definition of eval(m).
Theorem 9.1. For any machinem : RM and any x, y : N, the types Rm(x, y) and Σ(y : N), Rm(x, y)
are Rosolini propositions.
Proof. For the first type, let g : N + N → 2 be the function which takes value 1 on inr y and 0
otherwise. Define αk
def
= g(runk(m,x)). We have
(αk = 1) ' (g(runk(m,x)) = 1);
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i.e., α takes the value 1 exactly when runk(m,x) = inr y, so Rm(x, y) ' ∃(k : N), αk = 1. Finally,
we truncate α, to get the sequence which takes value 1 only at the first location that α does.
For the second type, let h : N + N→ 2 be the function which is 0 on inl k and 1 on inr k, and
again take αk = h(runk(m,x)). We have that
(αk = 1) ' (Σ(y : N), runk(m,x) = inr y).
Summing over all k : N, rearranging and truncating takes us to
(∃(k : N), αk = 1) ' (∃(y : N),Σ(k : N), runk(m,x) = inr y).
By Lemma 2.19, we then have
(∃(k : N), αk = 1) ' Σ(y : N),∃(k : N), runk(m,x) = inr y.
Corollary 9.2. If f : N⇀ N is computable, then f(n) is a Rosolini partial element for all n : N.
Proof. Since we are trying to prove a proposition, we may assume we have somem : RM com-
puting f . We know that the extent of f(n) is equivalent toΣ(y : N), Rm(x, y), so by Theorem 9.1,
f(n) is Rosolini.
Taking this one step farther, we have
Theorem 9.3. Every computable partial function f : N⇀ N is disciplined with respect to the Rosolini
propositions.
isComputable(f)→ isDis(f).
Proof. By functoriality of truncation, it is enough to show that for any recursivemachinem : RM,
there is a function g : N → LRS(N) such that tame(g) = eval(m). This function g is given by
runk(m). We have the predicate
p(n)
def
= λk.k is least such that runk(n)↓.
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Then p(n) defines a Rosolini structure, and if w : (p(n)(k) = 1), then runk(n) = inrmw for some








In fact, the functions g and h used in the proof of Theorem 9.1 are computable, and so we
may strengthen the above results.
Theorem 9.4. For any machinem : RM and any x, y : N, the types Rm(x, y) and Σ(y : N), Rm(x, y)
are semidecidable propositions.
Corollary 9.5. If f : N ⇀ N is computable, then f is disciplined with respect to the semidecidable
propositions.
We examine the converse of this last result later in the chapter.
9.2 Which total functions can be computable?
Consider the following two versions of “Church’s Thesis”:
Π(f : N→ N), isComputable(η ◦ f),
and
Π(f : N→ N),CompStruct(η ◦ f).
The first is consistent, with the effective topos as a model. The second, however, is false [84, 7].
Let us call the first Church’s thesis and the second strong Church’s thesis. We will follow the
structure of Troelstra’s proof to show that Strong Church’s thesis is false. The proof proceeds
as follows:
· If strong Church’s thesis holds, thenN→ N embeds intoN, and so has decidable equality.
· if N→ N has decidable equality, then there is a functionH : N→ 2 deciding the comple-
ment of the halting problem.
· if strong Church’s thesis holds, then H is computable. Hence, we can recursively decide
the complement of the halting problem.
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· the complement of the halting problem is not recursively decidable.
We break the proof into lemmas below.
Lemma 9.6. Assuming strong Church’s Thesis, there is an embedding ε : (N→ N)→ N such that for
any f ,
{ε(f)} = η ◦ f.
Proof. Given a witness c of Church’s thesis we get a c′ : (N → N) → RM as c′ def= π0 ◦ c. By
definition, we have
eval(c′(f))(n) = (η ◦ f)(n),




Now if ε(f) = ε(g), then
η ◦ f = {ε(f)} = {ε(g)} = η ◦ g.
Finally, η is an embedding, so f = g.
Corollary 9.7. If strong Church’s thesis holds, then N → N has decidable equality. That is, strong
Church’s thesis implies WLPO.
Proof. Assuming strong Church’s thesis, (N→ N) embeds into a type with decidable equality.
Lemma 9.8. If N → N has decidable equality, there is a function H : N → N such that H(x) = 0 iff
{x}(x) is undefined.
Proof. Fix x : N. Define rx : N→ N as
rx(n) =

1 if runn({x}, x) = inr(y) for some y
0 if runn({x}, x) = inl(k) for some k.
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That is, rx(n) = 1 iff {x}(x) returns in under n steps.
By our assumption that N→ N has decidable equality, we have
(rx = λk.0) + ¬(rx = λk.0)
Note that rx = λk.0⇔ {x}(x) = ⊥.
Define H(x) : N→ N by
H(x) =

1 if rx 6= λn.0
0 if rx = λn.0.
We have
H(x) = 0⇔ rx = λk.0⇔ {x}(x) = ⊥.
Theorem 9.9 (Troelstra [84]). Strong Church’s thesis is false.
Proof. If strong Church’s Thesis holds, by Lemma 9.7 we have that N→ N has decidable equal-
ity, and so by Lemma 9.8 we have a computable H : N → N such that H(x) = 0 iff {x}(x) is
undefined. But we saw in Section 8.4 that this function cannot be computable.
As any reasonable notion of partial function includes all total functions, we cannot have
a version of strong Church’s thesis for partial functions. Then in particular, if d is any set of
propositions containing 1, we have
¬Π(f : N→ Ld(N)),CompStruct(f).
However, the weaker form Π(f : N→ Ld(N)), isComputable(f) is consistent for d = isContr. The
above proof hinges on the fact that there is an embedding from the type of functions with
recursive structure to N. In the above, we extend this to get an embedding from (N→ N) to N.
Recall that in Section 8.2 we argued that we cannot expect an embedding from the type of all
computable functions to N. Indeed, while this is true classically, it is contradicted by Church’s
thesis.
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Theorem 9.10. If Church’s thesis holds, then there is no embedding
(
Σ(f : N⇀ N), isComputable(f)
)
→ N.
Proof. We essentially follow the argument for Theorem 9.9. Church’s thesis gives us an em-
bedding (N → N) → Σ(f : N⇀ N), isComputable(f). Extending this along the hypothetical
embedding e gives an embedding (N→ N)→ N. As a subtype of a type with decidable equal-
ity,N→ N has decidable equality. Then, by Lemma 9.8, we have a functionH : N→ N deciding
the halting problem. By Church’s thesis, H is computable, which is impossible.
In the introduction, wementioned four facts about computability theory arising from topos
theoretic and type theoretic intuition.
C1 It is consistent that all total functions N→ N are computable.
C2 It is false that all total functions N→ N are computable.
C3 There is an embedding from the class of computable functions to the natural numbers.
C4 It cannot be proved that there is an embedding from the class of computable functions to
the natural numbers.
C2 is Theorem 9.9, while C3 is an easy consequence of Theorem 7.14. C1 and C4 correspond to
the incompatible principles in Theorem 9.10. We know that Church’s thesis holds in the effec-
tive topos, and so is consistent with pure MLTT (but see the discussion below about univalent
mathematics), and so we have strong reason to expect C1 and C4 to hold. The conflict between
the topos-theoretic and type-theoretic facts has evaporated: C2 and C3 refer to computability
as structure, while C1 and C4 refer to computability as property.
This is not an artefact of univalentmathematics: Indeed, Troelstra’s argumentwas originally
used to show that function extensionality, Church’s thesis and the axiom of choice are mutually
incompatible over HAω. Moreover, in the effective topos, with the Mitchell-Benabou language,
all total functions are computable, and there is no embedding from the class of computable
functions to N, but in the effective topos as a model of MLTT, it is false that all total functions
are computable, and there is an embedding from the class of computable functions to N.
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9.3 Which partial functions can be computable
We have spent several chapters now circling around claims about which partial functions can
be computable. It is time to approach the question directly. We have so far presented two sets of
propositions: the Rosolini propositions, which for this section we call R, and the semidecidable
propositions which for this section we call S. For each of these, two notions of partial function:
the R- and S-partial functions, and the R- and S-disciplined maps. One may expect that the
S-disciplined maps are exactly the computable functions—that the converse of Corollary 9.5
holds, but it seems that this result needs both countable choice and Church’s thesis to prove.
Before presenting the result explicitly (Theorem 9.14), let’s examine the effect of Church’s thesis
on Rosolini structures.
Theorem 9.11. Church’s thesis implies that semidecision functions and Rosolini structures coincide.
That is, assuming Church’s thesis we have
Π(P : U),SemiDecision(P ) ' rosoliniStructure(P )
Proof. We have that
SemiDecision(P )
def
= Σ(f : 2N), isProp〈f〉 × isComputable(f)× (P ' 〈f〉).
By Church’s thesis, we have that isComputable(f) is true for all f : N→ 2, and so we have
SemiDecision(P ) ' Σ(f : 2N), isProp〈f〉 × (P ' 〈f〉),
and the latter is the definition of Rosolini structures on P .
That is, Church’s thesis collapses R and S. So we have
Corollary 9.12. Assuming Church’s thesis,
(a) Rosolini propositions and semidecidable propositions coincide;
(b) The Rosolini structure lifting and the semidecision function lifting coincide;
(c) Rosolini partial functions and semidecidable partial functions coincide;
(d) Rosolini-disciplined maps and semidecidable-disciplined maps coincide.
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Recall Theorem 5.46, which says that under countable choice, the disciplinedmaps coincide
with the partial functions N→ LisRosolini N.
Corollary 9.13. Assuming both countable choice and Church’s thesis, the following all coincide
(a) the Rosolini partial functions, N→ LR N;
(b) the Rosolini-disciplined maps, DisR(N,N);
(c) the semidecidable partial functions, N→ LS N;
(d) the semidecidable-disciplined maps, DisS(N,N);
In short, Church’s thesis and countable choice together unite all the restricted notions of
partial function we have considered so far. There is one notion still missing: the computable
partial functions. Indeed, countable choice andChurch’s thesis together imply that the Rosolini
and computable partial functions coincide.
Theorem 9.14. Assuming countable choice and Church’s thesis, any function N ⇀ N which is valued
in Rosolini propositions is computable.
Proof. ByCorollary 9.13, it is enough to show (under the two assumptions) that any semidecidable-
disciplined map is computable. Since we are trying to prove a proposition, we may assume we
are given an explicit f : N→ LS(N), and show that tame(f) is computable.
Decomposing f and applying Theorem 8.22, we have F : N→ U such that
Π(n : N),
(







By countable choice, then, we have
∥∥∥Π(n : N),(Σ(g : N→ N),CompStruct(g)× (F (n)↓ = g(0)↓))× (F (n)→ N)∥∥∥ .
Again, we are trying to prove a proposition, so we may assume we are given some H of type
H : Π(n : N),
(







We can again reorganize our type, to get a functionM : N→ N such that
Π(n : N), F (n)↓ = {M(n)}(0)↓ × F (n)→ N
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Now we can consider h : N ⇀ N whose extent is given by F (n) and whose value is given by
the map fn : F (n) → N which is the last component of H(n). By definition, this is pointwise
equal to tame(f), so we need a recursive machine computing h. For each n : N, let mn be the
machine for g where F (n)↓ = g(0)↓. Define the machinemwhich acts as follows:
To initializem on input n, initializemn on input 0, and ensure we are in state n. In state n,
to transition, use the transition function of mn and stay in state n. If we have halted in state n,
then we know g(0)↓, and so we have w : F (n)↓, and we can return fn(w).
The only question is whether we can computably access the machines mn, but each mn is
coded byM(n), and by Church’s thesisM is computable.
This gives us an extension of Corollary 9.12.
Theorem 9.15. Assuming both countable choice and Church’s thesis, the following all coincide
(a) the Rosolini partial functions, N→ LR N;
(b) the Rosolini-disciplined maps, DisR(N,N);
(c) the semidecidable partial functions, N→ LS N;
(d) the semidecidable-disciplined maps, DisS(N,N);
(e) the computable partial function Σ(f : N⇀ N), isComputable(f).
9.4 Discussion
We know that countable choice and Church’s thesis hold in the effective topos. While the effec-
tive topos satisfies proposition extensionality, propositions are handled differently in univalent
mathematics than in topos logic. Nevertheless, we have reason to believe the following
Conjecture. It is consistent that all Rosolini-disciplined maps are computable.
To prove this, it is enough to give a model of MLTT with proposition and function exten-
sionality in the univalent style which validates countable choice and Church’s thesis. While
such a model would actually give the stronger result that it is consistent that Rosolini partial
functions are computable, we have intentionally chosen to state the weaker conjecture. The
Rosolini-disciplined maps can be shown to compose even in the absence of choice principles,
and so can be used as a surrogate version of the computable partial functions, even in settings
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where we do not have countable choice, so long as such settings are compatible with Church’s
thesis.
The distinction between the stronger and weaker form of the above conjecture speak to-
wards our goal of understanding how the computable functions fit into a constructive frame-











Lower types embed into higher types and the boxed types can be shown to be closed under com-
position with no choice principles; the dashed lines collapse under Church’s thesis, while the
dotted lines collapse under countable choice. Moreover, the solid line collapses under Kripke’s
schema.
Since we know not all partial functions are computable, a corollary of Theorem 9.14 is that
countable Choice, Church’s thesis and Kripke’s schema are incompatible. The stronger result
that Kripke’s Schema and Church’s thesis are incompatible is already known, but the proof
in [85] goes via a different route.
The argument used in Theorem 9.9 was first given to show that function extensionality,
Church’s thesis and the axiom of choice are mutually inconsistent over HAω. Note that under
choice, Church’s thesis is the truncation of strong Church’s thesis.
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Further work
There are two clear lines of research fromhere: The first is to resolve themodel-theoretic aspects
in order to prove the conjecture, and the second is to develop constructive computability theory
at higher types.
Amodel validating Church’s thesis
A naive sketch of the proof goes as follows: We’ve already shown that Church’s Thesis and
Countable choice imply that the computable partial functions are exactly the Rosolini disci-
plined functions. Moreover, we know that the effective topos models both countable choice
and Church’s Thesis, and so in the effective topos the Rosolini disciplined maps coincide with
the partial computable functions.
Unfortunately, the notion of proposition as element of the subobject classifier, and the no-
tion of proposition as subsingleton type do not quite line up: in fact, it is not the case that all
subsingletons of the effective topos are equal. In other words, proposition extensionality as
stated in Definition 2.28 is not meaningful in the effective topos. There seem to be two ideas
one can use to get around this: one is essentially semantic, and the other syntactic.
On the semantic side, some work has been done By Ian Orton and Andy Pitts [63] on using
partial elements to give a version of the interval and the Kan filling operation used in cubi-
cal type theory. While we don’t expect arbitrary toposes to satisfy the univalence axiom (or
even proposition extensionality), these ideas could be used to rework the effective topos into
a univalent form. Work has already been done on a version of cubical realizability, in work by
Harper and others on computational higher type theory [3, 15]; ideas from here, or the stack
models [26] will likely be of value.
On the syntactic side, it may be possible to interpret our type theory in one that is modeled
by the effective topos. Since we do not use full univalence in the above, and function extension-
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ality is true in the effective topos, the sticking point is proposition extensionality. However,
since propositions in a topos are subobjects of the (specified) terminal object, they do satisfy
proposition extensionality. That is, the only obstacle is that the notions of proposition do not
coincide. It should be possible to give an intermediate type theory with a type Prop of propo-
sitions, along with a decomposition of the truncation operator ‖−‖ : U → U through this. It is
known that truncation forms an idempotent monad [86, 72], so we could add to a type theory
such as CiC rules corresponding to operators | − | : U → Prop and Elem : Prop → U decom-
posing this monad as an adjunction. In particular, if Prop is extensional (that is, P ↔ Q then
P = Q for P,Q : Prop), then Elem would pick a canonical subsingleton for each equivalence
class of subsingletons. The difficulties in this approach arise in two places:
1. First, some care would be required to ensure we correctly capture the relationship be-
tween types that truncation represents. For example, when P (x) is a subsingleton for
all x : X we want Elem(∀(x : X), |P (x)|) to be equivalent to Π(x : X), P (x). Effectively
characterizing such properties may be non-trivial.
2. Second, we need some sort of conservativity result, but it’s not clear how to state such a
conservativity result for this situation.
There’s an additional benefit of the second approach: For mathematicians working in a univa-
lent setting, there’s a general impression that the univalent approach restricted to the level of
sets and propositions is ultimately little more than a more convenient internal language for a
topos. A type theory bridging the gap between univalent type theory and a type theory mod-
eled by general toposes would give technical support to this impression.
Higher-type computation
Despite the close ties between the development of constructive theories and computation at
higher types, there does not seem to be a coherent constructive development of higher-type
computability theory.
The starting point of higher-order computability is PCF, and indeed it is not difficult to give
the operational semantics for PCF constructively: Recall that PCF is the simply type lambda
calculus with base type ι (representing the naturals, with a zero-test ifz and predecessor pred)
and a fixed point combinator Yσ : (σ → σ)→ σ for each type σ. Specifically, we have the term
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grammar
M ::= x | λx.M |M(M) | Yσ(M) |
m | succ(M) | pred(M) | ifz(M,M,M)
with the expected typing rules where ifz is first-order. Note that we take the constants to be
constructors rather than combinators. We have
n ⇓ n λx.M ⇓ λx.M x ⇓ x
M ⇓ n
succM ⇓ n+ 1
M ⇓ 0
predM ⇓ 0
M ⇓ n+ 1
predM ⇓ n
L ⇓ 0 M ⇓ v
ifzLMN ⇓ v




L ⇓ λx.N N [M/X] ⇓ v
LM ⇓ v
The Scott model has interpretation at base type JιK = N⊥, the dcpo of the lifted naturals.
Constructively, we may replace this with our lifting. Note that we cannot constructively use
the poset given by adding an element⊥ below every element of N (with the discrete ordering),
since this type N⊥ can not be shown to be a dcpo constructively. In fact, the two-element poset
with 0 ≤ 1 is a dcpo precisely if excluded middle holds: fix a proposition P and consider the
family u : P + 1 → 2 defined by u(inl p) = 1 and u(inr ?) = 0. Then this is directed as the only
possible non-equal pairs of elements are inl p and inr ?, for some p : P . In this case, we have
u(inr ?) < u(inl p). Then if the supremum of u is 1, then p holds, and if it is 0, then p does not
hold, but as u : 2 one of these cases must hold.
To see an example of how a constructive development of higher-type computability differs
from the classical development, we sketch an example based on themetricmodel of PCF in [28].
There, Escardó presents amodel of PCF in complete ultrametric spaceswherewe use themetric
to count recursive unfoldings—two points are closer if we need to unfold more applications of
the fixed-point combinator to distinguish them. We candefine a logical relation (in fact, a partial
equivalence relation at each type) of extensional equality between elements of this model, and
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then we can use a logical relation between the metric model and the Scott model to show that
the Scott model is a subquotient (the extensional collapse) of the ultrametric model.
The situation is somehow reversed in the classical case, since we must use L(N) instead of
N⊥ to interpret the base type.
PCF and ultrametric spaces
An ultrametric spaceM is ametric spacewhere the distance function d satisfies the strong triangle
inequality,
d(x, z) ≤ max{d(x, y), d(y, z)}.
Real numbers are not essential in the development. We instead avoid the technical issues that
arise from working with the reals by presenting ultrametric spaces via a sequence of equiva-
lence relations.
Definition 9.16. An ultrametric space is a set M equipped with countably many equivalence
relations {=n}n:N such that
1. =n is an equivalence relation for all n;
2. =0 is the total relation;
3. if x =n+1 y, then x =n y;
4. if x =n y for all n, then x = y.
The computational intuition is that x =n ywhen it takes at least n steps to distinguish x and
y. By setting d(x, y) = inf{2−k | x =k y}, we get an ultrametric space in the classical sense from
an ultrametric space as above.
We can define Cauchy sequences, limits and Cauchy completeness in the expected way, and
take a function between ultrametric spaces to to be non-expansive if x =n y ⇒ f(x) =n f(y),
and contractive if x =n y ⇒ f(x) =n+1 f(y).
Then we can prove that the category of complete ultrametric spaces with non-expansive
maps is cartesian closed, and takeX → Y be the (complete) ultrametric space of non-expansive
maps. We can also show that D(X) is a complete ultrametric space for any type X , and give
a version of the Banach fixed-point theorem. From this, we can model PCF in complete ultra-
metric spaces by taking D(N) to interpret the base type, and using the fixed-point theorem to
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interpret fixed-point recursion. Let us use D to denote this model. We can also give an opera-
tional semantics which tracks recursive unfoldings, and show that D is adequate with respect
to this semantics.
The logical relation of extensional equality on D is given by saying that delayk(n) ≈ delayl(n)
for each k, l, n : N, and then lifting this to higher types in the usual way. The quotient of the base
typeDι by this relation is LisRosolini(N). Classically, this is equivalent to L(N), and this quotient
lifts to higher types. Constructively, however, we do not have this equivalence. Worse, we do
not know that LisRosolini(N) is a dcpo, so we cannot use a version of the Scott model replacing
L(N) with LisRosolini(N). In other words, the interpretation of a type σ in the Scott model is not
a subquotient of Dσ.




Here we summarize the material in the chapter discussions: a key point in the univalent per-
spective is the careful distinction between structure and property, while taking the former to
subsume the latter. There is a distinction between property and structure in logical systems
(with propositions as formulas), and some type theories (such as the calculus of inductive con-
structions [21, 25, 41], which has a type of propositions), but there is usually no syntax for
relating structure and property. It is worth pointing out that propositions are not exactly proof-
irrelevant in our framework (as suggested in work leading up to the notion such as [65, 60, 64,
35]), because information can be extracted from them (Lemma 3.13 and [48, 49, 47]).
The difference in treatment of propositions makes direct translation of known results (es-
pecially model-theoretic results) somewhat non-trivial. Internally, a choice between structure
and property is necessary at all points (but the correct choice often presents itself quickly);
externally, we have difficulty using many standard models of MLTT, since they do not satisfy
our version of proposition extensionality. On the other hand, this treatment of propositions
resolves some ambiguity surrounding choice and extensionality (consider Section 3.6 and [58].
Besides the treatment of propositions, there are 3 novelties of univalent mathematics
· The namesake due toVoevodsky, the univalence axiomwhich gives a general extensionality
principle, from which proposition and function extensionality follow.
· The stratification of types into levels determined by the structure of identity types—
contractible types; propositions whose identity types are contractible; sets whose identity
types are propositions, (1-)groupoids whose identity types are sets, 2-groupoids whose
identity types are groupoids, and so on.
· Higher-inductive types (HITs), which allow us to generate a type using not only construc-
tors of that type, but also path constructorswhich inhabit identity types.
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The status of HITs and the relationship between univalence and computational meaning are
active areas of investigation [54, 20, 27, 45, 15, 46, 40, 8, 18, 39]. In the above, we restricted most
of our attention to sets, limiting our use of these new notions to quotient types, (propositional)
truncations, proposition extensionality, and function extensionality.
Our approach to partiality builds off of past approaches to partiality in type theory and
in topos theory. On the type-theoretic side, there are versions of the delay monad [12, 14]. At
its most basic, the delay monad is an intensional approach to partial functions with a clock.
Attempts have been made to make it more extensional by quotienting [16], but this approach
requires countable choice for composability; or generating it as a higher-inductive type [2], but
this approach expands the type of Rosolini partial functions, where we want to restrict the
Rosolini partial functions: we are trying to represent the computable partial functions, and
this type embed into the Rosolini partial functions. On the topos-theoretic side, there is the
notion of dominance [75] which is used to restrict the type of partial elements. Of particular
interest is the set of Rosolini propositions, which is used as a form of semidecidable propositions
in synthetic domain theory [75, 44, 89, 68] and synthetic computability theory [6].
Several traditional taboos can be stated in terms of Rosolini propositions:
· Kripke’s Schema says that all propositions are Rosolini.
· Markov’s Principle is double-negation elimination for Rosolini propositions.
· LPO says that true and false are the only Rosolini propositions.
· WLPO says that Rosolini propositions are either false or not false.
However, in order to show that the Rosolini propositions form a dominance, some version of
countable choice is needed. In fact, we need exactly that we can recover Rosolini structures
from Rosolini propositions (Theorem 5.32). In order for the partial functions arising from a set
of propositions to be composable, they must form a dominance. Since partial functions ought
to compose, we need countable choice to see the Rosolini partial functions as a good notion of
partial function.
Instead, we consider disciplined maps—those partial functions which respect information
from an intensional version of the Rosolini dominance. This intensional Rosolini dominance
(the Rosolini structures) gives a lifting which is equivalent to the delay monad, so we can say
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that a disciplined map from X to Y is a partial function f : X ⇀ Y for which there exists (as a
proposition) a Kleisli function for the delay monad which f factors through.
Since countable choice holds in the setoidmodel, and does not in univalent type theory [26],
it is worth examining how things play out in the setoid approach. We can indeed construct
the delay monad, and then quotient it to arrive at the Rosolini lifting. In general, the setoid
approach has the following advantages over the univalent approach:
1. The setoid approach allows us to use extensionality principles in a simpler version of
MLTT.
2. countable choice holds in the setoid model.
3. The setoid approach fits squarely with the traditional account of constructive mathemat-
ics proposed by Bishop.
However, the univalent approach has the following advantages over the setoid approach
1. The univalent approach allows us to make use of universes; in particular, this allows us
to define more computable functions, and to develop computability in more interesting
domains.
2. Definitions are more uniform, since we use an inductively defined identity type and all
operations are automatically extensional.
3. The univalent perspective fits squarely with a structural account of mathematics, and
extends the traditional account of constructive mathematics.
4. A type of propositions fits naturally into the theory, and clarifies the relationship between
structure and property.
5. There are computer proof systems with native support for formalization in univalent
styles. No such support exists for the setoid approach.
Once we have a notion of partial function, we can turn to computability theory. Much of
the classical theory goes through with little modification, however we introduced a modest
abstraction from Turing machines (the recursive machines) to simplify notation. We developed
computability theory in two forms: with computability as structure (CompStruct(f); Chapter 7),
and with computability as property (isComputable(f); Chapter 8). Many foundational results
in a first course on recursion theory go through for either notion, but a few (such as the Normal
Form Theorem) can only be stated in terms of computability as structure.
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Although every definable total function is computable, the statement that every partial func-
tionN→ LN is computable is false, as the diagonal function d : N→ LN is not computable. As
one goal is to find a good notion of partial function (in particular, we should be able to compose
them) which can consistently be assumed to be the computable partial functions, we need to
restrict the set of all partial functions in some way.
The Rosolini propositions give the ideas for a first attempt, andwe can restrict these to those
which can be witnessed to be Rosolini by a computable function to arrive at the semidecidable
propositions. In any case, neither the Rosolini partial functions nor the semidecidable partial
functions are composable, so we must pass instead to the associated disciplined maps. And
in fact, countable choice and Church’s thesis together imply that the four notions (Rosolini
and semidecidable partial functions, Rosolini disciplined maps and Semidecidable disciplined











Lower types embed into higher types and the boxed types can be shown to be closed under com-
position with no choice principles; the dashed lines collapse under Church’s thesis, while the
dotted lines collapse under countable choice. Moreover, the solid line collapses under Kripke’s
schema.
We know that countable choice and Church’s thesis hold in the effective topos. Although
the handling of propositions in a topos is slightly different than in univalent mathematics, we
therefore have reason to believe the following
Conjecture. It is consistent that all Rosolini-disciplined maps are computable.
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While the obvious model validating this (some univalent version of the effective topos)
should also validate the logically stronger statement that all Rosolini partial functions are com-
putable, the Rosolini-disciplined maps can be shown to compose even in the absence of choice
principles, and so can be used as a surrogate version of the computable partial functions, even
in settings where we do not have countable choice, so long as such settings are compatible with
Church’s thesis. The fact that the effective topos does not model our version of proposition
extensionality leaves us with a direction for future work: find either a way to interpret univa-
lent type theory in the effective topos (or toposes more generally), or come up with a univalent
version of the effective topos.
As our primary aim was not to develop computability theory, but to fit it into a larger con-
text, we have not done a great deal of computability theory. This presents another area for
future work. As higher-typed computability seems particularly well-suited to study from a
constructive view-point (relying on many of the same tools), and there are non-trivial ques-
tions raised almost immediately when we begin the attempt (for example, what does the Scott
model look like constructively?), this seems to be a fruitful area of study.
An important point in the above development is that we can view a notion as either struc-
ture or as property, and the notion will behave differently depending on the view we take. We
illustrated this with Church’s thesis (which is false for computability as structure), and with
our “facts” C1-C4 from the introduction and Section 9.2. We end by emphasizing this point
with another anecdote about the development of Part III: Originally, I had stated Theorem 8.22
in a stronger form, about semidecision procedures, giving the weaker statement as a corollary.
The proof looked the same, except truncation was applied differently. In fact, the proof was
wrong, because I used truncations incorrectly. If I had untruncated all structure in the theo-
rem (using computability structure everywhere) the corresponding result would hold using the
same proof, but Theorem 9.11 would not hold, and Corollary 9.12 would need to be modified
accordingly. In short, each decision about whether to view computability as property or struc-
ture leads to a different outcome. The development of ideas in Sections 8.5 and 9.2 is highly
dependent on proper handling of the distinction between structure and property.
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Index of Symbols
Named operators such as isProp point to the corresponding entry in the main index.
ap, see application on paths
apd, see application, on paths, dependent
app, 182
〈−〉
encoding of PR pairing function, 188
for a binary sequence, 117
{−}, 197
Comp, see also computable function, 206
, see Kleisli extension
◦, 18
CompStruct, see computability structure
defined, see partial element, defined
Dis, see disciplined map
encode, 194
∼, see also homotopy, 37
=, see also type, identity, 19
', see also equivalence, 37
⇔, 31
eval, see also recursive machine, 189
fib, see fiber
happly, 37





isComputable, see computable function
isContr, see contractible type
isDis, see disciplined map
isEquiv, see equivalence
isPR, see primitive recursive function
isProp, see proposition
isRosolini, see Rosolini proposition
isSet, see set




N, see also type of natural numbers, 18
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RM, see recursive machine
rosoliniStructure, see Rosolini structure
run, see also recursive machine, 189
Set, see set
S1, see also homotopy circle, 89
tame, see disciplined map
transport, see transport
| − |, see truncation
‖−‖, see also truncation, 63








axiom of, 108, 107–111, 153–157




Church’s Thesis, 27, 215–221
circle, see homotopy circle
computability
structure, 190







CT, see Church’s Thesis
Curry-Howard interpretation, 23
disciplined map, 162, 213–215
dominance, 127, 142, 141–147







unit of a monad, 106












for a monad, 106
for the lifting monad, 136
Kripke’s Schema, 27, 167, 222
KS, see Kripke’s Schema
lifting, see monad, lifting
Limited Principle of Omniscience, 26, 156,
167
Weak, 26, 156, 206, 216
LPO, see Limited Principle of Omniscience




delay, 120, 117–125, 173
lifting, see also partial element; partial
functions, 133, 133–141
of a dominance, 143
submonad, 107
MP, see Markov’s Principle
partial element, 133
defined, 133
extent of definition of, 133





total, see also partial element, defined,
138
partial functions, 133











Rosolini, see Rosolini proposition
semidecidable, 210, 213–215, 219–221
proposition extensionality, 71




structure, see computability structure,
200–203
relation, see predicate
recursive, see recursive, relation
single-valued, 130, 130–132
retraction, 38
Rosolini proposition, 148, 148–157, 174,
213–215, 219–221




semidecision procedure, see proposition,
semidecidable
set, 30, 83–85

















of natural numbers, 18, 101–105
extended, 117, 117–125, 148–149






universe, 16, 81–82, 147–148
univalent, see univalence
value, see partial element, value of
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